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Abstract 
Global climate change and other sustainability challenges demand a transition to more 
sustainable systems. The long-term and complex nature of such transitions invites long-
term planning, but it also suggests that the future is unpredictable and contested. 
Moreover, the act of envisioning, forecasting and planning for possible futures itself 
influences transitions, because visions and expectations form part of the institutional 
environment that shapes the behaviour of policymakers, innovators and others. Futures 
activities are thus part of the process of transition.  
A key source of technological expectations and visions are published technology futures 
documents, and the processes that are used to develop them. How are such published 
futures created, and why are they produced? How can we assess the quality of published 
futures? What role do computer models play in shaping such futures, and how can 
computer models be used to open up futures to alternative framings and perspectives? 
How can published futures be improved in order to facilitate the governance of transitions 
to sustainability? These are the questions that motivate this PhD, and which are the subject 
of the portfolio of publications and this commentary.  These questions are addressed 
through a case: hydrogen energy technologies.  
A key theme that runs throughout the publications is that the future is a contested space in 
which actors bid for their preferred futures, express their interests and their perspectives, 
and attempt to influence the processes of both appraisal of and commitment to particular 
futures. The thesis presents a variety of ways in which participatory scenario development 
can be combined with other methods to ‘open up’ futures and enable consideration and 
representation of diverse perspectives, deep uncertainty, and plural pathways.  
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Part I: Commentary on the Portfolio of 
Publications 
6
Scenarios and futures in the governance 
of sustainable innovation pathways: the 
case of hydrogen 
 
1 Introduction, research questions and aims of the research 
 
It has long been argued that innovation, and in particular the development and deployment of new 
technologies, can play a central role in overcoming environmental challenges. For many years, this 
debate focused on the development of ‘environmental technologies’ and ‘cleaner production’, with 
technological responses to environmental problems focused on abatement and dispersal of 
pollutants (Berkhout & Gouldson 2003). Today, many scholars and policy advocates think that 
promoting environmental technologies is insufficient to meeting the goals of sustainable 
development. Growing awareness of environmental limits—and particularly the challenges of 
avoiding dangerous climate change—have resulted in the emergence of a new and more ambitious 
perspective on the governance of innovation for sustainability. This new agenda, focused on 
enabling transitions to radically more sustainable futures, has become an increasingly important lens 
through which innovation for sustainability is understood (OECD 2015).  
 
The transitions perspective argues that only systemic shifts in the way that “societal functions” (such 
as transport, housing, food, etc.) are fulfilled can achieve the degree of environmental improvement 
required. Such transitions are ‘systemic’ because they rely on a co-evolutionary dynamic between 
technologies, institutions, social practices and business models, which (together with other 
heterogeneous elements) constitute a ‘socio-technical regime’ (Geels 2004).  
 
This evolution of the environmental technology debate—from a focus on abatement technologies to 
the increasingly prominent frame of transition—has involved both a broadening (in terms of the 
scope of issues understood to be relevant) and a longer time horizon. Both of these make demands 
on the way in which we envisage the future of technology.  
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The broadening from ‘environmental technology’ to ‘transitions’ demands consideration of not only 
technologies and their immediate economic or environmental attributes, but also of the 
heterogeneous assemblages of institutions, actors, networks and other elements that form a socio-
technical regime. This pushes innovators and policymakers to go beyond consideration of 
technologies that will ameliorate environmental problems (but otherwise leave socio-technical 
systems unchanged), and instead suggests more radical and systemic options should be considered, 
involving social, political and institutional change alongside the introduction of new technologies. 
Furthermore, the long timescales required for technological transitions force consideration of a 
longer time horizon than is typically necessary for considering pollution abatement technologies.  
 
Less obviously, a transition perspective embeds the act of envisioning the future within the process 
of change itself (Smith and Stirling 2007). Expectations, visions and beliefs shape transitions: they 
form part of the institutional environment that constitutes (and continually recreates) incumbent 
socio-technical regimes, and are a key part of the establishment of niches that incubate emerging 
alternatives.  
 
It has always been acknowledged that expectations—about both demand and about possible 
scientific or technological possibilities—have been at the heart of innovation processes (Rosenberg 
1976). Applied researchers expect to be able to solve problems; innovators expect to find a market 
for their novel products, processes, or business models and strategies. However, until recently the 
social processes through which expectations were shaped, and through which they shaped 
innovation itself, had been somewhat neglected.  
 
More recently, a richer depiction of the role of expectations in science and technology has been 
developed, largely by sociologists and historians of technology. This literature makes clear that 
visions and expectations of the future help shape innovation processes (Borup et al. 2006), and that 
in particular shared expectations condition the way in which innovation system actors make 
judgements about market opportunities and technological possibilities (Bakker et al. 2011). In the 
context of long-term radical transitions, expectations are understood to be central to the creation of 
‘niches’—protected spaces in which new technologies are developed (Geels and Raven 2006; Smith 
2007). Such niches can be market niches, in which the cost, performance or some other attribute of 
a technology is particularly highly valued; or it can be a ‘technological niche’, in which actors foster 
the technology based on expectations about its social, environmental or future economic 
performance (Agnolucci and McDowall 2007). 
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 On occasion, expectations are translated into ‘promises’, with innovators actively deploying 
expectations in order to win funding and support, and in doing so promising technological advances 
in return (van Lente 1993). Similarly, expectations shape patterns of support for emerging 
technologies, with funding and personnel directed towards areas with high expectations. Thus 
expectations can become self-fulfilling prophesies (van Lente 2012).  
 
This has implications for innovation governance in the context of sustainability challenges: both in 
the straightforward sense that innovators must expect that markets will develop for products and 
services with lower environmental burdens (which typically requires them to have some faith in 
policy processes and political commitment); and also because if expectations and visions matter, the 
question of whose expectations and visions prevail becomes important.  
 
An key source of such expectations are reports and other publications that aim to understand 
possibilities and implications of different futures (Weber 2002), as well as the processes through 
which these published futures are created. In this commentary, I refer to such documents as 
‘published technology futures’ (or henceforth simply ‘published futures’, for brevity), in order to 
distinguish them from diffuse expectations or narratives which, while they may also be present in 
publications, are not set out as explicitly intended representations of the future of a specific 
technology or sector.  
 
Published futures are thus important components of the governance of socio-technical change, and 
they are the focus of this PhD. In the next section, I set out the research questions that the portfolio 
of papers addresses, and provide a brief rationale for each.  
 
 
1.1 Research questions and overall aims 
 
The PhD addresses the role of published futures in the governance of socio-technical change. In 
doing so, I address the following four research questions.  
 
1. How are published technology futures created, and why are they produced? This first 
research question explores the context for published futures, exploring the variety of futures 
exercises and their aims.  
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 2. How can we assess the quality of published futures? Futures play a role in the governance 
of socio-technical change, and it is therefore important to be able to judge the quality of 
such exercises. This question addresses the need for critical reflection on key aspects of 
published futures if they are to inform public policy.  
 
3. What role do computer models play in shaping such futures, and how can computer 
models be used to open up futures to alternative framings and perspectives? Many futures 
are produced using computer simulation tools. Such futures are often given privileged status 
in policy contexts, and there is thus a particular need for careful scrutiny of the processes 
through which they are produced, interpreted and communicated.  
 
4. How can published futures be improved in order to facilitate the governance of transitions 
to sustainability? This final question explores some of the ways in which futures 
practitioners can respond to the quality criteria (explored in question 2) and the challenges 
of integrating simulation models in long-term futures (explored in question 3).  
 
These questions reflect a pragmatic sequence of steps for achieving the overall aim of 
understanding, and contributing to improvements in, the use of futures in the governance of socio-
technical change. That sequence first addresses the range of approaches and goals involved in 
current futures practice; it then asks whether existing practice is good enough given the high stakes 
involved in long-term governance of technology; and finally it addresses how can it be improved. The 
set of questions also reflects aspects of my personal research journey: my involvement with a 
community of energy system modellers has informed an understanding of both the value of and 
limits to computer modelling as a means of understanding and communicating possible futures.  
 
1.2 Overview of the commentary 
 
This commentary follows the sequence of questions raised above, expanding on the rationale for 
and importance of each of them, and providing both key context and the major findings of the 
associated papers. Table 1 shows the portfolio of publications, and the sections of the commentary 
to which they are most relevant.  
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Following a brief introduction to the case of hydrogen, the commentary discusses the diverse ways 
in which published futures are created, and the diverse purposes they serve (in Section 3, relating 
principally to Paper No. 1 and research question 1). I then explore some dimensions of quality of 
published futures (responding to research question 2), in the context of their role in public policy for 
transitions (Section 4, relating to Paper No. 2 and Paper No. 3). This section provides special 
discussion of the role of computer models in developing published futures, reflecting both their 
privileged status in policy debates (see, e.g. (Robinson 1988)) and my own personal research 
experience in applying energy system models (reflecting research question 3). In Section 5, the 
commentary then considers how futures approaches can respond to the challenges set out in the 
previous section, and it discusses my own attempts to produce such futures (in Paper No. 4, 5 and 6, 
responding to research question 4).  
 
The commentary thus puts the portfolio of work in context, and it sets out some of the key results 
and insights from the work. The commentary also aims to show that the portfolio of publications 
presented sits within a wider body of my work around scenarios, modelling and technology 
governance. References to this wider body of work are provided throughout, and a full list of my 




Table 1. The portfolio of publications and associated sections of the commentary 
 Publication Most relevant section 
of the commentary 
1 McDowall and Eames (2006) Forecasts, scenarios, visions, 
backcasts and roadmaps to the hydrogen economy: A review of 
the hydrogen futures literature. Energy Policy 34: 1236-1250. 
3 
2 McDowall (2016) Are scenarios of hydrogen vehicle adoption 
optimistic? A comparison with historical analogies. Environmental 
Innovation and Societal Transitions 20: 48-61. 
4 
3 McDowall (2012) Technology roadmaps for transition 
management: The case of hydrogen energy. Technological 
forecasting and social change 79(3): 530-542. 
4 
4 McDowall and Eames (2007) Towards a sustainable hydrogen 
economy: A multi-criteria sustainability appraisal of competing 
hydrogen futures. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 
32(18): 4611-4626. 
5 
5 Eames and McDowall (2010). Sustainability, foresight and 
contested futures: exploring visions and pathways in the transition 
5 
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to a hydrogen economy. Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management 22(6): 671-692. 
6 McDowall (2014). Exploring possible transition pathways for 
hydrogen energy: A hybrid approach using socio-technical 
scenarios and energy system modelling. Futures 63: 1-14. 
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2 Energy technology futures in action: the case of hydrogen 
In this thesis, I explore the research questions above through a case: hydrogen energy. This section 
therefore provides some brief context for hydrogen, its potential role in a sustainable energy 
system, and its value as a case for addressing the research questions outlined above.  
Hydrogen is a potentially sustainable fuel, and hydrogen technologies have received considerable 
funding support and policy attention in recent years. Hydrogen can be used as a fuel either through 
combustion or in fuel cells, which convert hydrogen into heat and power at high efficiencies. It can 
be produced from a wide array of primary energy sources, including fossil fuels and biomass, and 
also from electricity via the process of electrolysis. Thus a hydrogen energy system can capture and 
store energy generated by intermittent renewable technologies, and use that energy across a wide 
range of energy services, in transport, heat, power and a variety of industrial applications. The broad 
spectrum of possible applications of hydrogen energy, and its potential role as a complement to 
electricity as a zero-carbon energy vector, led to the idea of a “hydrogen economy”, a phrase that 
captures the potential for hydrogen to become a ubiquitous fuel used across the economy.  
Hydrogen energy became a focus of energy innovation policy in industrialised countries towards the 
late 1990s, and as the technology matured it became increasingly possible to see hydrogen as an 
emerging system that would transform the production and consumption of energy. Interest in 
hydrogen has waxed and waned over the years, with various cycles of hydrogen or fuel cell ‘hype’ 
((Schaeffer 1998; Bakker and Budde 2012; Ruef and Markard 2010)). Throughout these 
developments, it is expectations and visions—depictions of possible futures—that have sustained 
and shaped the activities of policymakers, investors, engineers and entrepreneurs (Sovacool and 
Brossmann 2010; Eames et al. 2006).  
There is an abundance of published futures depicting, exploring and advocating different possible 
hydrogen futures. Such futures have applied a wide variety of methods and approaches. As will 
become clear, the future of hydrogen has been a contested space in which different interests have 
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articulated radically different visions and expectations. Hydrogen’s status as an emerging, uncertain, 
contested and potentially transformative technology ensured a great deal of attention from a wide 
variety of actors on the possibilities and implications of hydrogen. Governments, industry groups, 
campaigners and academics have all been involved in efforts to understand and shape the 
development of this emerging technology.  
 
These characteristics make hydrogen a good case study for this project, both because it is of interest 
in itself (as a potentially transformative system innovation), and because the lessons learnt from 




3 Reviewing how published futures are developed 
 
There is a wide variety of approaches to developing scenarios and related futures exercises, and 
reviews have emphasised various dimensions along which these differ (Börjeson et al. 2006; 
Chermack 2004). This literature highlights the different methods, purposes, types of futures 
exercises. A similar diversity is found in scenarios and futures specific to energy, including hydrogen.  
Futures are often intended to be used directly in policymaking processes (Kunseler et al. 2015), 
either to directly inform decisions or to foster ‘conceptual learning’ (Hertin et al. 2009). Such futures 
are produced by a wide range of actors involved in policy debates, including businesses, government 
bodies, visionary individuals and civil society groups. McDowall et al. (2014) describe a variety of 
differing aims of such futures (these are not mutually exclusive: published futures may have several 
of these aims concurrently): 
1. Producing a best estimate of what is expected. This may or may not come with a set of 
uncertainties elaborated around it. A weaker form of this might be an attempt to bound the 
range of possibilities.  
2. Providing “what if” analysis. This is the creation of predictions given a known antecedent, or 
predictions of the impact of a given action or event (what will be the effects of policy x; what 
would happen if there was a rise in y). This might be framed in more or less ‘predictive’ 
language – i.e. “what might happen” – aiming to draw out a plausible but not certain 
implication of a particular event or parameter change. This can be combined with attempts 
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to elicit tacit beliefs and expectations from stakeholders, to draw out possible implications 
of different possible futures.  
3. Illustrating or testing possibility/impossibility, difficulty/ease of reaching particular goals or 
particular futures. This may include providing a sequence of steps necessary to reach a goal. 
4. Opening up thinking to options and/or issues that are thought to be ‘hidden’ by mainstream 
and/or dominant views; including attempts to open up thinking to possible ‘shocks’ (Van 
Notten et al. 2004; Volkery and Ribeiro 2009).  
5. Improving thinking. A number of scenario and modelling exercises argue that they have a 
cognitive benefit, in that they improve the way that people think about the future (e.g. (Craig 
et al. 2002; Chermack 2004; DeCarolis et al. 2012).  
3.1 Futures and governance: between appraisal and commitment 
The aims above all related to futures that are intended to be ‘substantive’ inputs into business or 
policy decisions, either through informing specific decisions or fostering conceptual learning. Some 
futures are also developed to advance a particular goal, rather than inform decision-making. 
Roadmaps and visions are particularly good examples. They are explicitly designed to help bring 
about the futures that they depict.  
The typology developed in Paper 1 (McDowall & Eames 2006) made a distinction between normative 
vs. descriptive futures. Descriptive futures are typically seen as inputs into decision-making, i.e. they 
are descriptive of possibilities, and are used to help decision-makers make an informed appraisal of 
the options. Normative futures advocate particular choices. This distinction echoes Stirling’s 
distinction (Stirling 2008) between ‘appraisal’ and ‘commitment’, in the context of public debate 
about technology choice. Appraisal relates to the evaluation of the relative benefits and risks 
associated with different technology pathways, while commitment describes the multiple ways in 
which commitments to particular technologies are pursued (including obvious commitment 
mechanisms such as direct subsidies). While purely descriptive futures are often seen as informing 
appraisal, normative futures advocate particular choices, and are thus an expression of emerging 
commitments to particular technological pathways. 
 
 
Paper No. 1.  (McDowall and Eames 2006). Forecasts, scenarios, visions, backcasts and roadmaps 
to the hydrogen economy: A review of the hydrogen futures literature. Energy Policy 34: 1236-
1250. 
The first paper of the portfolio (McDowall and Eames 2006) provides a review of 40 
hydrogen futures studies, and explores the diversity of goals and approaches used.  
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However, published futures often blur these distinctions: while many are ostensibly neutral, and 
seek to inform appraisal and choice processes, they often embody implicit commitments to specific 
technology choices. Indeed, while Paper 1 uses a ‘normative/descriptive’ distinction as part of the 
basis for a typology, all forms of futures work can be expected to be shaped by the norms and ideals 
of their creators. Normativity is pervasive in how people think about technology futures (Rip 2013).  
 
It is thus unsurprising that many published futures that are self-described as impartial, or that avoid 
explicit endorsement of particular choices, carry clear preferences. In some cases, it is more obvious 
that futures are being used to advance a particular agenda, used to ‘bid’ (Berkhout 2006) for a 
particular future. In 2010, a study published by a coalition of businesses and NGOs presented itself 
as a neutral and descriptive piece of analysis: it was entitled “A portfolio of powertrains for Europe: 
a fact-based analysis”, strongly signalling its descriptive rather than normative credentials. However, 
as a participant-observer in various hydrogen stakeholder forums, I observed the way in which the 
document was widely seen by stakeholders as a pitch by pro-hydrogen firms and interests to 
promote the role of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles alongside other low-carbon vehicle options.  
 
That firms should seek to present analytic advocacy as pure analysis is to be expected. Less 
obviously, normativity can be seen to pervade attempts to produce objective analytic work. My own 
observations of energy system modelling practice (some of which is written up in (McDowall et al. 
2014)) confirm that social norms about what constitutes reasonable living, driving, and heating 
practices become written into computer models, which then constrain and inform the way that 
people think about long-term future possibilities. This constitutes an often unconscious process that 
demonstrates prior commitments to specific forms of socio-technical arrangement. For example, the 
UK MARKAL/TIMES energy system models incorporate assumptions about the characteristics a 
vehicle must have in order for consumers to find it acceptable that are explicitly tied to current 
vehicle choice norms and preferences (see (McDowall and Dodds 2012)). Similarly, socially-shaped 
judgements about what forms of governance intervention are desirable and legitimate inform 
decisions about the plausibility of particular types of change. For example, judgements about the 
kinds of governance action that are legitimate and acceptable influence the choices that modellers 
make in parameterising scenarios. These normative dimensions to descriptive futures often remain 
hidden and unacknowledged, and may frequently be tacit even to modellers or scenario developers 
themselves (see, e.g. DeCarolis et al 2012).  
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So, while the distinction between ‘normative’ and ‘descriptive’ futures is useful in distinguishing 
between more or less explicit commitments in futures documents, it does not imply that ‘descriptive 
futures’ are a neutral space. Clearly, futures are developed not just to inform decisions, but can also 
be developed with more obviously political goals (this indeed reflects wider patterns in the use of 
evidence in policymaking, which recognises political uses (Hertin et al. 2009)). This is a key theme 
that runs through the portfolio of work associated with this commentary: futures are often used 
both for appraisal that informs technology choice, and are also used (explicitly, implicitly and even 
unconsciously) as part of the process of forming commitments to specific technology futures.  
 
3.2 Engaging with futures: ontological divides 
 
There are further, deeper, distinctions in the multiple ways in which diverse actors (scholars, 
activists, marketers, policymakers, visionaries, and so on) develop published futures. Those 
envisioning possible futures often differ in the underlying philosophies of science to which they 
adhere. Positivists focus on the presumed existence of general laws governing social and physical 
processes, and in examining possible futures they focus on predictive depictions of quantitative 
variables and their relative probabilities (Konrad et al. 2017). Such scholars have developed 
elaborate methodological repertoires for exploring quantifiable futures, yet pay relatively little 
attention to those aspects of socio-technical change that cannot be represented in system models, 
such as cultural meanings. The purpose of futures work here is often seen as decision-support, and 
the reduction of uncertainty about possible futures and outcomes. Since the obvious failures of long-
term planning and forecasting in the mid- and late-20th centuries, it has become common for futures 
practitioners with a positivist inclination to express such predictive analysis in language that avoids 
explicit forecasting (McDowall et al. 2014). Instead, such studies tend to talk of ‘scenarios’, 
‘outlooks’, ‘projections’, and so on. Nevertheless, what Robinson ((1990), p. 821) calls the 
“predictive flavour” of such studies remains clear.  
 
In contrast, constructivists and interpretivists use futures to critique and open up dominant 
narratives (McDowall and Geels 2017). Sardar (2010) elaborates this perspective, arguing that 
futures should be understood as ‘futureless’, in the sense that the future is fundamentally 
unknowable. Futures work is therefore about uncovering the meanings, interests and social 
structures underpinning different representations of the future and their attendant policy 
implications. Such perspectives often have little interest in the likelihood or otherwise of specific 
aspects of envisaged futures. As Konrad et al. (2017) put it: “The broader task … is to …increase the 
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process of critical thought about alternative trajectories of change without falling prey to the 
impossible task of predicting …the direction of technological advance…” (p. 481). 
This PhD does not seek to resolve such debates. Rather, it adopts a practical and policy-oriented 
perspective that emphasises the value of revealing the deep assumptions and worldviews that 
underpin published futures, while also exploring the possible implications and plausibility of 
hydrogen futures.  
3.3 Summary 
This section of the commentary – and Paper No. 1 of the portfolio – provide a response to the first 
research question motivating this thesis (“How are published technology futures created, and why 
are they produced?”). Published futures are produced using a range of methods and for a variety of 
purposes, which vary in the degree to which they explicitly endorse particular choices or beliefs 
about the future. A distinction between normative futures (advancing a particular goal) and 
descriptive futures (exploring future possibilities) is useful in understanding published futures, but it 
also clear that all futures exercises are shaped by the norms, beliefs and desires of their creators.  
4 Evaluating the quality of published futures as evidence for policy 
Since futures are used as tools of both appraisal and commitment in the governance of transitions, it 
is reasonable to ask how we can assess their quality. In McDowall 2012 (Paper No. 3) I articulate 
quality criteria for a specific form of published futures – technology roadmaps. The quality criteria 
developed in that paper are specific to roadmapping – an explicitly normative approach that aims to 
foster a particular future – and cannot be directly used for a wider body of futures work. Indeed, the 
diversity of types of technology futures used in public policy processes suggests that attempts to 
develop comprehensive quality criteria that would encompass the full range of futures work would 
be well beyond the scope of this thesis (see also Von Schomberg et al 2005). Rather than attempt to 
do this, in this section I address Research Question 2 by focusing on two quality criteria that can be 
applied to a wide range of diverse types of published futures. These two criteria are:  
1. The plausibility of futures
2. The extent to which published futures contribute to ‘opening up’ futures to possible
alternative perspectives, value judgements and uncertainties.
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4.1 Assessing plausibility and possibility 
There has been a lengthy debate between scenario developers interested in establishing relative 
probabilities of different futures, and those that reject the use of probabilities as irrelevant in 
scenario planning (Ramírez and Selin 2014; Morgan and Keith 2008). Much of this debate appears to 
rest on different conceptions of the primary purpose and roles of futures thinking, and I do not 
elaborate the arguments here. Rather, I draw attention to the point of agreement among these 
authors: regardless of the position taken with respect to the usefulness of assigning probabilities to 
futures, it is almost universally acknowledged that published futures must depict futures that are 
possible1. Thus the first quality criterion is “plausibility”, i.e. showing that a given future is possible.  
Unfortunately, it turns out that assessing the possibility status of complex socio-technical futures is 
not straightforward: while one can exclude futures that clearly violate well-established scientific 
principles, a great many imaginable futures cannot be easily shown to be possible or not possible. 
Betz (2010) discusses this issue, arguing that to say that something is ‘possible’ is to say that it is 
“consistent with what we know”, and that it is thus justified with respect to a given body of 
knowledge.  
In McDowall (2016; Paper No. 2) I make use of Betz’ work to show how historical analogies can 
inform judgements about the plausibility of the rate of technological transition depicted in scenarios 
of hydrogen fuel cell vehicle adoption. This is similar to the argument from Wiek et al. (2013), which 
uses historical precedents as a basis for judging the plausibility of a scenario. In Paper No. 2, I 
compared a set of hydrogen futures scenarios with historical analogies – historical cases in which 
alternative fuel vehicles have diffused. The paper finds that as a whole, published studies setting out 
the future of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles have been optimistic about the rate at which hydrogen 
might be adopted. I also found that very rapid vehicle transitions are possible, but have occurred 
historically under rather extreme political and economic conditions. For example, very rapid 
adoption of pure-ethanol vehicles took place in Brazil in the late 1970s and early 1980s under a 
government programme – but this was in the context of a military government and national 
ownership of the energy and fuel distribution industries. The observation here is that any scenario 
1 While it is recognised that science fiction has a role in stimulating socio-technical visions, such futures are 
self-consciously fictional, and are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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depicting alternative fuel deployment as rapid as this begs questions about its plausibility in political 
terms.  
Paper No. 2 suggests two conclusions of relevance here. First, the paper shows the direct value of 
historical analogies in clarifying what Betz calls the ‘possibility status’ of scenarios. Second, and 
perhaps more usefully, the paper shows that contrasting historical analogies with futures can 
generate insights into hidden assumptions and issues (for example, if a scenario asserts that rapid 
transitions are possible, what kinds of socio-political developments must be imagined in order to 
make this plausible?). 
My work here is a contribution to an emerging body of literature that uses historical analogies to 
interrogate possible futures (see, for example, (Höök et al. 2012; Wilson et al. 2012; Sovacool and 
Geels 2016)). However, there are also risks with this approach. Kunseler et al. (2015) argue that 
using historical analogy to affirm the plausibility of futures can undermine creativity of futures 
thinking, and thus unnecessarily constrains futures to reproductions of historical patterns. My 
response to this argument is to use historical analogies not just as a “plausibility test”, but as a 
mechanism for revealing hidden assumptions and issues implicit in published futures. 
4.2 Opening up, closing down 
Many forms of technology futures are aimed at informing decision-making. In the context of the 
governance of innovation, such futures represent forms of, or contributions to, appraisal processes, 
in which alternative possible options are compared. Several of the publications in the portfolio draw 
on the distinction made by Stirling between “opening up” and “closing down” in the appraisal of 
technology options (Stirling 2008, 2006). Stirling’s work highlights the value of processes that open 
up appraisal, which includes attention to: 
- The extent to which alternative possible perspectives are explored and represented
- The extent to which the degree of ignorance and uncertainty is made clear
Stirling’s emphasis on the need for opening up appraisal is based on the observation that wholly 
objective appraisal is impossible: in a plural society, it is not necessarily possible to identify a 
uniquely rational social preference ordering of a set of options (Arrow 1950). Any attempt to identify 
a ranking of options is thus likely to rest on framing assumptions (Stirling 1999). This suggests that 
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futures should be interrogated to reveal and explore their framing assumptions, and how the 
apparent desirability of particular futures is informed by, and can change with, the particular 
perspective used. In other words, any attempt to explore the desirability and legitimacy of published 
futures should rest on an acknowledgement of the social nature of knowledge and evidence 
production. This is particularly important given our earlier recognition that the construction of 
possibilities is suffused with normative assumptions and goals. Rather than aiming to arrive at a neat 
social preference ordering across a range of possible futures, analysts should seek to ‘open up’ 
futures appraisal to examine relative desirability under different assumptions and perspectives. 
Hence, the second general quality criterion is the extent to which published futures (and the 
associated processes) enable ‘opening up’.  
Clearly, this is particularly important where published futures are being developed in order to inform 
policy decisions. Do such futures enable understanding of how the performance of different futures 
might vary under divergent perspectives? Or do they present as universal and fact-based a narrow 
perspective that is representative of a particular interest group?  
A further issue in opening up appraisal relates to the degree to which futures are transparent about 
the nature and scale of uncertainties and ignorance involved. Many commentators on published 
futures activities, particularly scenarios and modelling, have argued for clarity in the way in which 
uncertainties are described and communicated (Morgan and Keith 2008; Funtowicz and Saltelli 
2014; Kloprogge et al. 2007; Mastrandrea et al. 2010). Yet despite such broad agreement on the 
importance of effectively communicating uncertainties, many futures exercises do not do this well. 
For example, I have explored the communication of uncertainties arising from futures work using the 
MARKAL energy system model in the UK, and documented weaknesses in the communication of 
uncertainties (Trutnevyte et al. 2016).  
In Paper No. 3, I observed that roadmappers face something of a dilemma. On the one hand, an 
open, participatory process that fully acknowledges uncertainty and the contested and diverse set of 
possible futures has greater legitimacy as an input into decision-making; but on the other hand, a 
process that purports to have achieved consensus and that downplays uncertainty is more likely to 
motivate and catalyse the alignment and action of key actors, and thus achieve its goals. This echoes 
the observation of Hulme and Dessai (2008): “We therefore suggest that using … scenarios in a social 
learning process may actually require a degree of illusion about their predictive skill before 
expectations about what the scenarios offer decision-makers can be more appropriately calibrated.” 
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(p. 6). But while Hulme and Dessai’s concerns are practical (relating to participant motivation), the 
concerns for roadmappers are more problematic, and relate to the way that roadmaps straddle both 
appraisal and commitment. The way out of this dilemma is for roadmaps to be part of a wider 
iterative and reflexive process, allowing for both ongoing revision of roadmaps as well as the pursuit 
of diverse possible pathways.  
4.3 Modelled futures: assessing plausibility and openness 
The research underpinning the portfolio of publications has been informed by my involvement in a 
number of modelling activities related to possible future hydrogen energy systems. Models are 
widely used in exploring possible energy futures, and often play a powerful role in shaping shared 
expectations.  
In policy contexts, models are often given privileged status (Robinson 1992; Porter 1995) and are 
treated as having a different epistemic status than qualitative futures developed by groups of 
stakeholders. This is sometimes because modelling enables a scientific discourse to be evoked, 
which appeals to norms about the use of scientific and objective information in policy; It is also 
sometimes because the modelling often defies scrutiny: only those with appropriate training can 
question the results.  
Furthermore, the attractiveness of models to policymakers itself generates strong instrumental 
pressures on those generating futures using models (McDowall and Geels 2017). Experience in a 
Paper No. 2. McDowall (2016) Are scenarios of hydrogen vehicle adoption optimistic? A 
comparison with historical analogies. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 20: 48-
61. 
This is the most recent paper in the portfolio, having been published in September 2016. 
The paper discusses how historical analogies can be used to inform judgements about the 
plausibility of scenarios.  
Paper No. 3. McDowall (2012) Technology roadmaps for transition management: The case of 
hydrogen energy. Technological forecasting and social change 79(3): 530-542. 
This paper deals with a particular form of futures exercise, the roadmap, and develops an 
approach to evaluating the quality of roadmapping processes in the context of transition 
governance.  
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wide array of fields of relevance to sustainability transitions (e.g. (Schneider 1997), including my own 
work (McDowall et al. 2014), makes clear that those carrying out modelling are often influenced by 
instrumental pressures to emphasise the importance and reliability of their findings, and have 
incentives to downplay uncertainties.  
 
In the above, I set out two broad areas against which the quality of published futures can be judged. 
I now explore how well modelled futures stack up against those criteria, and in doing so, I address 
Research Question 3.  
 
4.3.1 Models and plausibility 
 
First, we can ask about the extent to which models are useful for determining the ‘possibility status’ 
of futures. Again following Betz (2010), we can see that models can often show that particular 
futures are not possible, because consistent accounting and quantification can show when scenarios 
breach fundamental physical limits. Yet it is also clear that many well-established models can easily 
be used to produce highly implausible outcomes. As tools for establishing possibility, models can 
thus have a limited, though important role: they can help to eliminate some futures by showing 
them to be not possible, but futures produced with even a sophisticated model should not be 
assumed to be possible simply because they can be modelled.  
 
4.3.2 Models and opening up 
 
Optimisation models, such as the MARKAL/TIMES energy system models that I have worked with, 
are programmed to identify the ‘optimal’ energy system, subject to a set of constraints (optimal, in 
these models, is defined in purely techno-economic terms). They thus operate within a narrow 
framework, ignoring many aspects of possible futures that are clearly important (such as equity and 
justice issues) and making strong assumptions about the commensurability of costs that may be 
difficult in practice to justify (e.g. trading off costs of new technologies against costs associated with 
reduced delivery of energy services such as heating). Such models are typically used as tools for 
‘closing down’ appraisal of possible future options, enabling policymakers to justify specific 
technology choices (e.g. (LCICG 2014)), and even as vehicles for the expression of prior commitments 
(e.g. (BERR 2008)).  
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However, it would be a mistake to assume that models of this kind are inevitably associated with 
closing down appraisal, in contrast to participatory processes that enable opening up. Stirling has 
highlighted that relatively opaque analytic processes, such as models, are not necessarily any more 
prone to acting as vehicles for ‘closing down’ appraisal than are participatory processes involving 
stakeholder engagement (Stirling 2008), since the latter may succumb to similar pressures to close 
down appraisal, expressed through choice of participants, framing of participatory processes, and so 
on.  
 
Moreover, we can identify ways in which even highly closed technical methods can be used in a way 
that facilitates opening up. Betz discusses the role of models in the context of climate change 
scenarios. His work argues that it is often difficult to use models to definitively determine the 
‘possibilisitic status’ of scenarios, since the validity of models in open systems is weak (Hodges and 
Dewar 1992; Windrum et al. 2007; Ormerod and Rosewell 2009; Oreskes et al. 1994). But he notes 
that models may play a different role: by uncovering possible scenarios that would otherwise not be 
imagined: “simulating complex systems based on their microdynamics might suggest possibilistic 
hypotheses we have not even thought about” (Betz 2010, p. 98).  
 
In this case, a model can be seen as opening up decision contexts to new perspectives and 
possibilities, by bringing to light possibilities that had previously been overlooked. While a linear 
optimisation model such as MARKAL/TIMES is typically emblematic of relatively closed form of 
analysis, we can see here that sensitive use of such tools can contribute to opening up wider debate 
and dialogue about possibilities, options and choices. The question is then how to use models to 
inform futures exercises that enable opening up. I present one attempt to respond to this challenge 




This section has addressed Research Question 2 (“How can we assess the quality of published 
futures?”). In particular, the section has articulated the rationale for two key criteria: i) plausibility 
and ii) the degree to which appraisal can be ‘opened up’; and it has explored some of the challenges 
in assessing futures against these criteria.  
 
The section has also explored the particular role of computer models in shaping published futures, 
responding to Research Question 3 (“What role to computer models play in shaping such futures, 
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and how can computer models be used to open up futures to alternative framings and 
perspectives?”). This work highlighted that models do not provide a simple ‘plausibility test’, and 
noted that models can provide a route to ‘opening up’ futures by highlighting possibilities that had 
previously been overlooked.  
 
The next section turns to the challenges of improving the development of published futures.  
 
5 Building and learning from futures for energy transitions  
 
I have argued that published futures should facilitate opening-up in the appraisal of technology 
options. What practical steps can be taken to achieve this? The final three papers of the portfolio 
each address an alternative approach to building and using scenarios to inform sustainability 
transitions in the context of hydrogen energy, and they thus respond to Research Question 4 (“How 
can published futures be improved in order to facilitate the governance of transitions to 
sustainability?”). These different methods reflect different rationales for conducting scenario 
exercises, and attempt to respond to some of the quality criteria, and common weaknesses in 
scenario approaches, discussed in section 4. As a result, the approaches adopted are intended to 
respond to some of the concerns set out in the previous section. 
5.1 Participatory backcasting and vision appraisal 
 
The first two papers (both co-authored with Malcolm Eames) set out a process in which normative 
‘visions’ of a hydrogen economy were developed drawing on a participatory workshop. These visions 
were then subjected to a process of multi-criteria mapping (MCM), which revealed the divergent 
value judgements and perspectives that conditioned beliefs about the relative sustainability of the 
different futures. This process is described in detail in Paper No. 4 (McDowall & Eames 2007). The 
next stage in the process was a participatory backcasting exercise, which aimed to explore how such 
futures might be achieved. These processes aimed to a) use futures as a space for enabling dialogue 
and debate about socio-technical priorities and possibilities; b) develop pathways informed by 
different governance contexts and insights from the literature on long-term change in socio-
technical systems.  
 
This work thus directly responds to the requirements that foresight knowledge should:  
24
- Be plausible, in ‘socio-technical’ terms, with the use of archetypal transition pathways 
derived from detailed case studies of historical technological transitions.  
- Enable opening up to alternative perspectives, in both the sense that the process was 
developed through a participatory process, but also that the visions were subjected to a 
detailed participatory evaluation process using multi-criteria mapping (MCM).  
 
The MCM work found that the sustainability of hydrogen was deeply contested. In assessing the 
relative sustainability of different hydrogen futures, stakeholders identified many issues familiar to 
techno-economic analysts concerned with energy systems: such as costs, feasibility, life-cycle CO2 
performance, uncertain oil prices and policies, and so on. Stakeholders with different perspectives 
also differed on fundamental issues of how technology futures should be judged, raising issues that 
went far beyond techno-economic concerns or uncertainties. These related to concerns about 
relevant scales of governance and the resulting distribution of political power and control of energy 
systems, and concerns relating to the relationship of certain technologies with particular power 
structures and interests (such as a perceived reliance of nuclear energy on a more heavily militarised 
state). These more fundamental differences in beliefs about the nature of society-technology 
relationships shaped participants’ appraisals, and suggest that divergent assessments of 
sustainability in the context of hydrogen ultimately involve deeply political choices in the face of 





Portfolio of publications: papers 4 and 5.  
 
McDowall & Eames (2007) Towards a sustainable hydrogen economy: A multi-criteria 
sustainability appraisal of competing hydrogen futures. International Journal of Hydrogen 
Energy 32(18): 4611-4626. 
This paper applies multi-criteria mapping (MCM) to a set of hydrogen visions, 
developed through a participatory process.  
 
Eames and McDowall (2010). Sustainability, foresight and contested futures: exploring 
visions and pathways in the transition to a hydrogen economy. Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management 22(6): 671-692. 
This paper elaborates a participatory backcasting approach to building scenarios, 
informed by theoretical frameworks drawn from transitions studies.  
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5.2 Scenarios and interdisciplinary dialogue: integrating qualitative and quantitative 
dimensions 
 
The exercises published in Paper No. 4 and Paper No. 5 (Eames and McDowall 2010) provided a 
valuable and novel approach to opening up appraisal, by combining participatory scenarios 
development with multi-criteria mapping. However, I also felt that the resulting scenarios lacked the 
techno-economic consistency that models are well placed to provide. This led me to develop an 
approach to linking quantitative modelling with qualitative and participatory scenario approaches.  
 
The final paper in the portfolio (Paper No. 6; McDowall 2014) is the result of that effort. In Paper No. 
6, I tackle the challenges associated with applying both qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
thinking about the future of hydrogen energy. Advocates of quantitative methods typically argue 
that these have greater usefulness, and also that they avoid material infeasibilities – such as techno-
economic internal inconsistencies (see e.g. discussion in (Fontela 2000)). Yet as previously discussed, 
such tools are often used in a way that obscures both the partial and value-laden nature of the 
resulting scenarios, as well as the scale of the uncertainties and choices involved.  
 
Several authors describe a need for ‘integration’ of different forms of knowledge across disciplines 
to enable modelling to more effectively support the pursuit of sustainable development objectives 
(e.g. (Harris 2002)). Others have described the necessity of transdisciplinarity and the integration of 
social and natural sciences in producing foresight knowledge.  
 
In Paper No. 6, I describe an approach of creating ‘dialogue’ between narrative scenarios and 
models. The idea here is to use the strengths of both approaches, while highlighting where each may 
have shortcomings. This process generates additional learning into possibilities, and often generates 
insights into previously tacit assumptions or beliefs held about what constitutes likely or desirable 
outcomes – both those held by stakeholders and those built into models. Thus a dialogic process 
between narrative scenarios can help scenario approaches to be more effective in their roles as 
“learning machines” (Berkhout et al. 2002).  
 
The emphasis on dialogue between different approaches has been partly inspired by the work of 
Cuppen (Cuppen 2010), who used the phrase ‘constructive conflict’ in the context of a participatory 
process of deliberation. It also has some resonance with Barry’s work on interdisciplinarity (Barry et 
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al. 2008), which highlights the possible value in an ‘agonist-antagonist’ mode of interdisciplinarity, 






The papers discussed in this section of the commentary provide some answers to the fourth and 
final research question (“How can published futures be improved?”). The work in this section of the 
thesis has described how futures can be used to create opportunities for dialogue and deliberation 
over the direction of socio-technical change, and how modelled futures can be used in dialogue with 
future narratives derived from participatory processes. The work has thus demonstrated ways in 
which futures can be opened up to diverse perspectives.  
 
6 Conclusions  
 
The PhD has addressed each of the research questions: highlighting the range of aims and types of 
futures methods; developing and applying quality criteria for roadmaps in particular and for 
published futures in general; exploring the role that computer models can play in opening up 
futures; and it has suggested some ways in which technology futures can be improved. In this final 
section, I turn to the overall conclusions that can be drawn from across those research questions and 
the portfolio of publications as a whole. The PhD delivers two broad categories of conclusions – the 
first related to the specific case of hydrogen, and a second, broader set of conclusions on learning 




Portfolio of publications: paper 6.  
 
McDowall (2014). Exploring possible transition pathways for hydrogen energy: A hybrid 
approach using socio-technical scenarios and energy system modelling. Futures 63: 1-14. 
While participatory scenarios are valuable, a consistent challenge for scenarios is the 
integration of qualitative approaches and quantitative modelling. This paper articulates a 
novel approach that puts these alternatives into ‘dialogue’.  
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6.1 The future of hydrogen 
 
The work underpinning the portfolio of publications resulted in a set of conclusions specific to 
hydrogen. These are contributions to the debate around the possible role of hydrogen in future 
energy systems. Here, I provide a short summary of some of these conclusions.  
1. The sustainability of hydrogen is contested: while hydrogen is often framed as ‘sustainable’, 
and is typically included in e.g. statistical measures of “clean energy” innovation (such as 
R&D funding or low carbon patents), people disagree considerably about whether and under 
what circumstances a hydrogen energy system is indeed sustainable. There are two 
important points here. First, hydrogen can be used in a wide variety of systems with very 
varied environmental performance, suggesting that any assertion of a hydrogen system as 
automatically sustainable is misleading. Second, people disagree about how best to judge 
which hydrogen systems are sustainable: there are contested values and different beliefs 
about key uncertainties that defy any attempt to overcome divergent opinions through 
analytic data gathering and research (Paper No. 4).  
2. Hydrogen researchers and policy advocates may have overlooked the potential for hydrogen 
internal combustion engines to facilitate a more rapid transition than would otherwise be 
plausible (Paper No. 2). 
3. Despite a proliferation of technology roadmaps for hydrogen, many of these have been of 
rather low-quality. There is potential for technology roadmapping to play a more 
constructive role in facilitating the development of hydrogen energy systems (Paper No. 3).  
4. Model based analysis depicting hydrogen as an attractive option has tended to make implicit 
assumptions about strong co-ordination capabilities between groups of relevant actors, 
beyond that typically observed in emerging technology innovation systems. Scenarios that 
include significant business model innovation (such as through alternative modes of car 
ownership and use) may offer an important way of circumventing some of these co-
ordination barriers (Paper No. 6).  
 
6.2 Published technology futures and innovation governance 
 
Looking beyond hydrogen, the insights and approaches developed in this thesis can be applied more 
generally to the governance of innovation for sustainability. As I made clear in the introduction, 
technological expectations and beliefs play a direct role in the development of socio-technical 
change: they actively influence the choices that innovators, researchers and governments make in 
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developing new technologies. It is no wonder that the published technology futures that reflect and 
influence such expectations are increasingly seen as potential tools of governance of innovation 
(Konrad et al. 2017). Alongside governments, a wide variety of actors attempt to influence 
expectations, by promoting futures that correspond to their interests (Pollock and Williams 2010). 
One means by which they do this is formal, published futures: documents that depict, describe and 
explore possible futures.  
 
The work in this thesis, addressing Research Question 1, has showed that actors employ a wide 
variety of techniques, and produce futures both to inform decision making and to assert a particular 
future. While they vary in the extent to which they explicitly endorse particular choices, they 
inevitably express the perspectives and concerns of their producers. The future is thus a contested 
space in which actors bid for their preferred futures, express their interests and their perspectives, 
and attempt to influence the processes of both appraisal of and commitment to particular futures.  
 
In that context, I argued that it is important to examine the quality of published futures, since they 
are a part of the institutional context that shapes technological change. Critical examination of 
published futures in this way is important, both because it can help governments to direct innovative 
activities towards more sustainable outcomes, and because scrutiny of published futures can help to 
prevent powerful incumbent actors from dominating the way in which the future is understood and 
represented. I identified two quality criteria that can be applied to a wide range of published futures: 
first, they should be plausible, and second, they should enable consideration of alternative 
perspectives, and be open and honest about the scale of uncertainties involved.  
 
My work devoted particular attention to computer models, since published futures produced using 
models are often seen as more ‘scientific’, and they carry greater influence in policy than futures 
produced using alternative forms of foresight knowledge. Yet it is clear that, despite their many 
strengths, models do not provide a simple ‘plausibility test’, nor do they necessarily enable opening 
up of futures to alternative perspectives. Subjecting modelled futures to greater scrutiny is thus 
important in avoiding a misleading sense of certainty about the likely or desirable direction of socio-
technical change. A conclusion from the work is that a key benefit of models is often overlooked: 
modelling may reveal possible futures that had previously not been considered, and in doing so they 
can contribute to opening up consideration of a wider range of futures.  
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Finally, the thesis has explored some ways in which published technology futures can be improved. 
In particular, the set of papers provides three specific methodological contributions that facilitate 
both the construction and critique of published futures in the context of governance of long-term 
transitions. All of these mechanisms help to foster reflection on goals, possibilities, contingencies 
and options, and create opportunities for revealing tacit assumptions.  
 
1. The irreducibly political nature of disagreements about the sustainability or desirability of 
different futures highlights the importance of opening up futures to multiple diverse 
perspectives. Participatory futures exercises can be usefully combined with multi-criteria 
participatory appraisal to facilitate the process of ‘opening up’ a policy area to divergent 
perspectives (as illustrated in Paper No. 4). Through combining participatory visioning and 
multi-criteria mapping, decision-makers and others can be informed about not only the 
apparent performance of possible hydrogen systems under different perspectives, but also 
the fault-lines and beliefs that preclude a simple analytic identification of a ‘best’ option.  
2. The work recognises the value of models as tools that can help futures work by revealing 
where scenarios may contain material infeasibilities, and by revealing previously overlooked 
possibilities. However, models are also prone to misuse and misinterpretation. The work in 
this portfolio of publications (Paper No. 6) concludes that a ‘constructive conflict’ approach, 
in which models and model runs are confronted with stakeholder-based narrative scenario 
approaches, can be a successful way of harnessing the benefits of models in transition 
scenarios while reducing the risks that models then serve to unduly close down the futures 
generated.  
3. The work has shown the benefits of using historical analogies to learn about the plausibility 
of particular futures (Paper No. 2). The ‘constructive conflict’ between narratives and models 
referred to above relates to a dialogue between two different approaches to thinking about 
the future. Similarly, the work with historical analogies shows that there is value in creating 
dialogue between specific elements of scenarios and historical analogies.  
 
 
The overall conclusion is that technology futures are not a neutral space – they carry within them 
the values, perspectives and often tacit assumptions of their creators. Opening them up to scrutiny – 
through participatory processes, through engagement with formal modelling frameworks, and 
through comparison with historical analogies – can result in learning both about future possibilities, 
but also about the present-day perspectives and assumptions that are relevant for decision-making. 
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In doing so, opening up technology futures can help drive better public policy, and so facilitate the 
orientation of innovation towards more sustainable outcomes.  
 
Finally, the PhD suggests a number of avenues for further research, some of which I am pursuing 
through ongoing projects. In particular, I am keen to further develop the ‘constructive conflict’ 
approach to integrating narrative scenarios and system modelling; and I am also working further on 
the use of historical analogies to reveal insights into the dynamics represented in future scenarios. 
Technology futures are an important part of the broader socio-technical environment in which new 
technologies develop – and they will remain an important arena for future research.  
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Abstract
Scenarios, roadmaps and similar foresight methods are used to cope with uncertainty in areas with long planning horizons, such as
energy policy, and research into the future of hydrogen energy is no exception. Such studies can play an important role in the
development of shared visions of the future: creating powerful expectations of the potential of emerging technologies and mobilising
resources necessary for their realisation.
This paper reviews the hydrogen futures literature, using a six-fold typology to map the state of the art of scenario construction. The
paper then explores the expectations embodied in the literature, through the ‘answers’ it provides to questions about the future of
hydrogen. What are the drivers, barriers and challenges facing the development of a hydrogen economy? What are the key technological
building blocks required? In what kinds of futures does hydrogen become important? What does a hydrogen economy look like, how and
when does it evolve, and what does it achieve?
The literature describes a diverse range of possible futures, from decentralised systems based upon small-scale renewables, through to
centralised systems reliant on nuclear energy or carbon-sequestration. There is a broad consensus that the hydrogen economy emerges
only slowly, if at all, under ‘Business as Usual’ scenarios. Rapid transitions to hydrogen occur only under conditions of strong
governmental support combined with, or as a result of, major ‘discontinuities’ such as shifts in society’s environmental values, ‘game
changing’ technological breakthroughs, or rapid increases in the oil price or speed and intensity of climate change.
r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Scenario building; Hydrogen economy; Roadmapping
1. Introduction
Scenarios, roadmaps and similar foresight methods are
increasingly used in academia, government and industry as
a means of coping with uncertainty in areas with long
planning horizons, such as energy or transport policy
(Greeuw et al., 2000). Research into the future of hydrogen
as an energy carrier and the putative ‘hydrogen economy’
has been no exception. There is a rich contemporary
literature, spanning articles in academic peer reviewed
journals and ofﬁcial or semi-ofﬁcial policy documents,
through to works of popular advocacy, exploring the
future potential of hydrogen energy.
Foresight methods and approaches can play an im-
portant role in the development and propagation of shared
visions of the future, creating powerful expectations of the
economic, social and environmental potential of emerging
technologies; and mobilising the intellectual, ﬁnancial,
political and institutional resources necessary for their
realisation (Weber, 2004).
This paper presents an extensive review of the current
(English language) hydrogen futures literature, and maps the
state of the art of scenario construction around hydrogen.
The review undertaken for this work is not an exhaustive list
of all hydrogen futures studies ever published. Rather, the
aim has been to capture the diversity of the current hydrogen
futures literature by identifying groups of studies, and
characterising them by asking questions about their aims,
how they were put together, what kinds of perspectives they
have of the future and of technological change, and over what
sort of time scales each type of study tends to operate.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy
describes the search strategies used to identify and analyse
the hydrogen futures literature. Section 3 presents a simple
typology that characterises this diverse literature according
to the objectives, methodology and narrative structure of
the studies discussed. Six broadly distinct, although not
entirely exclusive, types of study are identiﬁed. These are:
(1) Forecasts; (2) Exploratory Scenarios; (3) Technical
Scenarios; (4) Visions; (5) Backcasts/Pathways; and, (6)
Roadmaps. Section 4 then provides a second analytical
‘cut’ on this literature by interrogating it for the answers it
provides to a series of questions about the future of the
hydrogen economy:
 What are the drivers of a hydrogen economy?
 What are the barriers and challenges facing the
development of a hydrogen economy?
 In what kinds of future does hydrogen become
important?
 Which technologies are important and what does a
hydrogen economy look like?
 How does a hydrogen economy develop and evolve?
 When does a hydrogen economy emerge? and
 What does a hydrogen economy achieve?
Finally, Section 5 draws together some overarching
conclusions and reﬂections.
2. Review methodology
Studies were identiﬁed by using electronic journal
databases and internet searches to search for: ‘Hydrogen
or fuel cells’ AND ‘economy’; ‘scenario’; ‘futures’; ‘road-
map’; ‘pathway’; ‘routemap’; ‘forecast’; ‘foresight’; ‘back-
cast(ing)’; ‘vision’. Some studies were also brought to the
attention of the investigators by colleagues working in the
ﬁeld.
Studies were included that described a hydrogen or fuel
cell future, or a strategy or ‘route’ by which a hydrogen or
fuel cell future might develop. There was a focus on those
studies which were most relevant to the UK, but studies
speciﬁc to other countries were included (Andersen et al.,
2004; Arnason and Sigfusson, 2000; Australian Govern-
ment, 2003; Fuel Cells Canada, 2003; US Department of
Energy, 2002).
A total of 40 studies, published between 1996 and 2004,
were reviewed. Of these 11 focus on hydrogen or fuel cells
in road transport, whilst a handful emphasised stationary
fuel cell applications. Most studies considered hydrogen or
fuel cells in more general contexts, including a variety of
production routes and uses. All of the studies were
analysed against a standard template to ensure that the
same elements of each were captured and compared in a
rigorous and efﬁcient manner (McDowall and Eames,
2004).
3. A typology of hydrogen futures
Our analysis identiﬁed six distinct though overlapping
types of hydrogen futures study.1 These can be further
grouped into ‘descriptive’ and ‘normative’ approaches. See
Table 1 below.
3.1. Forecasts
Two ‘roadmaps’ also included market forecasts as
part of the study (Fuel Cells Canada, 2003; HyNet, 2004)
(Table 2).
Forecasts are characterised by the use of quantitative
methods to predict futures based on current trends, or
based on surveys of expert opinion (Kosugi et al., 2004).
They tend to explore shorter time scales (up to 2030). Most
used inputs such as technological learning curves, demand
projections, fuel cost or oil price projections, and the
characteristics of competing technologies to model market
penetration of fuel cells or hydrogen (Christidis et al., 2003;
Fukushima et al., 2004; Mima and Criqui, 2003; Thomas et
al., 1998). Some used ‘scenarios’ (here meaning variations
in the set of input assumptions) to explore the impact of
different factors on shaping the future of hydrogen. The
most basic forecast in the literature simply extrapolates
sales ﬁgures from 1996 to 2003 to project stationary fuel
cell market growth to 2020 (HyNet, 2004).
Rates of adoption of hydrogen technologies are con-
sidered to be largely a function of their relative costs
compared to alternative technologies. However, several of
the above studies also model the effects of policy
interventions such as carbon taxes.
In assessing what necessary developments must occur in
order for a hydrogen economy to develop, these studies
focus on concrete technological challenges (e.g. price of
fuel cell electricity per kWh). The central challenge to a
hydrogen economy is seen as bringing down the costs of
hydrogen technologies, along with creating the necessary
market conditions for penetration, such as the establish-
ment of a refuelling infrastructure (sometimes assumed for
the purposes of the modelling exercise).
Signiﬁcant strengths of forecasting approaches are that
they can provide: quantitative targets for technology
development (providing a sense of performance and cost
necessary to compete successfully); a quantitative consis-
tency check and basis for exploring the importance of
different assumptions; and unlike many of the other studies
reviewed, they tend to view hydrogen in the context of
wider energy systems and competing technologies.
However, forecasts, particularly over long time-hori-
zons, have been widely criticised for an overly deterministic
view of the future (Berkhout and Hertin, 2002; Smil, 2000),
and of technological change (Geels and Smit, 2000). Such
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criticisms challenge the assumption that new technologies
simply replace old ones, without perturbing the technolo-
gical ‘regime’ or ‘paradigm’ in which they operate: creating
new markets, new institutions, and new user behaviours
and patterns of consumption. By themselves, such forecasts
may be of limited use in helping us to understand the
complex processes by which large technological systems are
transformed.
3.2. Exploratory scenarios
Rather than extrapolating from existing trends, explora-
tory scenarios seek to inform policy making by illuminat-
ing underlying drivers of change, often drawing upon
tacit knowledge and expertise, to build internally con-
sistent storylines describing a number of possible futures
(Table 3).
The exploratory scenarios reviewed here explore longer-
term (2030–2100) futures and include trend-breaking
developments. However, whilst the possibility of including
‘surprise’ elements is thought to be a key strength of the
exploratory approach (van Notten et al., 2004; Schwartz,
1996), this possibility was explicitly discussed in only two
of the exploratory studies reviewed (Ohi, 2001; Shell, 2001),
and not by others which nonetheless invoked trend-
breaking changes such as sweeping shifts in social values
(Barreto et al., 2003; Di Mario et al., 2003). Similarly,
though some authors have emphasised the importance of
participatory techniques in exploratory scenario building
(e.g. Berkhout and Hertin, 2002), only the studies by Ohi
(2001), Watson et al. (2004) and The Australian Govern-




A typology of hydrogen futures
Descriptive Forecasts use formal quantitative extrapolation and
modelling to predict likely futures from current trends.
Exploratory scenarios explore possible futures. They
emphasise drivers, and do not specify a predetermined
desirable end state towards which must storylines
progress.
Technical scenarios explore possible future technological
systems based on hydrogen. They emphasise the
technical feasibility and implications of different
options, rather than explore how different futures might
unfold.
Normative Visions are elaborations of a desirable and (more or less)
plausible future. They emphasise the beneﬁts of
hydrogen rather than the pathways through which a
hydrogen future might be achieved.
Backcasts and pathways start with a predetermined ‘end’
point—a desirable and plausible future. They then
investigate possible pathways to that point.
Roadmaps describe a sequence of measures designed to
bring about a desirable future. Studies from the previous
four groups, or elements of these groups, frequently
form the basis for the identiﬁcation of speciﬁc measures,
but not always.
Table 2





Study using the IPTS Transport Technologies model to
explore fuel cell vehicle market penetration with business
as usual projections, plus sensitivity to oil price, industry
decisions, and carbon policies.
Fukushima
et al. (2004)
Uses quantitative model to project diffusion of solid
oxide fuel cells for power generation in Japan, exploring
sensitivity to technological change, component
availability and recycling, and fuel price.
Kosugi et al.
(2004)
A survey of expert opinion used to provide predictions
of fuel cell technological development.
Mima and
Criqui (2003)
Uses New & Renewable Technologies module of the
POLES world energy model to forecast penetration of
fuel cells into both stationary and mobile applications,
and explore the impacts of technology breakthroughs,
cheaper natural gas, and carbon policies.
Thomas et al.
(1998)
Uses a market penetration model to predict fuel cell
vehicle uptake under the California Zero Emission
Vehicle mandate, and calculates returns on investment,
and social cost/beneﬁt ratios.
Table 3





Participatory exercise based on the development of
qualitative scenarios to describe possible contexts for
hydrogen development, followed by workshops to




Develops qualitative scenarios for high, medium and
low hydrogen uptake. Explores the combinations of
drivers that might push a hydrogen economy.
Barreto et al.
(2003)
Elaborates on the SRES-B1 scenario developed by the
IPCC. Hydrogen is introduced in a qualitative scenario,
and this is then quantiﬁed using MESSAGE-MACRO
Di Mario et al.
(2003)
Uses the SRES B1 scenario as a baseline around which
two alternative hydrogen scenarios are explored, with




Explores the growth in three sets of infrastructure:
transport, communications, and power grids, and uses
these socio-technical trends to explore the future for
FCVs as mobile communications and power platforms.
Ohi (2001) Three qualitative scenarios, structured around rate of
technological change and dominant social values, are
used to explore possible futures for hydrogen and R&D
strategies that are robust across scenarios.
Shell (2001) Explores two scenario storylines, one of which describes
a possible future for hydrogen arising from a radical
innovation in hydrogen storage.
Watson et al.
(2004)
Uses the UK DTI Foresight Futures framework to
structure four qualitative scenarios. The prospects for
hydrogen in each different ‘world’ are examined and
quantiﬁed.
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Unlike most of the other studies reviewed in this paper,
several of the exploratory studies made explicit reference to
theories of technological change, such as Geels’ multi-level
perspective of technological transitions (Geels, 2002a, b;
used by Andersen et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2004).
Three of the exploratory studies reviewed develop
existing scenario sets e.g. the UK Foresight Futures
framework (Watson et al., 2004) and the IPCC SRES
scenario B1 (Barreto et al., 2003; Di Mario et al., 2003).
These studies explore the potential for hydrogen within
their ‘parent’ scenarios, and use quantitative models (such
as MESSAGE-MACRO, POLES, or the purpose-built
THESIS) to enrich and help quantify the scenario outputs.
The other exploratory studies develop new scenarios and
storylines to explore the conditions under which a
hydrogen future might unfold (Andersen et al., 2004;
Australian Government, 2003; Kurani et al., 2003; Ohi,
2001; Shell, 2001). This involves identifying sets of drivers
that are likely to be important in the future development of
hydrogen technologies and the transition to a ‘hydrogen
economy’. At least one study assumed the presence of
strong pro-hydrogen policies, to investigate the implica-
tions of such policies in a variety of future worlds
(Andersen et al., 2004).
The exploratory scenarios stand out as having more
structured approaches to thinking about drivers, although
they tend to emphasise those that operate at the ‘landscape’
level. This approach has been criticised as being overly
‘top-down’ (Geels, 2002b). However, when considering
long time periods it arguably provides a useful means of
capturing the broad dimensions of change. Table 2 outlines
the dimensions chosen by the eight exploratory scenario
studies, such as rate of technological change, or type of
governance (Table 4).
An important feature of exploratory scenarios is that the
storylines are not supposed to be driven by a preconceived
desirable end-point. However, many of the exploratory
scenario studies reviewed here include a ‘happy ending’
storyline, in which CO2 is dramatically reduced and society
is reasonably well off and secure. These scenarios tend to
involve rapid technological change integrated with a
socially responsible and globally co-ordinated society—
with a signiﬁcant role for hydrogen. This suggests a
tendency for such exercises to come up with an uncon-
scious ‘favourite’—one that, in this case, is usually
decidedly pro-hydrogen.
3.3. Technical scenarios
The approach of these studies is best summed by Hart et
al. (2003):
ythe purpose is not to predict the uptake of alternative
fuels or vehiclesy, but to assess the implications of a
large-scale move, should it be attempted.
These studies explore different possible hydrogen-based
technological systems, and assess the implications of these
against a range of criteria, such as carbon emissions, cost,
and technical feasibility. Technical scenarios are much
more speciﬁc about the systems envisaged for the future,
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Major drivers in exploratory scenarios




Rate of economic growth Economic growth
deﬁnes energy price, and




growth world, lowest in
low growth world.
Strength of social &
environmental values
Rate of technological change
Conventional energy price






Rate of technological change
Andersen
et al. (2004)
Not expressed as ‘dimensions for
change’ in the study itself—these
are inferred.
Environmental concerns






Balance of power: market vs.
state
Severity of climate change
impacts
Security of oil supplies
Watson et al.
(2004)













Shell (2001) Resource scarcity Assumed correlations
not clearTechnological advance
Social and personal priorities
Di Mario
et al. (2003)
Used the dimensions of the IPCC
Special
Strong environmental
values and globally co-
ordinated decision-
making allow steady and
sustained economic
growth.
Report on Emissions Scenarios
B1 world only (see above), rates
of hydrogen penetration within




Explored only one future—












Used the dimensions of the IPCC
Special
Strong environmental
values and globally co-
ordinated decision-
making allow steady and
sustained economic
growth.
Report on Emissions Scenarios
B1 world—high environmental
values, strong globally co-
ordinated decision-making.
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and how these might work in technological terms. Whilst
such studies can make an important contribution to
assessing the feasibility and desirability of alternative
future systems, they often neglect the social and cultural
dimensions of technological change (Table 5).
The future is viewed as a series of more or less static
technological options, rather than storylines of technolo-
gical change. Most of the studies (Eyre et al., 2002; Hart
et al., 2003; Ogden, 1999; Sørensen et al., 2004) make
assumptions about future demand for energy provided by
hydrogen, and model possible systems that would meet
that demand. Of the ﬁve studies, three investigate the
potential for producing hydrogen entirely from renewable
resources.
The drivers for change are considered at the macro level
of carbon emissions and energy security, while the major
barriers identiﬁed are the higher costs of hydrogen
technologies, and the lack of renewable electricity supplies.
However, these studies do not attempt to investigate the
dynamics of the transitions to the modelled systems, and
therefore do not explore the broader factors that would
promote or inhibit particular futures developing, or how a
hydrogen infrastructure might develop, as these issues are
outside the scope of the analysis.
3.4. Visions
There are two broad types of ‘vision’ identiﬁed in the
literature. The ﬁrst, and the kind with which this section is
concerned, are produced by individuals or small groups,
outlining a desirable hydrogen future. The second is
produced through stakeholder workshops to provide the
basis for a ‘road-mapping’ exercise, and is an attempt to
generate a shared picture of a desirable future and way
forward. This latter type will be considered under ‘Road-
maps’ (Table 6).
Vision studies present, often rather utopian, narrative
descriptions of a future hydrogen economy. In so doing
they aim to show that a hydrogen economy is both
plausible and desirable. These studies tend to be rhetorical
rather than analytical. Their role is not to analyse or
predict the future; the strength of the approach is that they
expand the possibilities considered, and create a shared
picture of what the future could be. Time scales are
generally undeﬁned, although visions are often set further
into the future than more formal futures exercises. They
also tend to include more ‘surprise’ elements that break
with current trends (e.g. technological breakthroughs,
shifts in social values). A notable misﬁt amongst these
studies is a paper by Bossel et al. (2003), which presents a
vision of an alternative to hydrogen, the ‘liquid synthetic-
hydrocarbon economy’.
Generally these visions depict a future where technolo-
gical, infrastructural and institutional changes go hand-in-
hand with a shift towards greener social values and a more
egalitarian society. In the more radical examples, the
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Uses qualitative scenarios to deﬁne energy demand
conditions in 2050, and then examined the carbon
emissions of alternative possible technological systems
that would meet that demand.
Hart et al.
(2003)
Examines implications of supplying transport energy
demand with renewably produced hydrogen or biofuels,
given estimates of 2050 transport demand. Models
penetration of different combinations of vehicle and fuel
technology, and examines the carbon impacts.
Ogden (1999) Outlines ﬁve alternative possible systems that would
meet projected transport demand for southern




Describes two possible technological systems based on
hydrogen and wind electricity, matching hour by hour
electricity demand, and for each system calculates the
total wind supply and hydrogen storage system needed
to meet that demand.
Winebrake and
Creswick (2003)
Uses the Analytic Hierarchy Process to explore the
beneﬁts and disadvantages of alternative fuel cell vehicle
fuel conﬁgurations, and conducts a sensitivity analysis
exploring how robust the ﬁndings are in the face of
different dominant social values.
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Describes a possible future for Iceland, based on
hydrogen and renewably produced methanol.
Bockris (1999) Describes a solar-hydrogen future for the US
Bossel et al.
(2003)
Presents an argument against the use of hydrogen as a
fuel, and provides a possible alternative —a synthetic
liquid hydrocarbon economy.
Dunn (2001) Presents hydrogen as the fuel of the future, and describes
a vision of what a hydrogen economy will involve.
Goltsov and
Veziroglu (2001)
Presents a vision of the ‘hydrogen civilisation’, a future
world posed as the only alternative to continued
dependence on fossil fuels.
Lovins and
Williams (1999)
Describes a future hydrogen economy, and outlines
some of the components of the transition, in the form of
super-efﬁcient vehicles and synergy between mobile and
stationary power.
Rifkin (2002) Outlines a decentralised and democratic vision of the
future for hydrogen and energy, drawing parallels with




Draws a parallel between the Apollo programme to put
a man on the moon, and the challenge of energy
independence and hydrogen; describes how hydrogen
could become the dominant fuel within a decade.
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hydrogen economy heralds no less than ‘the redistribution
of power on earth’ (Rifkin, 2002). Some even frame a
transition to a hydrogen economy as an inevitable
development of human ‘progress’—e.g. Dunn (2001).
While some see technological transitions as manageable
through R&D investment, demonstration projects, taxes,
and strong government leadership (Dunn, 2001; Lovins
and Williams, 1999), others invoke a need for major shifts
in social values (Goltsov and Veziroglu, 2001), or revolu-
tionary technological breakthroughs (Bockris, 1999). How-
ever, most visions do not directly address the dynamics of
change or the development of infrastructure.
The macro drivers of the transition to a hydrogen economy
are perceived to be its potential societal beneﬁts particularly
with respect to climate change, but also fossil fuel depletion,
energy security, air pollution, and ‘geo-political dominance’.
However, at a meso/micro level, government actions and
policy measures, such as funding for demonstration projects,
tax regimes, and education programs, are seen as critical to
shaping the emergence of a hydrogen economy. Other ‘micro’
drivers include the development of renewable energy and
hydrogen technologies, and potential synergies between
building and vehicle energy use.
The degree of commonality amongst visions is striking,
not least because they tend to gloss over potential areas of
disagreement, such as the potential role of carbon
sequestration or nuclear power. All the visions, with the
exception of Bossel et al. (2003), see an eventual transition
to a system in which hydrogen and electricity are
predominant energy carriers, and are used more or less
interchangeably. Vehicles will be fuelled by direct hydro-
gen, not synthetic or fossil hydrocarbons. Hydrogen
provides the ‘missing link’ for intermittent renewables,
allowing the entire world to move to a zero carbon
economy. A weakness of the visions is that they tend to
gloss over areas of disagreement (such as roles for carbon
sequestration or nuclear power), and potential pitfalls or
disadvantages associated with the development of a
hydrogen economy.
3.5. Backcasts & pathways
These studies all start with the assumption that some
form of hydrogen economy is desirable, and investigate
possible paths by which the transition to that hydrogen
future might be attained. Indeed, this attention transition
issues is a key strength of these studies. This normative
scenario process is in the spirit of backcasting, in which a
future vision is elaborated, and storylines work back from
that vision to the present (Robinson, 1982). However, none
of these studies represent extensive backcasting studies, nor
do any refer explicitly to the methodological literature on
backcasting or scenario building more generally. For most,
a clear picture of a future hydrogen economy remains
undeﬁned, though goals are sometimes expressed as targets
(e.g. California Fuel Cell Partnership target for number of
fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) on the road) (Table 7).
Typical time scales range from 2020 to 2050. Only the
California study considers the possible effects of ‘surprise’
and discontinuities. Despite the attention to transition
issues, few appear to draw explicitly on theoretical
literatures on change in large technological systems. Most
rely on a simple technology push/market pull models of
technological change. An exception is Farrell et al. (2001),
which is heavily informed by the multi-level ‘technological
transitions’ theory of Geels (2002a, b).
3.6. Roadmaps
Like backcasts, roadmaps assume the desirability of
hydrogen, often deﬁning a (usually vague) vision, and
outlining a series of steps to get there. The difference with
backcasts/pathways is in the way that roadmaps view the
future, as explained below (Table 8).
In general, assumptions about the future are not made
explicit or explored, leaving ‘business as usual’, or the
continuation of current trends as a default perspective.
Unlike in other futures studies, the future is described only
in terms of the actions to be taken and the targets to be
met, rather than elaborating broader aspects of a future
world, or describing storylines. The future is treated
instrumentally, as a ‘policy problem’, with the emphasis
placed on what is to be achieved.
Most of these roadmaps combine three important aims.
Firstly, to identify barriers to the emergence of a hydrogen
future and the measures needed to overcome them. They
explore and, often graphically, communicate the relation-
ships between future markets, technologies and policies
(Phaal et al., 2003). Secondly, most fulﬁl an advocacy
function. As a result it has been suggested that many
roadmaps create unrealistically rosy expectations of a
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Outlines criteria for deﬁning successful
commercialisation, and then explores speciﬁc barriers
and threats to achieving that success, and four possible
transition pathways based on four different fuels:
hydrogen, methanol, gasoline, and ethanol.
Foley (2001) Explores policies and pathways by which hydrogen
might be introduced into transport.
Fuel Cells UK
(2003)
Presents a vision of the future for fuel cells in the UK,
and explores the important trends that will set the
context for the transition towards that vision.
Mauro et al.
(1996)
Presents two alternative transition routes to a hydrogen
economy, a centralised route, and a decentralised




Technical analysis of two routes towards commercially
viable fuel cell vehicles, and evaluation of the alternative
routes in terms of well-to-wheels carbon emissions.
Wurster (2002) Explores how a hydrogen refuelling infrastructure might
develop.
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technology’s future (Geels and Smit, 2000). Lastly, the
roadmapping process seeks to bring together key stake-
holders to develop a shared vision of the future: a common
‘script’, deﬁning agreed roles and cues for action. Whilst
this may also be an implicit function of other types of
scenario studies, it is an explicit aim of many roadmapping
initiatives.
The great strength of the roadmapping approach is the
identiﬁcation of barriers and solutions to them, and
generation of shared targets. While the process itself is
often important in terms of bringing together stakeholders
in a common strategic forum, the ﬁnal roadmap itself also
provides a measure against which progress can be
measured.
Building a roadmap usually involves groups of stake-
holders identifying the drivers, barriers, targets, and wider
threats and opportunities. Some roadmaps are less
inclusive, and are produced by advocates of particular
policy routes. The approach is very pragmatic. Policies are
usually identiﬁed for the short term (5–10 years), with
targets mapped out over the longer term (up to 2050 and
beyond). Such studies are often dominated by rather linear
market pull/technology push perspectives.
4. What does the literature say about a hydrogen future?
Having outlined the main types of hydrogen futures
studies, the following section examines what this literature
tells us by examining the answers it provides to a series of
speciﬁc questions about the future of the hydrogen
economy.
4.1. What are the drivers of a hydrogen economy?
The literature revealed divergent views on the factors
that will shape the future of hydrogen energy. In many of
the visions and exploratory scenarios, for example, the
development of a hydrogen future is explicitly seen as being
driven by shifting social values, particularly the emergence
of stronger environmental values, but also greater concern
for social equity: the latter being perceived to underpin a
shift away from centralised energy production and
distribution towards more distributed forms of generation.
Many of the visions suggest that the major technological
barriers have been overcome, or are readily solvable, as
long as the political will is there to provide funding and
support (e.g. Dunn, 2001; Lovins and Williams, 1999;
Goltsov and Veziroglu, 2001; Rifkin, 2002). These studies
frame the hydrogen economy as an issue of politics—held
back only by the inability of governments to take a lead.
In contrast, many other studies focus on technological
drivers (Bockris, 1999; Bossel et al., 2003; Kosugi et al.,
2004; Owen and Gordon, 2002). Some of these make the
implicit assumption that ‘if it works’, the hydrogen
economy will be realised, while others focus on costs,
working on the principle that it has to ‘work’ at a price that
is competitive with conventional technologies (Mima and
Criqui, 2003; Thomas et al., 1998).
The literature also includes divergent views on the level
at which driving factors should be considered. This means
that the term ‘drivers’ has many interpretations, just as the
terms ‘scenario’, ‘vision’ and ‘roadmap’ are used in a
variety of different contexts. Exploratory scenarios con-
sider drivers to be broader societal changes (social values,
rate of technological change etc), while other studies
deﬁned government intervention and investment in R&D
as a driver, or speciﬁc market demands, such as that for
backup power.
However, four overarching problems or policy objectives
consistently stand out in the literature as providing the
underlying drivers of a transition to a hydrogen future.
These are:
Climate change: Reducing carbon dioxide emissions is
clearly considered to be the most important of these.
Climate change is cited by all of the studies reviewed.
Indeed, seven of the studies refer only to climate change as
a reason for a transition to a hydrogen economy.
Energy security: This encompasses a range of concerns
over the ﬁnite nature of oil and gas reserves, their
geopolitical sensitivity and location, energy prices, and
vulnerability of centralised energy systems to attack. No
studies focused exclusively on this aspect, and 18 made no
mention of energy security at all. Of the studies that
emphasise energy security (Arnason and Sigfusson, 2000;
Australian Government, 2003; DTI, 2004; Dunn, 2001; US
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Studies classiﬁed as ‘Roadmaps’
Roadmaps
Study Brief description
DTI (2004) Outlines the actions and decision points for the
development of hydrogen technologies
EST (2002) Outlines steps that need to be taken in 2005, 2010, and




Stakeholder workshop process used to generate targets
and milestones in key areas for fuel cell development,





Describes a series of actions for the Greater London
Authority to promote the development of hydrogen in
London.
Hynet (2004) Builds on a hydrogen vision for Europe, and outlines
timelines and necessary action for the visions to be
realised.
US NHA (2004) A study based on workshops to identify key goals for
hydrogen commercialisation, and barriers and solutions
to those goals, in order to produce a realistic and
plausible roadmap for hydrogen development.
Toshiaki (2003) Presentation outlining Japan’s strategic targets for fuel
cell and hydrogen development.
US Department
of Energy (2002)
Roadmap developed through stakeholder workshop
process, outlining key targets and milestones in the
development of a US hydrogen economy.
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NHA, 2004; Rifkin, 2002; US Department of Energy,
2002), most are roadmaps or visions.
Local air quality: Many studies cited reductions in local
air pollution as a signiﬁcant beneﬁt of a transition to a
hydrogen economy, though only regionally focused studies,
such as those from London and California (California Fuel
Cell Partnership, 2001; London Hydrogen Action Plan,
2002; Ogden, 1999; Thomas et al., 1998) gave this factor
particular emphasis.
Competitiveness: Seven studies refer to international
competitiveness as an important driver in the transition
towards a hydrogen economy (Australian Government,
2003; Fuel Cells Canada, 2003; Fuel Cells UK, 2003;
Greater London Authority, 2002; HyNet, 2004; Owen and
Gordon, 2002; US Department of Energy, 2002).
A ﬁnal less frequently cited objective is the potential of
FCVs to reduce noise pollution in urban areas.
4.2. Barriers & challenges
The literature recognises a diverse range of barriers to
the development a hydrogen economy. The three most
prominent are:
 The absence of a hydrogen refuelling infrastructure—the
difﬁculty of establishing a market for FCVs in the
absence of a refuelling infrastructure—and vice versa.
 High costs: particularly of fuel cells and of low-carbon
hydrogen production.
 Technological immaturity: hydrogen on-board storage
and consequent limited current driving range of hydro-
gen vehicles; limited life-time of fuel cells. Several other
technological challenges are speciﬁc to particular
hydrogen futures, and will be discussed in the context
of the differing technological architectures envisaged for
hydrogen in Section 4.4.
Other frequently cited barriers include safety, public
acceptability, and the absence of codes and standards.
There are also many barriers that are picked up by only a
few studies, including: the absence of surplus renewable
electricity; social values that disregard the environment; a
regulatory framework that currently supports fossil fuels;
ability of incumbent technologies to adapt in the face of
competition from hydrogen; limited skills base; absence of
global co-operation or plan of action; limited availability
of fuel cell components, particularly platinum; difﬁculty of
technological developers in accessing capital; lack of
demand for hydrogen products; and, social opposition,
uncertainty over viability and costs of carbon sequestra-
tion.
4.3. In what kinds of future does hydrogen become
important?
The exploratory scenarios are rather consistent. Hydro-
gen emerges in future worlds where there is medium-strong
economic growth, associated with rapid technological
development; and when
(a) concerns about the environment are strong, especially
when climate change becomes obvious;
or,
(b) when traditional energy supplies are expensive or
vulnerable.
Hydrogen does not emerge in worlds dominated by
market rather than social values; where climate change
impacts are small; where technological development is
slow; and when economic growth stagnates. The develop-
ment of hydrogen is patchy in worlds of strong regional
autonomy, with strong uptake locally only in areas without
signiﬁcant oil or gas reserves.
4.3.1. Does a hydrogen future rely on ‘step-changes’?
It is noteworthy that hydrogen generally emerges slowly
or not at all in ‘Business as Usual’ type scenarios (Andersen
et al., 2004; Australian Government, 2003; Di Mario et al.,
2003; Owen and Gordon, 2002; Mima and Criqui, 2003;
Ohi, 2001).
In contrast, rapid penetration of hydrogen occurs only
when there is strong government support (although
typically even this is not seen as a sufﬁcient condition:
Andersen et al., 2004; Di Mario et al., 2003), or major
‘discontinuities’, such as shifts in social values (Di Mario et
al., 2003; Ohi, 2001), technological breakthroughs that
radically reduce costs (Ohi, 2001), shifts in the relative price
of oil (Andersen et al., 2004), or increases in the speed and
intensity of climate change.
4.4. What does the hydrogen economy look like?
The drivers, barriers and challenges outlined above
shape a wide range of possible hydrogen economies,
involving different technological trajectories and ‘architec-
tures’, demonstrating very different conceptions of what is
meant by a ‘hydrogen economy’. Only some (19) of the
studies provide detail about the sources, uses and modes of
distribution of energy in a hydrogen future. Of those that
do, most fall into one of two broad technological
architectures: decentralised or centralised, as illustrated
below (Fig. 1).
4.4.1. Decentralised architectures
These architectures are based on local production of
hydrogen, from electrolysis, biomass processes, or steam
reforming of natural gas. Some decentralised systems
envisage hydrogen production from local energy sources
(such as small-scale biomass conversion, or ‘micro’ renew-
ables) while others see energy production as remaining
centralised, with energy transferred to hydrogen produc-
tion units (in homes or on forecourts) either as electricity or
natural gas. Decentralised hydrogen production overcomes
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many of the infrastructural barriers facing a transition to
hydrogen.
Some studies (Foley, 2001; US NHA, 2004), particularly
those with a focus on road transport, see on-site hydrogen
production as a transitional phase (for discussion of how
these technological architectures change, see below). For
others, decentralisation is a key feature of the hydrogen
economy, allowing the beneﬁts of distributed generation,
home refuelling, and even the ‘democratisation of en-
ergy’—empowering people by giving them control of
energy (Rifkin, 2002). Some of the decentralised systems
involve synergy between the transport and heat & power
sectors, with FCVs both providing mobile power and
selling power to the grid at times of peak demand
(Australian Government, 2003; Barreto et al., 2003; Dunn,
2001; Lovins and Williams, 1999).
4.4.2. Centralised architectures
A centralised system can draw on a wider variety of
energy sources than decentralised systems (coal gasiﬁcation
and nuclear thermal hydrogen generation, for example, are
largely incompatible with decentralised systems) but it
depends on the development of a dedicated hydrogen
distribution infrastructure. Many of the centralised systems
focus on hydrogen use in road transport, and envisage local
hydrogen pipeline grids linking early demonstration
projects and ﬂeet vehicle refuelling depots, creating
‘hydrogen corridors’ in areas of high demand (Fig. 2).
A third technological architecture, described by Bossel et
al. (2003) and Arnason and Sigfusson (2000), involves the
use of hydrogen and captured carbon to synthesise liquid
hydrocarbon fuels, such as methanol. These liquid hydro-
carbon fuels can then be used in FCVs with on-board
reforming. It is argued that this can be compatible with a
low-carbon hydrogen economy, since the carbon for the
fuel is captured from other sources (such as industrial
emissions from metals processing (Arnason and Sigfusson,
2000), or biomass (Bossel et al., 2003).
Other very different technological architectures are
possible, e.g. the Shell scenarios, initially at least, envisage
hydrogen sold ‘in a box’ as a fuel cartridge, which it is
claimed breaks current distribution and infrastructure
paradigms (Shell, 2001).
Many studies envisage a ﬁnal mix of centralised and
decentralised architectures, with pipelines in areas of strong
demand, and with both centralised and decentralised
production supplying the hydrogen market, or see one as
a precursor to the other.
4.4.3. Each architecture is dependent on key technological
building blocks
If government or industry support a particular archi-
tecture, or simply expect a particular architecture to
emerge, R&D will prioritise particular technological
challenges, which may be irrelevant for other possible
architectures. This highlights the role that expectations and
visions of the future can play in directing technological
change—a vision of a future architecture deﬁnes the
technological challenges in the present.
The corollary of this is that a technological ‘break-
through’ may lead to a particular architecture becoming
dominant. For example, the development of low-cost liquid
hydrogen storage, or a (perceived) failure of solid storage
and high-pressure tanks, could rule out decentralised
systems, given the technological difﬁculties of small-scale
liquefaction. Similarly, a breakthrough in on-board re-
forming could make the synthetic liquid hydrocarbon route
more attractive, obviating the need for on-board hydrogen
storage. Breakthroughs in key technologies could thus
produce ‘emerging irreversibilities’, leading to ‘lock-in’ or
‘path dependency’ (see Arthur, 1989; David, 1985; Rip and
Schot, 2003), a phenomenon cited by some authors as a
reason to avoid R&D in particular technologies, such as




























Fig. 2. Shows common building blocks of centralised hydrogen produc-
tion systems. Text size of each building block indicates the number of
studies that envisage a role for it. Key technologies: carbon sequestration,
























Fig. 1. Shows common building blocks of decentralised hydrogen
production systems. Text size of each building block indicates the number
of studies that envisage a role for it. Key technologies: small-scale
electrolysis and steam methane reforming of natural gas (SMR), renew-
ables, ‘energy station’ stationary systems, FCVs.
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For decentralised systems, the major technological
challenge is the expense of hydrogen from small-scale
natural gas reformers and electrolysers, while centralised
systems rely on the viability of a large-scale hydrogen
distribution infrastructure, and prospects for centralised
systems are greatly enhanced by cost-effective coal
gasiﬁcation or nuclear–thermal water splitting.
Additional technological developments are necessary for
the envisaged hydrogen economies to be low-carbon:
plentiful and competitive renewable electricity, carbon
sequestration, or nuclear power. While fossil fuels are seen
by most studies as transitional, some envisage a long-term
role for fossil fuels based on sequestration.
Key technologies for all pathways include improved fuel
cell power density and longevity, improved fuel cell
economics, and fuel storage. Compressed hydrogen is seen
as the most likely option by most studies, though solid state
storage is thought to be a possible long-term solution.
Liquid hydrogen storage is considered to have a transi-
tional role in some studies.
The basis on which studies reject particular building
blocks varies, from the ‘purely technological’ rejection of
liquid storage as hopelessly energetically inefﬁcient, to the
rejection of components that fail to meet policy goals. For
example, studies with an emphasis on climate change reject
carbon-emitting hydrogen technologies, while studies con-
cerned with energy security focus on nationally abundant
resources, such as coal in the United States and Australia,
wind in Denmark, and hydroelectricity in Iceland.
In summary, the literature envisages a range of hydrogen
economies, which are described in terms of alternative
technological architectures. The future of hydrogen is thus
contested. The roles of carbon sequestration, nuclear
energy, renewable electricity, on-board reforming of
hydrocarbons and the viability of pipelines and trucked
hydrogen are all areas of particular debate and uncertainty.
The basis on which different elements, or ‘building blocks’,
are included or rejected varies, but there are also shared
elements. Almost all include fuel cell vehicles, and most
include strong roles for renewables. Steam methane
reforming is widely expected to be the principal method
of producing hydrogen over the short-to-medium term.
Finally, it should be noted that crucial technological details
are often omitted. For example, many studies suggest a role
for fuel cells in distributed electricity generation, but do not
specify the type of fuel cell, or fuel used.
4.5. Evolution of hydrogen economies
As noted above much of the literature seeks to illuminate
pathways to a hydrogen future. Whilst there is considerable
variation in the transition paths described, a number of
patterns are apparent:
(1) From decentralised to centralised: Most studies see the
decentralised route as the key to by-passing the
infrastructural problem, but some (e.g. US Department
of Energy, 2002) see centralised production as coming
ﬁrst, through the ‘link-up’ of demonstration projects
and the creation of ‘hydrogen highways’ or ‘corridors’
fuelled with industrially produced hydrogen.
(2) From fossil fuels to renewables: Most studies see the
ultimate hydrogen economy as fuelled entirely by
renewables, with electricity and hydrogen as the
dominant, and largely interchangeable energy carriers.
Fossil fuels, and nuclear, are described, in some studies,
as transitional technologies, or ‘bridges’.
There are also disagreements about system evolution.
There is broad agreement that ﬂeet vehicles, refuelled at
depots, will be the most likely entry point of hydrogen
into road transport (despite evidence from other alter-
native fuels that ﬂeets may be poor early markets; McNutt
and Rodgers, 2004). However, there is marked dis-
agreement about the types of fuel cell vehicles that will
be ﬁrst to enter the market. One line of argument is
that the technology exists for small passenger cars to
decrease greatly in weight, thus to some extent reducing
the power and storage requirements of fuel cell systems,
and that such ‘hypercars’ are the ideal strategy for a
hydrogen transition (Lovins and Williams, 1999). Others
argue that large heavy goods vehicles are more appro-
priate early adopters, since the space and weight require-
ments are less stringent—especially true for shipping
(Arnason and Sigfusson, 2000; Farrell et al., 2001). The
ability of fuel cells to provide auxiliary power for services
(especially IT) inside luxury and large vehicles (such as
SUVs), could provide convenience that will offset minor
losses in driving range and performance (Kurani et al.,
2003).
Another area of disagreement concerns the sequence of
introduction of FCVs and stationary fuel cells, with views
differing about which are likely to enter and dominate
markets ﬁrst.
4.6. Early learning: the importance of niche markets in
technology development
A variety of early niche markets are either recognised or
advocated as providing an important stage for the
development of a hydrogen economy. Most of these early
markets or technologies are described as overcoming cost
barriers, by providing niche applications that allow
learning and scale economies, as well as increasing public
familiarity. The role of learning in niche applications is
stressed in many approaches to technological change (e.g.
Kemp et al., 1998).
(1) H2 Internal Combustion Engine vehicles—hydrogen
ICEs are far cheaper than FCVs, and are likely to
remain so for some years. Their adoption could provide
low pollution vehicles that help stimulate a market for
hydrogen, and provide a means for public familiarity
with hydrogen as a fuel.
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(2) Portable electronics and consumer goods—widely seen
as the most likely early fuel cell market, growth in
micro and small fuel cell sales is thought likely to help
drive down fuel cell prices, and push fuel cell
acceptability and familiarity.
(3) Remote and off-grid power—would bring down FC
system costs, allowing cheaper small-scale electrolysis
or steam methane reforming.
(4) Premium/backup power—as above. It is argued that
stationary fuel cells for backup or premium power,
using the ‘energy station’ concept described above,
could potentially become nodes for hydrogen refuelling.
(5) Injection of hydrogen into natural gas mix (up to 20%),
and either using the mixture directly to lower emissions,
or separate the gas and hydrogen, and using the natural
gas network as a nascent hydrogen pipeline network
(Andersen et al., 2004).
(6) Auxiliary power units (APUs) for vehicles—APUs
would provide electricity in vehicles much more
efﬁciently than current systems, and remain available
when the engine is off, making them attractive to the
military and long-haul trucks in particular (Lutsey et
al., 2003). The cost challenges for APUs are much less
daunting than for automotive cells.
(7) Ships—not constrained by size and weight as much as
passenger cars, so storage is less of an issue. Can
provide both reductions in fuel cell costs, and learning
processes that will stimulate progress (Farrell et al.,
2001).
(8) Demonstration projects—currently the largest market
for fuel cells. Public authorities and companies eager to
demonstrate commitment to high technology and green
values are providing a niche demand for fuel cells,
allowing cost improvements through scale economies
and learning.
4.7. When does a hydrogen economy emerge?
Fig. 3 above sketches the estimates made for the transition
to fuel cell vehicles, a ‘building block’ common to all but a
few of the hydrogen futures studies. We have included
estimates from two studies that were not included in the
review, as their major focus is other than hydrogen (IEA,
2003; RAC, 2002). The chart is a graphical aid, rather than
formal plotting of estimates (the Y-axis is not standardised
and is inevitably somewhat subjective), but serves to illustrate
both the diversity of views on a likely timetable for
transition, and some common threads. The chart shows
predictions of what is likely or possible, rather than proposed
targets, which have not been plotted. Where studies straddle
categories along the Y-axis, different possible futures were
considered in the study with differing levels of FCV
penetration, each assumed to be equally likely.
4.8. Policies
Many studies recommend particular policy paths, and a
number of approaches are evident. At one extreme, one
study advocates ‘‘the formation of a new environmental
consciousness of the general public of all countriesybased
on scientiﬁc, highly reliable predictions’’ (Goltsov and
Veziroglu, 2001). Other studies, rather more prosaically,
propose the variety of speciﬁc measures outlined below.
The four most commonly advocated policy measures are:
 increased R&D funding (often targeted at speciﬁc
problems, particularly storage);
 public education programmes;
 infrastructure development (sometimes through estab-
lishment and ‘link up’ of demonstration projects);
 tax incentives for hydrogen fuel and vehicles.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 3. Shows estimated dates for a transition to a fuel cell based transport system.
W. McDowall, M. Eames / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 1236–12501246
49
Other commonly recommended policies include: the
development of codes & standards; mandates for zero
emission vehicles; promotion of hydrogen through govern-
ment and industry champions; clear government support to
stimulate conﬁdence and attract investment. Other recom-
mendations include support for renewables; development
and dissemination of a clear ‘transition strategy’ to provide
conﬁdence and reduce uncertainty; targets for low carbon
vehicles; and improving the fuel cells skills base.
In the policy recommendations proposed, there is a
tension between the risks of ‘winner-picking’, and of ‘lock-
in’. A winner picking strategy, involving deﬁnition of the
technologies of the future, is high risk and arguably
unrealistic—we can never know the best technology in
advance. Conversely, an incremental approach, avoiding
picking winners by providing a goal-oriented policy
framework (e.g. incentives for low carbon vehicles), may
be subject to ‘lock-in’ to current technological trajectories,
which only winner-picking policies can break.
4.9. What does a hydrogen economy achieve?
Six studies address the extent to which a transition to a
hydrogen future will ameliorate CO2 emissions (Barreto et
al., 2003; Di Mario et al., 2003; Eyre et al., 2002; Hart et
al., 2003; Owen and Gordon, 2002; Watson et al., 2004).
All conclude that hydrogen, and in particular fuel cell
vehicles, can make a signiﬁcant impact on reducing carbon
emissions in the long term. However, three of these (Eyre et
al., 2002; Hart et al., 2003; Owen and Gordon, 2002)
suggested that the beneﬁts from a transfer to hydrogen will
only occur after 2030–2050, and that moving to a
hydrogen-based road transport system before this is likely
to increase total carbon emissions (either on a wells-to-
wheels basis, or through the displacement of carbon gains
from renewable electricity).
5. Discussion and conclusions
5.1. Futures in hydrogen: the state of the art
The literature reveals a range of sophisticated models,
exploratory narrative techniques, simplistic trend extra-
polations, rhetorical arguments, and strategic plans. Very
few used participatory techniques, with the notable
exception of many roadmaps, and two of the exploratory
studies. None of the backcast studies represented a major
and theoretically grounded backcasting exercise. Of all
the studies describing hydrogen futures, only four made
any reference to theoretical literatures of technological
change.
The six types of study reveal ﬁve ways of considering and
understanding the future of hydrogen energy and hydrogen
technologies:
(i) as a product competing in a largely context-free
market place (forecasts);
(ii) as a possibility among many as broader changes in
society unfold (exploratory scenarios);
(iii) as a sequence of possible technological systems or
architectures. (technical scenarios);
(iv) as a normative vision of a future world, in which
hydrogen saves society (visions);
(v) as a solution to speciﬁc problems, and thus a policy
goal (backcasts and roadmaps).
5.1.1. What is wrong with the hydrogen futurist’s toolbox?
 The general lack of theory leads to several of the
common futures ‘pitfalls’ identiﬁed by Geels and Smit
(2000): for example, determinism and a pre-occupation
with new, ‘exotic’ technologies. Furthermore, many of
the studies that lack a theoretical background model the
effects of technology policies in their depiction of a
hydrogen transition, making assumptions about the
effects of policies on innovation and diffusion of new
technologies, but without making the basis for these
assumptions explicit.
 Lack of transparency and participation.
 Lack of distinctness or clarity in the roadmaps.
 Predictions, forecasts and targets are recycled in the
literature, deployed as arguments to conﬁrm particular
views of the future, rather than treated as best guesses
under uncertainty, and targets tend to be recycled as
predictions (e.g. the London Hydrogen Action Plan
picks up targets from the Japanese Vision).
 The literature tends to provide a rather top down view,
emphasising global and national drivers whilst paying
little attention to the local challenges and opportunities
associated with particular geographical areas.
 Few studies seek to systematically assess the broader
sustainability impacts of a large-scale transition to a
hydrogen economy. So for example there is little attempt
to deal with product life-cycle and waste/de-commis-
sioning issues—such as the possible toxicity of fuel cell
components or hydrogen storage materials.
 Many of the studies reviewed tend to treat prospective
developments in hydrogen in relative isolation, rather
than as embedded features of overarching energy and
transport systems. As a result they tend to give
insufﬁcient attention to the broader systems changes
required for the envisaged hydrogen futures to be
achieved, for example with respect to the primary
energy basis of particular Hydrogen routes.
Moreover, many of the descriptive futures appear to
display a pro-hydrogen bias, as is clear from the way that
barriers to a hydrogen transition are considered. For
example, the difﬁculty of storing hydrogen, a function of its
low mass, is framed not as a disadvantage, but as a
technological ‘challenge’.
On the basis of the above one could argue that there is a
need for more critical theoretically informed studies,
explicitly addressing the sustainability, energy and trans-
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port policy implications, and socio-technological dynamics
of the transition hydrogen. However, this criticism needs to
be set against the broader function of much of this
literature in stimulating imaginative thinking and so
‘opening up’ different possible socio-economic and tech-
nological futures, rather than ‘closing down’ possible
options on the basis of inevitably incomplete knowledge.
Furthermore, whilst this review has drawn attention to the
lack of rigour in the treatment of technological change and
socio-technical transitions found in much of the hydrogen
futures literature, one needs to balance this against the
limited predictive utility of current theoretical approaches
to these issues.
5.1.2. What can we learn from the hydrogen futures
literature?
The literature represents a rich resource describing the
diversity of opinions about possible and desirable hydro-
gen futures, demonstrating that the hydrogen economy is
not a simple, single idea. Moreover, this diversity of
opinions extends beyond possible hydrogen systems, and
includes the criteria on which those systems are understood
and evaluated, implying that purely technological under-
standings alone will be unable to deﬁne a single ‘sustain-
able hydrogen economy’.
More speciﬁcally, the questions explored in Section 4
provide insights into speciﬁc areas:
 Amidst a range of opinions about the types of factor
that will shape the future of hydrogen, four major policy
drivers are evident in the literature: climate change,
energy security, air pollution, and perceived competitive
advantage in developing hydrogen technologies.
 Three major barriers are also clear: infrastructure,
technological immaturity, and cost.
 In ‘business as usual’ scenarios, hydrogen emerges
slowly or not at all. In this literature, hydrogen only
emerges quickly where governments take strong action
in the face of climate change or security fears, or radical
technological or social change occur.
 There is no agreement on what a ‘hydrogen economy’
might look like.
 Despite uncertainty about how a hydrogen economy will
emerge and evolve, a series of ‘promising niches’ were
identiﬁed as playing important roles in a transition.
Widely divergent views exist on the likely dates of
‘market entry’ for fuel cell vehicles.
 There is considerable uncertainty over what, in terms of
greenhouse gas emissions, a transition to hydrogen
energy would achieve in the short to medium term.
5.2. Conclusion: no hydrogen economy, but many hydrogen
economies
Shared visions and expectations of the future can be
powerful forces in the shaping of technology, directing and
constraining research efforts by providing a mental map of
future ‘possibility space’; recruiting support; mobilising
resources; and providing a ‘protected space’ for new and
emergent technologies, whose future promise can do much
to offset their present poor performance (Geels and Smit,
2000; van Lente, 1993). The Hydrogen Economy is one
such vision, yet the range of possible hydrogen economies
depicted in this review demonstrate that the shape of a
future hydrogen economy is contested rather than shared.
Key disagreements focus on the sources of hydrogen, with
disputes over the roles of nuclear power and carbon
sequestration, while another set of disagreements focus on
the conﬁguration of infrastructure.
It may be that the indistinctness of the ‘hydrogen
economy’ is part of the key to its rhetorical power.
Berkhout (2004), borrowing a phrase from Bijker’s work
on the Social Construction of Technology (Bijker, 1995),
claims that visions with greater ‘interpretive flexibility’ have
a greater ability to compete among multiple possible
images of the future. This could help explain why many
of the roadmaps fail to specify what is meant by a
hydrogen economy—their very vagueness allows hydrogen
to become ‘all things to all men’.
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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
There  is  a large  literature  exploring  possible  hydrogen  futures,  using  various  modelling  and
scenario approaches.  This  paper compares  the  rates  of transition  depicted  in  that  literature
with a  set  of  historical  analogies.  These  analogies  are  cases  in  which  alternative-fuelled  vehi-
cles have  penetrated  vehicle  markets.  The  paper  suggests  that  the  literature  has  tended  to
be optimistic  about  the  possible  rate  at which  hydrogen  vehicles  might  replace  oil-based
transportation.  The  paper  compares  11  historical  adoptions  of  alternative  fuel  vehicles  with
24 scenarios  from  20  studies  that depict  possible  hydrogen  futures.  All  but  one  of  the hydro-
gen scenarios  show  vehicle  adoption  faster  than  has  occurred  for hybrid  electric  vehicles
in  Japan,  the  most  successful  market  for hybrids.  Several  scenarios  depict  hydrogen  transi-
tions occurring  at a rate  faster  than  has  occurred  in  any  of  the  historic  examples.  The paper
concludes  that scenarios  of alternative  vehicle  adoption  should  include  more  pessimistic
scenarios  alongside  optimistic  ones.
© 2015  The  Author.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This is  an open  access  article  under  the CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
There is a substantial existing empirical literature examining the rates at which technologies have historically diffused into
markets (Hirooka, 2006; Rogers, 2003). A number of authors have studied energy technologies in particular, including both
supply and demand technologies (Grübler et al., 1999; Lund, 2006; Nakicenovic, 1986; Wilson, 2010). This literature makes
clear that the diffusion of new energy technologies is frequently characterized by inertia (Fouquet, 2010; Grubler, 2012;
Kramer and Haigh, 2009). Incumbent socio-technical regimes are durable, for a number of technical, social and economic
reasons (Geels, 2002). The apparent stability of observed diffusion rates for power generation technologies has even led
Kramer and Haigh (2009) to propose that the relatively slow rates of adoption of energy technology can be described as
“laws” (Kramer and Haigh, 2009). In particular, barriers associated with the deployment of complementary goods – such
as new vehicles and the infrastructure to supply them with fuel – are important in determining the dynamics and speed of
alternative vehicle adoption (Meyer and Winebrake, 2009).
How  well do scenarios of future energy technology adoption represent this inertia? Studies of long-term technology
futures are an important source of evidence for policymakers considering interventions in R&D and technology deployment.
While many such studies have examined the potential for transitions to new low-carbon vehicles, very few have focused on
Abbreviations: AFV, alternative fuel vehicle; FCV, fuel cell vehicle; CNG, compressed natural gas; LPG, liqueﬁed petroleum gas; SUV, sports utility
vehicle;  HEV, hybrid electric vehicle.
E-mail address: w.mcdowall@ucl.ac.uk
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2015.10.004
2210-4224/© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
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the rate at which such a transition might be expected to occur. Over-optimistic rates of transition depicted in the literature, if
believed by policymakers to represent possible or likely futures, create two risks for policy. First, over-optimistic expectations
of transition rates may  lead to disappointment and perceived failure of an attempt to foster a new fuel. This could lead to policy
support being abandoned even when a technology has a good long-term potential. Second, if new technologies are required
to meet emissions goals but transitions are slow, action to initiate adoption of such vehicles must be taken sooner rather than
later. In contrast, over-optimistic adoption rates may  lead to policymakers adopting a wait-and-see approach, since such
scenarios imply that the vehicle market is more responsive to interventions than is in fact the case, and that policymakers can
wait and act later when more information is available about the relative performance and costs of particular technologies.
Furthermore, scenarios of possible transitions (to hydrogen or other low carbon systems) are widely used as inputs
into analyses of the costs and implications of such transitions. In the case of hydrogen, many studies have used exogenous
adoption scenarios as an input to calculations of the possible costs of hydrogen infrastructure, yet few have tested the
sensitivity of their ﬁndings to this assumption (Agnolucci and McDowall, 2013). One of the few studies to do so (Murthy
Konda et al., 2011) showed that the costs are indeed rather sensitive to assumptions about the rate at which a transition
might take place, with costs up to 40% higher in scenarios with slower demand growth. Others have used projections of
hydrogen demand as inputs into macro-economic analysis (Jokisch and Mennel, 2009).
Understanding whether the rates of alternative fuel vehicle adoption in scenarios are possible or likely is clearly desirable,
and one approach to attempt such validation is to examine historical precedents. Indeed, a number of recent authors have
taken this approach, both exploring future scenario consistency with historic patterns of the same technology (such as
historic and possible future deployment of nuclear), and also deriving insights from comparing future scenarios with historic
diffusion of analogous technologies. Wilson et al. (2012) describe the rationale for comparing historical technology diffusion
rates with those observed in long-term global energy modelling studies (using the MESSAGE and REMIND models), arguing
that learning from the past is important for testing the feasibility of future scenarios. Similarly, Höök et al. (2012) compare
two sets of global energy scenarios to historic global growth rates of fossil fuel and nuclear technologies. While Wilson
et al. (2012) ﬁnd that the scenarios they examine have been conservative with respect to technology deployment rates and
extents, Höök et al. (2012) show that the scenarios they examine have been optimistic compared with the slow pace of
historic energy resource growth. Other recent examples include van Sluisveld et al. (2015) and Iyer et al. (2015).
However, it is also clear that transitions in the past are conditioned by social, economic and technological contexts that will
change in future. How can evidence from the past then be used to inform our judgements about whether these scenarios do
indeed represent possible, or even likely, futures? Betz (2010) provides some guidance here, by clarifying different domains
of ‘possibility’ with respect to scenarios. To say that something is possible, in his view, means that its occurrence is consistent
with what we know (or alternatively, is not inconsistent with what we  know1); in which case, a judgement on whether
something is possible is dependent on a certain source of knowledge. In this context, historic analogies can be understood
as providing knowledge about the nature of change in vehicle systems—these analogies represent ‘what we  know’ about
how fast such change can occur. This is not to say that this body of knowledge deﬁnes the limits of what is possible. Rather,
it shows what range of futures is ‘consistent with what we know’, and what can thus be stated as ‘realistic’ or ‘serious’
possibility.
Though differently framed, this approach has some resonance with the work of Wiek et al. (2013), who have suggested
that the “plausibility” of scenario elements can be to some extent validated by looking at whether similar things have
happened in the past. Implicitly, their deﬁnition of plausibility is similar to the ‘consistent with what we know’ approach of
Betz (2010) and it is that sense in which the term ‘plausible’ is used here.
This paper compares rates of diffusion of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) in scenarios with a set of historical alternative
fuelled vehicle analogies. In doing so, it assesses future scenarios in terms of their consistency with our historical knowledge
about technology diffusion. The paper also examines the socio-political and techno-economic characteristics that have been
associated with rapid alternative vehicle adoption in the past, and uses this to reﬂect on the appropriateness of this historical
knowledge for thinking about the future possibilities for hydrogen. Previous studies have drawn on historical examples of
alternative fuelled vehicle transitions to inform the potential for hydrogen FCVs (Backhaus and Bunzeck, 2010; Hu and
Green, 2011; Yeh, 2007). However, this paper is the ﬁrst to draw on such examples to address the question of how fast
alternative fuelled vehicles can be plausibly assumed to penetrate vehicle markets. The paper thus addresses the following
two questions: how fast have new types of vehicle achieved a given market share in the passenger car ﬂeet? Are the rates of
adoption in hydrogen futures in the literature consistent with these historic analogies?
2. Methods: comparing rates of alternative vehicle adoption
The approach taken by this study was four-fold:
1 Identiﬁcation of relevant analogies and collection of data;
2 Examination of key attributes of each analogy;
1 The distinction being between veriﬁcationist and falsiﬁcationist positions.
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3 Identiﬁcation and characterisation of scenarios of hydrogen fuel cell vehicle adoption;
4  Comparison of adoption rates between scenarios and historic analogies;
Each historical example took place in a different set of circumstances. The rates of adoption observed in the analogies can
only be seen as an approximate guide for how alternative-fuelled vehicle substitutions might unfold. The paper therefore
does not estimate precise quantitative differences in rates between the historical analogies and the scenarios in the literature.
Instead, it brings together a body of knowledge that enables an assessment of whether such scenarios have been collectively
optimistic.
2.1. Identifying appropriate analogies for hydrogen transitions
The purpose in selecting analogies is to identify past events that provide insight into the situation faced by hydrogen
vehicles.  With hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, a new fuel and new drivetrain are being introduced simultaneously. As with
previous attempts to stimulate transitions to alternative fuel vehicles, hydrogen mobility does not offer signiﬁcant beneﬁts
to the consumer in terms of new or different features. Analogies with shifts between transport modes – such as from horse
to car – are not appropriate.
The  following approach was taken to identifying appropriate analogies. Studies reporting barriers to the diffusion of
alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) were reviewed (Browne et al., 2012; Byrne and Polonsky, 2001; Leiby and Rubin, 2004;
Melaina and Bremson, 2008; Petschnig et al., 2014; Struben and Sterman, 2008). From these, and from the wider literature
on innovation diffusion (Rogers, 2003) and the literature speciﬁc to possible hydrogen transitions (McDowall and Eames,
2006) a set of factors inhibiting rapid adoption of AFVs was identiﬁed. These are:
• The  well-known ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem (car makers cannot sell cars until the refuelling infrastructure is in place;
infrastructure providers cannot recoup investment until there are cars using the fuel).
• The  possibility that the attempted transition will fail generates signiﬁcant investment risks, relevant for infrastructure
providers, adopters and vehicle manufacturers (where new manufacturing investments are required).
• Low  visibility/trialability for consumers. Lack of opportunities to test and get to know the technology will ensure it remains
outside the choice set of potential consumers (Rogers 2003).
• Limited  choice set for early adopters: a limited range of vehicle models on offer will mean that consumers who are seeking
a  particular category of vehicle (such as a small urban car or an SUV) may  be completely excluded from the potential pool
of  adopters (Leiby and Rubin, 2004).
Historical analogies were then identiﬁed that also faced some or all of the four key challenges identiﬁed from the literature
review. Several candidate analogies were identiﬁed directly from the review of barriers to adoption, since they were discussed
in the literature referred to above. A further search for candidate analogies was  made by searching for reports and papers
discussing alternative fuel vehicles in general, and for speciﬁc fuels and vehicle types. Analogies were only included where
they had reached a minimum of 5% share of the ﬂeet; examples with less adoption than this are unhelpful for the comparison
with the scenarios, which represent successful adoption with higher levels of penetration. The scenarios represent adoption
of FCVs as passenger vehicles. As a result, data for the historical analogies have also been expressed in terms of the share of
passenger vehicles2.
From this process, several types of alternative vehicle were identiﬁed that clearly faced some of the barriers: compressed
natural gas (CNG), liqueﬁed petroleum gas (LPG, also known as autogas) and hybrid electric vehicles. Data was sought on
transitions involving these vehicles, and where data was available, they were included.
Biofuels are frequently cited as an alternative fuel, and so attempts to foster transitions to biofuel powered vehicles were
also considered for inclusion. However, biofuels generally require only very minor, or no, adjustment to the vehicle, and so
were deemed to be an inappropriate analogy, since few of the barriers faced by hydrogen are common to biofuels. There
is one exception: pure ethanol cars, which were introduced in Brazil during the late 1970s, require either major engine
adjustments or the production of new cars. These were therefore included as an analogy.
Finally, the process of adoption of diesel as a fuel for cars in France has been included. Prior to the 1970s, diesel was
almost exclusively a fuel for heavy duty vehicles. While automakers had offered a number of diesel taxi models during the
1950s, the ﬁrst mass-market high-speed compact diesel car, the Peugeot 204BD, was  introduced in 1967 in France. Countries
following France’s lead faced lower barriers: whereas in the early years of the French diesel transition, only a few diesel
passenger car models were available, the French market paved the way for others (this was both because of the increased
range of vehicle models on sale via exports of French cars, and also the greater visibility to consumers of diesel as a fuel for
cars rather than heavy duty vehicles). The analogy for hydrogen thus becomes much weaker in the follower markets.
The ﬁve types of alternative vehicle, and the countries in which their deployment has been attempted, is shown in Table 1,
along with hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles. The table provides the author’s assessment of the extent to which each type of
2 The term ‘passenger vehicle’ and ‘car’ are used interchangeably in this paper, though it is worth noting that the deﬁnition of passenger vehicle includes
light  trucks (i.e., pick-ups).
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Table 1
Historical analogies, and the strength of barriers faced in each of four categories.
Alternative vehicle type Countries Strength of barriers to rapid adoption




Liqueﬁed Petroleum Gas (LPG)
vehicles
Lithuania, Turkey, Poland and
the Netherlands.
Medium Weak Medium None
Compressed  Natural Gas (CNG)
vehicles
Argentina, New Zealand,
Pakistan  and Iran
Medium Weak Medium None
Pure  ethanol vehicles Brazil Strong Medium Medium Weak
Diesel  passenger cars France Weak Weak Weak Strong
Hybrid  electric vehicles Japan None Weak Strong Strong
Hydrogen  fuel cell vehicles Strong Strong Strong Strong
transition was confronted with each of the four key barriers identiﬁed earlier. A more detailed version of the table, with
explanations as to how the relative strength of barriers was  assessed, is available in Supplementary Online Material. As can
be seen from the table, all of the selected barriers face some or all of the barriers faced by hydrogen, though to differing
degrees.
Data was collected from industry associations representing the LPG and CNG vehicle markets, from national statistical
agencies, and from report on vehicle statistics and road transport trends and markets. Data sources for each of the historical
analogies included in the analysis are reported in the Supplementary Online Material I.
Some potential historical analogues are excluded. In Korea, LPG vehicles have reached a share of around 19% of the
light duty vehicle ﬂeet. The introduction of LPG vehicles started at the very beginnings of mass motorization in Korea, in
the 1970s, and no good data from this early period has been identiﬁed. In 1982, the share of LPG in transport sector fuel
consumption was the same as that of petrol, at 7%, and the sector was  dominated by diesel for heavy goods vehicles, with
very low motorization rates for passenger cars and other light duty vehicles; (Ishiguro and Akiyama, 1995; Sathaye, 1984).
At the time Korea was highlighted as notable for experimenting with the fuel, and was seen as potentially leading down
a non-petrol motorization route (Bharier, 1982). The introduction of LPG in the 1970s was thus not the introduction of a
new fuel and vehicle type to replace an incumbent, it was rather the simultaneous development of two  competing fuels
and powertrains, petrol and LPG. In contrast, attempts to deploy hydrogen cars will take place in the presence of a very
well-entrenched incumbent. LPG in Korea is thus a poor analogy for this process.
Two other exclusions have been made on the basis of insufﬁcient data. There is a high proportion of LPG cars in Bulgaria
(WLPGA, 2005), but insufﬁcient time series data was identiﬁed to characterize their diffusion over time. Similarly, Armenia
has a high proportion of CNG cars, but here too data was not identiﬁed to enable analysis of adoption rate.
Note  that the sample of historical transitions is also skewed towards the inclusion of those that have had relatively rapid
and successful transitions, in part since data is only available for vehicles that have had non-negligible deployment, and
in part because slower transitions are of less interest for the analysis in this paper. The paper is aimed at exploring the
plausible upper bound on rates of new vehicle adoption, rather than attempting to establish an estimate of what constitutes
a ‘normal’ rate. However, the record of historical analogies, including those used here, includes many examples of attempts
that ultimately failed, in the sense that the new vehicle type did not replace the incumbent technology. This includes
those that were initially very fast (as in New Zealand and Brazil) and those that were much slower, as with the Dutch LPG
experience. This suggests that there is no simple relationship between adoption rate and failure, and that the inclusion of
historic failures does not undermine the relevance of the analogies for comparison with future scenarios.
2.2.  Comparing rates of vehicle adoption: direct comparison of market share
Typically, analysts have found that the diffusion of innovations follows an s-shaped curve, with a three-parameter logistic
curve often found to ﬁt best (Grübler et al., 1999; Wilson, 2010). The logistic curve can be used to compare the rates at which
technologies have historically diffused into markets and replaced an existing incumbent (Wilson, 2010). However, using the
logistic model to compare rates of transition suffers from a number of weaknesses in the context of the present study. In
order to use the logistic model, one either needs to have a sufﬁcient time series to be able to identify the saturation point
at which the alternative vehicle reaches 100% of its ultimate market share; or one needs to make assumptions about the
ultimate market share. Unfortunately, many of the historic analogies have yet to reach their saturation point, and using a
logistic curve to forecast the saturation point is well known to be highly inaccurate (Martino, 2003). One option would be
to assume that any alternative fuel car is a direct substitute for all cars, and that the ultimate market potential for a new
fuel is 100%. However, this would ignore the diversity of market segments that can be observed in real vehicle markets. The
adoption of diesel as a fuel shows signs of saturating in European markets well below 100% of the car ﬂeet. The weaknesses
of the logistic approach preclude its use as the main metric for comparison of historic analogies and future scenarios.
This paper thus adopts an alternative approach. The question here is how one can best compare the rates at which new
vehicle-fuel combinations have penetrated vehicle markets. Where good data exists on the year of introduction of a vehicle, it
is possible to simply compare transitions directly by examining market shares at various years following introduction. Unlike
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Fig. 1. Alternative vehicles as a share of the vehicle ﬂeet: 11 historical analogies.
the approach based on the logistic model, this does not have the advantage of generating a neat metric of transition rate
(such as the t metric discussed by Grübler et al. (1999) or Wilson (2010)). However, it does avoid the need for assumptions
that may  not be warranted on the basis of the heterogeneous transitions in the historical record and the projected future.
Identifying ‘market introduction’ is not always straightforward (nor indeed is the identiﬁcation of any benchmark of
technology diffusion, such as 1% market penetration). National vehicle statistics do not always record vehicle registrations
of car types when very small numbers are concerned, and data on alternative vehicle numbers is often patchy, with data
available in some years but not in others. In some cases, there is good data on the ﬁrst refuelling station available for public
use for a particular fuel, or the entry onto the market of the ﬁrst mass-produced vehicle using a particular fuel (e.g., the
pure-ethanol Fiat 147 introduced in Brazil in 1979). However, other cases make it more difﬁcult to clearly identify the point
of introduction. In Pakistan, a number of ‘pilot’ CNG refuelling stations and vehicles were deployed in the early 1980s, but
it is not clear whether this represents the introduction of the vehicles, since news articles from that period clearly indicate
that these were viewed as experimental more than commercial. Similarly, in Iran, plans to convert vehicles to CNG were
adopted shortly before the revolution, in the late 1970s, with 2000 vehicles converted to run on CNG (Mohammadi et al.,
2011). Subsequently some early ﬂeet vehicles (numbering around 1200) were converted to CNG in the city of Mashad in
the early 1980s (Kakaee and Paykani, 2013). However, these early activities do not appear to have been followed through
during the 1990s, and thus these early experiments are ignored for the basis of estimating ‘market launch’.
It  is typically more straightforward to identify market launch in projections of hydrogen vehicle futures than it is in the
historical record. However, here too there are sources of error, particularly where data is only available by digitizing ﬁgures
published in papers and reports. Most of the hydrogen futures studies against which historical transitions are compared
are either explicitly or implicitly assuming that the transition begins at the point of mass market ‘launch’, rather than
demonstration or pilot projects. In the data used here, the point at which introduction of the vehicle-fuel combination is
aimed at the mass market has been identiﬁed, rather than using the establishment of pilot refuelling stations or the launch
of prototype vehicles as a basis for comparison of the transition rates.
3. Historical transitions—insights from diffusion patterns
Having  set out the rationale and method, this section reports on the historical analogies themselves. Each group of
analogies is discussed in turn, with brief descriptions of the key techno-economic characteristics of the vehicles and fuels,
as well as key socio-technical developments associated with the analogies. Note that only summaries are given here; more
detailed versions of these histories are given in Supplementary Online Material II.
The socio-technical developments are described using the terminology and framework of the multi-level perspective
on technological transitions (Geels, 2002), in particular the concepts of “regime” and “landscape” are used. The “landscape”
level describes the background and long-term processes that lie outside the immediate inﬂuence of a socio-technical system.
The “regime” refers to the actors, technologies, networks and institutions involved in the production, use and governance
of cars.
Data on historic transitions were collected from a wide range of sources, and these are given in Supplementary Online
Material III. The historic transitions are shown in Fig. 1, up to 30 years following market introduction of the new vehicle
type. Transitions are also show against real time in Figs. 2, 3, 4, and 5.
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Fig. 2. LPG and CNG transitions.
Fig. 3. Diesel car adoption in France.
3.1. LPG and CNG transitions
Both  CNG and LPG have been used sporadically as a vehicle fuel for over a century. However, it is only since the 1970s
that these fuels started to penetrate vehicle markets at signiﬁcant market shares (adoption patterns show in Fig. 2).
3.1.1. Key techno-economic characteristics
As previously noted, both CNG and LPG are used in internal combustion engines, and can be retroﬁtted on existing
petrol  or diesel vehicles, signiﬁcantly facilitating rapid adoption. Furthermore, both fuels are widely used for non-transport
purposes, and there is thus a large existing network of production and distribution facilities. Construction of infrastructure
for adoption of these fuels in the transport sector is thus much less challenging than it would be for fuels that have not been
widely used.
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Fig. 4. Adoption of pure-ethanol cars in Brazil.
Fig. 5. Hybrid vehicle diffusion in Japan.
3.1.2. Landscape and regime developments
CNG and LPG have been promoted by national governments—often for reasons of energy security. In Argentina for exam-
ple, domestic national gas reserves provided a strong rationale for public support for adoption of natural gas, particularly
following the country’s default and currency devaluation, which substantially raised the cost of oil imports. Similarly, New
Zealand’s attempt to manage a transition to natural gas vehicles in the 1980s was  inspired by the oil crises of the 1970s,
and achieved rapid conversion of cars reaching around 10% of the ﬂeet within a decade. Local governments (e.g. Karachi)
have also provided support, because of the reduced emissions of air pollutants from CNG and LPG as compared with petrol
or diesel. A summary of the regime-level (including policy) and landscape conditions and developments underpinning each
example is shown in Table 2.
3.2. Diesel fuel for private cars
Diesel as a fuel for passenger cars was launched in France in 1967, with the introduction of the Peugeot 204BD. The
subsequent market growth of diesel cars is shown in Fig. 3.
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Table 2
Summary of regime and landscape developments and conditions of each of the CNG and LPG historical analogies.
Key policy and other regime-level developments Key landscape developments and conditions
Argentina CNG Signiﬁcant policy support in the form of price controls; enacted in
order to improve security of supply and reduce the import
dependence
Financial  crisis and devaluation of the Argentine Peso;
discovery of domestic gas resources
Pakistan CNG Signiﬁcant policy support through preferential pricing and support
for  infrastructure; enacted in order to improve security of supply
and  reduce the import dependence. Urban air quality has also been
an  important policy driver
Pakistan has some domestic natural gas reserves, but is
strongly  dependent on imports for oil products.
Iran CNG Strong policy support in the form of subsidised gas supply, and
generous  support for vehicle conversions. The policy has been
justiﬁed  on the basis of severe petrol shortages, fostered by high
petrol subsidies, in the presence of limited reﬁnery capacity; in
addition to the unmanageable costs to government of petrol
subsidies,  and political difﬁculties of subsidy reform
Imposition of trade sanctions by the international
community has exacerbated an existing constraint on
domestic  reﬁnery capacity expansion, resulting in severe
petrol  shortages; enormous domestic gas resources
New  Zealand CNG Very strong policy support (subsidies for both fuel and conversion)
was  introduced in the wake of the oil crisis and discovery of
domestic  natural gas. Conﬁdence in conversions fell as many were
of low quality; policy support was  removed as oil prices fell and
costs to government mounted
Oil crises of the 1970s; discovery of domestic gas
resources. Subsequent decline in oil price contributed to
policy  withdrawal
Netherlands LPG Initiated as a result of price advantage of LPG, which was  produced
as  a by-product from reﬁneries. Later policy support, in the 1980s,
was justiﬁed by the need to protect Dutch business investments in
the LPG sector
Surplus LPG production from reﬁneries and the natural gas
industry;  1957 Suez crisis a major boost to LPG demand;
later  oil crises also stimulated LPG vehicle demand
Lithuania LPG Reduced rates of fuel duty for LPG No major landscape developments
Poland  LPG Tax exemptions for LPG have encouraged adoption No major landscape developments
Turkey  LPG Turkey’s LPG boom occurred as a result of the tax exemption for
LPG, which was initiated for use of LPG as a domestic heating and
cooking fuel, not initially for transport. Commentators suggest this
does not stem from a co-ordinated effort to promote LPG as a
vehicle  fuel, but is instead a product of policy inconsistency across
sectors
No major landscape developments
3.2.1. Techno-economic characteristics
Since diesel fuel is relatively widely available for heavy goods vehicles, the barriers posed from an infrastructure per-
spective are relatively low. Key barriers for early diesel adoption are: the limited range of vehicle models; the perception
of consumers that diesel was a fuel not for cars but for heavy duty vehicles; and the investment risks for car manufactur-
ers, in light of uncertainties about consumer acceptance of diesel cars. Diesel engine technology was well known, and the
technological adaptations required for introducing diesel as a mass-market private car technology were relatively
low (particularly when compared with the technological challenges of introducing hydrogen fuel cells). Diesel vehicles
are more expensive than their petrol counterparts of similar size and class, but they are more efﬁcient, which typically
results in lower running costs.
3.2.2. Landscape and regime developments
Preferential taxation of diesel fuel – introduced for a number of reasons (discussed in the Supplementary material) –
played an important role in the promotion of diesel cars. Government support for diesel has arisen for a variety of reasons,
including the higher efﬁciency of diesel cars, and the relative comparative advantage of French and European vehicle man-
ufacturers in diesel technologies. It has also been suggested that landscape developments were important for the French
promotion of diesel vehicles (particularly a surplus middle-distillates of oil, which emerged from the late 1960s as France
began to switch away from oil as a heating and power generation fuel; see the Supplementary material for further details,
and relevant references).
3.3.  Pure bioethanol in Brazil
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw rapid adoption of pure ethanol cars in Brazil, alongside the development of consid-
erable refuelling infrastructure (see Fig. 4).
3.3.1. Techno-economic characteristics
Pure ethanol cannot be used in a petrol engine without substantial adjustments, though such conversion is possible. The
basic internal combustion engine technology is very similar, and few changes need to be made to manufacturing plant to
produce pure-ethanol cars. This meant that substantial new investments in car production were not required. The costs of
such vehicles are not signiﬁcantly different than for petrol cars. Refuelling stations also need to be adapted to safely store
and handle pure ethanol.
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Table  3
Summary of the future scenarios included in the analysis.
Type of Study Studies included
Stakeholder process HyWays (2008); McKinsey (2010); NHA (2009)
Exogenous input into further analysis Almansoori and Shah (2009); Ball et al. (2007); Lin et al. (2008)
Hydrogen  transition model Greene et al. (2007) Keles et al. (2008); Leaver et al. (2009)
Energy  system optimisation model Bahn et al. (2013); Contaldi et al. (2008); Endo (2007); Martens et al. (2006);
McCollum et al. (2012); Rits et al. (2003); Strachan et al. (2009); Tseng et al. (2005);
Winskel et al. (2008)
3.3.2. Landscape and regime developments
The landscape conditions for Brazil’s push to adopt pure ethanol vehicles are striking: in the late 1970s, the oil price rose
rapidly, creating severe pressure on the country’s balance of payments. At the same time, global prices for one of Brazil’s
major exports (sugar) had crashed, further exacerbating the economic problem.
The Brazilian government, which at the time was  a military dictatorship, initiated very strong support for conversion to
pure ethanol vehicles. Ethanol was seen as a route to energy independence, and ultimately also export markets and industrial
strength. Policy support included fuel price ﬁxing and subsidies for ethanol production facilities. Fuel distribution was in the
hands of a state-owned monopoly (Petrobras), which initiated construction of large numbers of ethanol refuelling stations.
The costs to government of maintaining this programme were estimated at 17% of the Brazilian government’s 1983 budget
(Sathaye et al., 1989).
Subsequent  landscape and regime developments led to the withdrawal of state support for pure ethanol cars, including:
slower than anticipated technological improvements and cost reductions in ethanol technologies; ethanol shortages that
damaged consumer conﬁdence; global falls in oil prices.
3.4.  Hybrid electric vehicles in Japan
Hybrid electric vehicles were launched by Toyota and Honda in the late 1990s. The pattern of growth is shown in Fig. 5.
3.4.1. Techno-economic characteristics
Hybrid electric vehicles are more expensive than their non-hybrid counterparts, but the running costs are lower, mak-
ing them attractive when fuel prices are high, and for those motorists with high annual mileage. There is no additional
infrastructure required for refuelling. However, hybrids represent signiﬁcant changes to the vehicle powertrain, and the
introduction of hybrids required substantial investments in manufacturing plant.
3.4.2. Landscape and regime developments
Hybrid electric vehicles entered the market at a time when concerns about climate change were rising rapidly; and
subsequently, high oil prices resulted in consumers making substantial shifts away from ‘gas guzzling’ models. Automotive
manufacturers globally were quick to follow the lead taken by Toyota and Honda, and the range of manufacturers producing
hybrids, and the range of vehicle models, has risen. However, consumers still have a relatively narrow range of hybrid
models from which to choose (US data show 32 models available in 2010, compared to many hundreds of non-hybrid
models).  Policymakers have also provided incentives for adoption of hybrids, including both purchase tax incentives, and
preferential parking and road pricing policies.
4. Rates of hydrogen transition in the literature
Having discussed the historical analogies, this section now turns to the hydrogen FCV adoption scenarios. A wide variety
of approaches have been used to construct descriptions of the future of hydrogen vehicles. Though all of these are described
here as ‘scenarios’ – since they provide depictions of futures thought to be possible – they differ in their methodological
underpinnings, and in the sources of knowledge on which they are based. None of the studies examined described itself as a
forecast. However, such differences between scenario studies – in methodological approaches, levels of detail and motivating
objective – are often lost outside the relevant research communities that produce them (Loftus et al., 2015). Despite the
diverse methodological origins, examining this body of scenarios as a whole is useful because these scenarios represent the
collective published view of the possibility space for hydrogen vehicle adoption.
Rates of hydrogen vehicle adoption from four types of futures study were examined (the studies included for each of the
four types is shown in Table 3):
1 Studies in which a fuel cell vehicle penetration scenario is developed as a result of a stakeholder process. These draw
on  a wide and diverse body of knowledge and expectations, often backed up by some formal quantitative analysis. As
such,  they embody a diversity of sources of knowledge, including subjective beliefs built on personal and professional
experiences alongside formal analytic processes. As contributions to the policy discourse, they are also emblematic of the
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Fig. 6. Transitions in the literature: proportion of the vehicle stock that is hydrogen vehicles in the futures examined. The ﬁgure shows stakeholder based
studies  (solid blue), scenarios assumed as inputs into other analysis (green dots), dedicated hydrogen transition models (purple dashes) and energy system
models  (red tramlines). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
‘futures work’ (McDowall, 2012; Pollock and Williams, 2010) of key innovation system actors, who  have strong interests
in  articulating a credible and optimistic view of the future of hydrogen.
2 Studies in which an assumed trajectory of FCV adoption is used as an analytic input into further analysis, such as for
analysis of the costs of hydrogen infrastructure development. One might expect that considerably less analytic thought
has  gone into such scenarios as compared with the ﬁrst category, since these scenarios are simply starting assumptions
for more detailed analysis. In the studies examined here, the assumed adoption scenarios are statements about the future
that  are presented as possible, but without any explicit justiﬁcation for why they might be thought to be possible.
3 Studies in which the diffusion of hydrogen vehicles is projected through a dedicated hydrogen transition model. These
scenarios have been developed by analysts seeking to represent the key processes driving a transition to a hydrogen-fuelled
transportation system, using an agent-based model (Keles et al., 2008), a system-dynamics model (Leaver et al., 2009), and
non-linear  optimisation (Greene et al., 2007). They share a focus on modelling the processes by which increasing returns to
adoption3 enables a self-sustaining transition to emerge. They represent attempts to capture the most signiﬁcant dynamics
of  AFV transitions within a formal modelling framework.
4 Studies in which the adoption of fuel cell vehicles is projected by an energy systems optimisation model (ESOM), such as
MARKAL/TIMES. These models take the perspective of a single social planner, optimising the energy system (including the
deployment of fuel cell vehicles, and hydrogen demand and supply) to meet policy targets.
The  range of studies is shown in Fig. 6. From 20 studies, 24 scenarios are compared. Most are national-scale studies though
two are from a US State (California (Lin et al., 2008; McCollum et al., 2012)) and two for the EU (HyWays, 2008; McKinsey,
2010) are included. Several studies contained more than one scenario, however in many cases only sufﬁcient results were
available from a single scenario for estimation of market penetration of hydrogen vehicles over time.
It  is interesting to observe that scenarios produced by energy system optimisation models (ESOMs) tend to be the most
rapid. This can partly be explained by the formulation of ESOMs, which tend to represent consumers as having homogenous
preferences, operating under perfect foresight and with cost-optimisation as the sole decision criterion. This gives such
models a tendency to rapidly deploy a cost-effective technology. In contrast, the scenarios developed through stakeholder
processes reﬂect the accumulated experience and insights of a body of people some of whom have been involved in bringing
new vehicle technologies to market. These tend to be among the more gradual transitions.
5. Results: comparison of transition rates in historical analogies and hydrogen futures
A comparison of the hydrogen futures and historic analogies is shown graphically in Fig. 7. The ﬁgure shows the historic
analogies with the fastest diffusion, since it is this upper bound – the fastest historic examples – that are of principal interest
in determining a plausible upper bound on alternative fuel futures. These upper bounds are compared with the minimum,
maximum, and quartiles for the range of hydrogen futures, through the use of box-and-whisker plots.
3 As increasing numbers of users adopt a new vehicle technology, the attractiveness of that technology to others increases, because of increased visibility,
growing  infrastructure and greater provision of associated maintenance services, reduced capital costs associated with learning-by-doing, among other
factors.  These are forces are known collectively as resulting in ‘increasing returns to adoption’.
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Fig. 7. Box-and-whisker plot showing the range of forecasts in the hydrogen futures literature. Boxes show the interquartile range, intersected by the
median,  while the whiskers show the minima and maxima. Lines show the fastest historical analogues in each group.
Several key points can be seen from this ﬁgure. First, the maximum penetration from historical examples is well below the
maximum from the futures literature. Around a quarter of the hydrogen futures depict transitions that occur more rapidly
than has previously been experienced for a switch to a new vehicle/fuel type. These very fast scenarios are largely derived
from energy system optimisation models, which have a well-known tendency to rapid technology deployment (Jaccard
et al., 2003).
The  chart also shows the exceptional nature of Brazil’s attempt to make a transition to pure-ethanol cars. Unlike the
CNG/LPG transitions, all of which relied to some extent on after-market vehicle conversion and bi-fuel operation, the Brazilian
case largely relied on new vehicles running only on ethanol.
The  bulk of scenarios examined – and the median scenario – does fall within the range of historical precedents. However,
with the notable exception of Brazil, all of the rapid transitions involved signiﬁcant after-market conversion and bi-fuel
operation.
Only one of the hydrogen futures examined (one of the HyWays scenarios, developed on the basis of stakeholder input as
well as quantitative analysis) takes place more slowly than the adoption of hybrid electric vehicles in Japan, which is the most
successful market for hybrids. Despite hybrid electric cars generally being seen as a commercial and technological success,
and one for which no infrastructure adjustment was  necessary, their uptake has been slower than almost all hydrogen
futures examined.
6.  Discussion and conclusions
6.1.  Lessons for hydrogen from the past
The historical precedents for alternative fuel vehicle adoption suggest – as shown in Fig. 7 – that scenarios for the future
of hydrogen have tended to be optimistic about the rate at which vehicle adoption might take place.
This  optimism appears particularly acute when one considers that none of the historical transitions examined faced
barriers as substantial as those facing the development of a hydrogen FCV system. In particular:
• Some  existing distribution facilities existed before market entry for most of the examples. Diesel was  available in a portion
of  ﬁlling stations in France before diesel engines became widespread in passenger cars, signiﬁcantly reducing the infras-
tructure burden; countries adopting CNG vehicles had existing distribution infrastructures for natural gas for residential
and service sector consumption; LPG is widely distributed as a fuel for cooking and heating in most of the countries in which
LPG  has become widely adopted. Ethanol blends had been promoted in Brazil prior to the introduction of pure ethanol
vehicles, and as a result an existing ethanol production and distribution infrastructure was widespread (though new ded-
icated  fuel pumps were required for pure ethanol cars). For hybrid electric vehicles, of course, no new fuel distribution
facilities were required.
• In  countries adopting CNG and LPG, a large portion of these vehicles are relatively cheap retroﬁts. This means that a wide
variety of vehicle models was available to potential consumers. Furthermore, conversion means that rapid adoption can
take  place without retiring existing vehicles before they reach the end of their useful lives. Finally, the costs to consumers of
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adoption are low (conversion costs much less than buying a new vehicle outright) and relatively low risk, since conversions
need not be permanent.
• Many  CNG and LPG vehicles are bi-fuelled, able to run on both petrol and the alternative fuel, considerably reducing the
barriers  to adoption in the face of limited alternative fuel ﬁlling stations.
• All  of the transitions involved the use of internal combustion engine technology that was  well understood and mass-
produced at the time at which ‘market launch’ occurred. The changes implied by these transitions for upstream
manufacturing capacity were limited in many of the cases, suggesting relatively low investment risks for automotive
manufacturers. Diesel cars in France required the development of new manufacturing plants for diesel passenger cars, but
the  mass-production of diesel engines was well established. For ethanol vehicles in Brazil, existing manufacturing plants
were  used to produce pure-ethanol vehicles with minimal disruption. The exception is hybrid electric vehicles, for which
new  manufacturing capacity, involving new technology, was required to produce the new vehicles.
Only one transition – the Brazilian attempt to foster pure-ethanol vehicles – involved rapid adoption in the face of
production of new vehicles and the necessary construction of distribution and ﬁlling station infrastructure for a new fuel.
The particular nature of the governance arrangements (nationally owned fuel distribution company under a military gov-
ernment), the global economic circumstances (sugar market collapse, oil price crisis), and the scale of costs required to
achieve such a rapid transition are striking. Ultimately, the scale of resources required to support this transition was  judged
unsustainable, and support was withdrawn.
6.2. Rapid technology transitions: what do scenarios need to explain?
The  hydrogen futures examined emphasise the technical and economic dimensions of socio-technical change. Most are
derived from formal quantitative simulation or optimisation models, and most others are at least informed by such models.
These studies put in the foreground the techno-economics of vehicle adoption and choice: costs, stock turn-over rates,
vehicle efﬁciencies and so on. However, the historic examples of the fastest transitions suggest that typically it is unusual
political and social circumstances – often associated with landscape-level developments – that underpin rapid transitions.
In the cases of Argentina and Iran, it was a sudden currency devaluation and severe economic sanctions, respectively, that
enabled rapid adoption of CNG. In Brazil, it was the exposure to oil price shocks and sugar price volatility.
What  becomes interesting in scenarios of rapid alternative fuel transitions is thus not only the techno-economics, but
the politics and social dynamics: what kinds of political and social circumstances are required for, or implied by, scenarios of
rapid hydrogen adoption? Under what circumstances might the political legitimacy of an attempt to transform road transport
with advanced fuel cell vehicles be achieved? These questions are rarely asked in scenarios that depict quantitative projec-
tions of hydrogen transitions. However, they shift the burden of plausibility in such scenarios: how can scenarios of rapid
transition explain themselves in socio-political terms? Clearly, radical scenarios are possible—but a failure to engage with
and confront the socio-political dynamics of rapid change reduces the usefulness of a scenario exercise by obscuring critically
important uncertainties. Rather than focus on whether a high carbon tax or infrastructure subsidy will catalyse a transition
to a hydrogen-fuelled transport system, scenarios should perhaps also consider where and under what circumstances such
sustained political support might come about.
The point here is that rapid transition scenarios do have a place in thinking about the possible future of alternative fuelled
vehicles. But where such scenarios are used to inform policy, it should be clear that these scenarios are perhaps unlikely to
occur in the absence of rather extreme social and political events. Scenarios that invoke only the application of policies with
a positive cost-beneﬁt ratio struggle to appear plausible if they depict such rapid change, and the developers of scenarios
depicting alternative vehicle transitions could improve scenarios by reﬂecting on the social and political implications of (or
requirements for) such rapid change.
6.3. Comparison with related work
Wilson et al. (2012) compare the rates of adoption of new energy technologies in two  energy models (MESSAGE and
REMIND) with past experience. They conclude that the models have been conservative in their depiction of technology
diffusion, in contrast with the results found here. This may  be in part because the historical analogues they explored focused
on the full technology life-cycle, rather than the ﬁrst decades after market introduction. Their work thus assessed rates over
longer durations, using the t metric derived from a logistic diffusion model. The results here are more in line with those
discussed by Höök et al. (2012), who ﬁnd that scenarios from two studies (a set of Shell scenarios and the GET global energy
systems optimisation model) signiﬁcantly overstate the rate at which energy transitions can be expected to take place, given
historical precedent.
6.4.  Conclusions
The analysis presented here provides important insights into plausible rates of adoption for alternative fuelled vehicles.
It should be clear that the analogies are limited in terms of their applicability to hydrogen, and the quantitative patterns
identiﬁed are limited by data weaknesses. Furthermore, the diffusion of new technologies is not a deterministic process,
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but rather is one that is historically contingent, as has been illustrated in the overview of key aspects of each of the historic
analogies. One should therefore be careful in drawing strong conclusions about likely future rates of technology diffusion
from a set of particular, imperfect historical analogies.
Together the assembled analogies provide a coherent body of knowledge against which to assess whether the future
scenarios are consistent with what we know about change in vehicle technology choice. In this comparison, the hydrogen
futures appear to have been collectively optimistic. The historical analogies do show that rapid transitions are possible,
but none of the transitions examined faced barriers as signiﬁcant as those faced by hydrogen. The apparent optimism over
transition rates in the literature is problematic, both because much subsequent analysis is informed by depicted transitions,
and because over-optimistic expectations about transition rates can damage the chances of applying effective policy.
We conclude that those studying hydrogen futures should include more conservative projections about the rate at which
a hydrogen fuelled transportation system might emerge, alongside analysis of more optimistic scenarios. It should be clear
that this does not mean that optimistic rates have no place: rapid substitutions have happened in the past, and as Tseng
et al. (2005) have noted, the scale of energy system change envisaged in most low-carbon scenarios is such that historical
precedent cannot be used as an unequivocal guide to what is possible. Indeed, one could argue that the levels of marginal
abatement cost (and hence carbon price) that are necessary to meet emissions targets would be hugely punitive to high-
emissions vehicles, and that under such circumstances transitions to low-carbon alternatives could be as rapid as those
experienced in Brazil (which was undergoing the oil crisis and which had massive government support) or in Iran, where it
is economic sanctions that have stimulated conversions to CNG. Furthermore, current efforts to introduce hydrogen fuel cell
vehicles are the product of intensive efforts to co-ordinate industrial and policy action across many countries simultaneously,
for which no precedent appears to exist. The conclusion is therefore that optimistic and pessimistic assumptions should both
be examined, and their implications understood.
A ﬁnal conclusion relates to the focus of both innovative efforts and futures studies in hydrogen vehicle developments,
which  focus almost exclusively on fuel cell vehicles. Bi-fuel and after-market conversion technologies for hydrogen internal
combustion vehicles are possible, and indeed a number of ﬁrms exist developing and promoting such technologies. These
incremental technologies are typically given short shrift in futures analysis. None of the 20 studies examined for this paper
included conversion of petrol cars to hydrogen, or explored bi-fuel vehicles that are powered by either hydrogen or petrol.
Yet the analysis here suggests that such technologies could play an important role in enabling a rapid uptake of hydrogen
fuelled vehicles. While internal combustion engines running on hydrogen are less efﬁcient than their fuel cell counterparts,
they offer a route for the fuel to be adopted more widely and more quickly. This kind of incremental technology may  be
essential in enabling proﬁtability of early refuelling infrastructure and so enabling hydrogen fuel to gain a critical mass of
market share.
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Technology roadmaps are increasingly usedby governments to informand promote technological
transitions, such as a transition to a hydrogen energy system. This paper develops a framework for
understanding how current roadmapping practice relates to emerging theories of the governance
of systems innovation. In applying this framework to a case study of hydrogen roadmaps, the
paper finds that roadmapping for transitions needs to place greater emphasis on ensuring good
quality and transparent analytic and participatory procedures. To be most useful, roadmaps
should be embedded within institutional structures that enable the incorporation of learning
and re-evaluation, but in practice most transition roadmaps are one-off exercises.







1. Introduction: roadmaps, transitions and hydrogen
Technology roadmaps have become ubiquitous in discussions of long term energy technology policy. Indeed, technology road-
mapping has found a place at the heart of global policy efforts for a low-carbon future: In 2008, the G8 andMajor Economies declared
“Wealso note the value of technology roadmaps as tools to promote continuous investment and cooperation in clean energy research,
development, demonstration, and deployment.” [1].
Increasingly, technology roadmaps are developed for major socio-technical systems changes, or technological transitions. This
paper examines the role of technology roadmaps as instruments in the governance of such long-term transitions. To do this, it
draws on a large literature on socio-technical change that has developed over recent years, but that has done so largely independently
of the literature on roadmapping. This paper seeks to bring together these separate but related strands of research, andmake recom-
mendations for the practice of roadmapping in transition policy.
To illustrate and inform the theoretical discussion, the paper draws on a case study of hydrogen roadmaps. Hydrogen energy –
a long-term and highly uncertain option for enabling deep decarbonisation of the energy system – has been a particular focus for
government-directed roadmapping activities. This paper draws on a review of hydrogen roadmaps to present a critical analysis of
the use of technology roadmapping as part of the ‘toolbox’ of policy-makers tasked with steering society towards a low-carbon
future.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces technology roadmapping, and describes the way in which roadmaps
have been adopted by policymakers seeking to facilitate transitions towards alternative, more sustainable, technological systems.
Section 2 draws on insights from socio-technical theory to illustrate how roadmaps can be used as tools in governance of transi-
tions, and uses this literature to develop a framework for evaluating roadmaps in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the case study,
hydrogen energy. Section 5 evaluates hydrogen energy roadmaps against the framework developed in Section 3, and Section 6
draws conclusions.
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2.1. Technology roadmapping: origins and use in industry
Technology roadmapping as a technique was brought to prominence in the academic literature by Galvin [2], in an editorial in
Science that highlighted the successful use of roadmapping at Motorola and in the semi-conductor industry. Since then, a large
literature has developed dealing with technology roadmapping in industry and within firms [3–7]. The approach has become
widespread, and can be seen as part of the ongoing trend for technology futures to be more actively organized and managed
both by private and public organisations [8].
Technology roadmaps allow technology developments to be integrated with business planning, and they allow assessment of the
impacts of new technologies andmarket developments on the prospects for a firm [5]. Roadmaps are developed in a number of ways,
and various scholars have produced outlines of the key stages of developing technology roadmaps (for excellent overviews, see [4,5]).
From this variety of approaches, a set of core practices can be identified:
• Roadmaps identify the major players in the innovation system, and provide an outline of the industry or emerging innovation
network.
• They describe the current status of a technology.
• They set out a view of the future of a technology, including the possibilities for its development and deployment.
• They identify needs and priorities—including R&D needs, and sometimes market and regulatory needs, such as codes and
standards.
• Those produced at the sectoral level (rather than by individual firms) aim to offer a consensus view of the way forward. As a
result, they are almost always collaborative, or at least consultative, in the sense that they include the views of different
teams, groups and stakeholders.
• They are frequently – but not always – depicted graphically [9].
• Many roadmaps – but by no means all – involve regular updates and monitoring of progress against milestones and targets. The
roadmapdevelopedby the semi-conductor industry is re-issued every 2 years,with ‘updates’ issued in the interim. It, and roadmaps
like it, is continually redrawn to reflect new knowledge and developments.
Roadmaps should not be understood as projections or forecasts. Rather, roadmaps conflate and combine three different ways of
understanding the future: expectations (what is thought likely to happen), desires (what is hoped will happen) and promises
(whatwill bemade to happen). In combining and conflating these perspectives, roadmapsweave a picture of the future that attempts
to galvanise actions in the present. In doing so, roadmapping processes often drawon other foresight approaches, including scenarios,
Delphi surveys, and quantitative forecasts. In effect, we can understand roadmaps in the following ways:
– As the current ‘state of the debate’. A roadmap embodies a view of the status of a technology in terms of its development, and
an inventory of possibilities, barriers and opportunities. This is usually presented as a consensus view, at least of those who
have participated in the process.
– As an attempt to create a realistic and pragmatic projection ofwhat is both feasible and desirable. Roadmaps are informed by analysis,
and aim to set out a plausible view ofwhat the future could hold. A successful roadmapmust be seen as at least credible or plausible,
even if they are not always seen as setting out a likely or inevitable future.
– As a guide to innovators. A roadmap maps the key areas in which progress is required (what Hughes [10] memorably described
as ‘reverse salients’), including the barriers and the opportunities, allowing scientists and engineers to get a clearer sense of
where resources need to be focused to move the innovation system forwards.
– As a ‘bid’ for a particular future in a competitive market in which only some futures will attract resources and support. Roadmaps
articulate a particular view of what the future can and should be like – i.e. they set out a normative vision of the future – and they
demand resources and support accordingly [11]. As a result, we should expect roadmaps to be optimistic, and sometimes even
hyperbolic.
– As a promise of what will be done, and how the future will unfold.
– As a process that facilitates the development of networks and the alignment of actors within an innovation system.
– As a tool in the ongoing management of innovation. Many roadmaps are periodically updated, and provide an institutional
structure through which actors in the innovation system can monitor progress, consider changing priorities and identify
opportunities.
2.2. Roadmapping in public policy: from products to systems
Technology roadmappingwas first applied at the level of individual products and technologies. Over time, the scope of roadmaps has
expanded to encompass product or technology groups, and whole industry sectors [12]. As the scope of roadmapping has expanded,
governments have become more involved in using roadmaps in public policy. Early examples of governments supporting technology
roadmap initiatives emerged from industry and trade departments, keen to foster the competitiveness of their industries [13,14]. In
these exercises, the role of government was limited to providing support for the roadmapping process, and government was not nec-
essarily interested in the direction taken by the technological developments discussed. The interest of government in promoting
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roadmaps was to facilitate the development of competitive industries, and to push science and technology forward, wherever forward
might be.
More recently, roadmaps have become a tool by which governments foster not only the development of competitive industries,
but also the development of new and emerging technological systems that meet social goals, such as low-carbon technologies. Road-
maps are developed as part of the process of setting directions for the socio-technical development of society. The last decade in par-
ticular has seen increasing use of roadmapping approaches in technology policy by governments, particularly in the context of energy
policy and the transition to a low-carbon energy system [15].
In making this shift from industry to public policy, the nature of technology roadmapping activities has adapted to include a
broader set of concerns. Technology roadmapping in industry tends to focus on relatively short term and quite technical devel-
opments (see, for example, the roadmaps produced by the semi-conductor industry [16], which are often cited as an archetype
of successful roadmapping). In contrast, governments and policy advocates have tended to use the tools, approaches and lan-
guage of technology roadmapping to address issues that are considerably longer-term in nature [15], and that involve substantial
social and political as well as technical elements.
This broadening of the scope of roadmapping activities echoes a shift in technology policy for the environment, from the promotion
of individual ‘environmental’ technologies (such as end-of-pipe scrubbers), to the transformation of entire socio-technical systems
[17,18]. Roadmaps, once used to map out the development path for new products, are now developed to articulate pathways for
long-term sustainable “systems innovations” or “technological transitions” (these terms are used as described by e.g. [19,20]). In
other words, they are used to articulate a vision of the development of an entire system, including the infrastructural, market, policy,
educational and regulatory developments as well as technological issues.
The potential development of a ‘hydrogen economy’ is one such example—the development of a hydrogen energy system requires
substantial shifts in institutions, physical infrastructure, user behaviour, supply chains, industry structure and so on. It is not simply
the development of a set of new technologies, but rather it is a socio-technical transition [21]. Roadmaps for a hydrogen economy en-
compass a much broader array of concerns than is typical in technology roadmaps in industry.
In short, technology policy makers and advocates interested in the governance of technological transitions have adopted an
analytical and management tool that was developed for use within industry (technology roadmapping), and transferred it into
a new context (socio-technical transitions). Governments are using roadmapping as one of a number of tools (along with fiscal
structures, technology funds, trading schemes and traditional regulations) for managing – or attempting to manage – long
term transitions in the socio-technical arrangements of society.
This shift raises questions about the way in which the tools of technology roadmapping can be applied to these broader, more
systemic shifts in socio-technical arrangements.
3. Technology roadmaps as instruments of transition policy
Policy-makers are already using roadmaps as part of the policy architecture through which they attempt to steer transitions
towards more sustainable socio-technical arrangements. However, the practice and literature on roadmapping, and the literature
on the governance of transitions, have developed largely separately. In this section, the paper seeks position ‘transition roadmaps’
within the broader theoretical literature on the governance of transitions.
3.1. Governing transitions: insights from socio-technical theory and transition management
Within the socio-technical literature, technologies are understood to be embedded within broad configurations – ‘seamless
webs’ – of social and technical arrangements [10,20,22]. These arrangements include patterns of behaviour, social norms, regula-
tory rules, and so on. These structures in which technologies are embedded are termed a socio-technical ‘regime’, or ‘technology-
specific innovation system’ [23]. Regimes are dynamically stable and resist change, resulting in inertia and what is often called
‘lock-in’ [24,25].
Change in such systems can be best understood through an evolutionary perspective [20,26]. Emerging technologies are de-
veloped and nurtured in niches, by ‘proto’ innovation systems. In the early stages of development, the actors involved in the
emerging innovation system are less closely aligned than those in mature systems. To develop, networks of actors must align
and coordinate action, and fulfil a series of key activities or ‘functions’ of a successful innovation system, including: development
of knowledge, entrepreneurship, mobilization of resources, legitimation, guidance of the search, and diffusion of knowledge
through networks [27,28].
This model of technological change as a quasi-evolutionary process, in which action is constrained by regimes, provides an ex-
planation for the frequently observed failure of technology policies that are based on classic market failure approaches [27,29].
The economics of innovation (see, e.g. [30]), on which such policies are based, can be seen as only a partial account of the dynam-
ics of innovation, because it does not take into account the ‘embeddedness’ of technologies within complex social structures that
constrain action.
Advocates of market-based approaches to innovation policy frequently contrast market-based policies with the perceived alterna-
tive: top-downplanning and control, characterised by a strong role for the state in attempting to ‘pick technologicalwinners’ [31]. Quite
rightly, attempts to plan technological progress are seen with considerable scepticism: we do not and cannot knowwhich frontiers of
scientific and technical advance will lead to themost rapid progress. Technological developments are inherently unpredictable and in-
determinate. Furthermore, given the nature of innovation systems as networks of actors, practices and institutions, it is clear that no-
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one actor is ‘in charge’ to do the top-down planning [32]. The power required to steer the socio-technical development is diffused
through networks of actors, rather than held by the state or by any one actor. As a result, attempts to ‘plan’ a successful transition
are likely to fail [33], as are attempts to re-make socio-technical arrangements entirely through price signals.
How, then, can governments guide the emergence of more sustainable socio-technical systems? Various approaches have been
suggested that emphasise a ‘reflexive’ and adaptive approach, focusing on learning, reappraisal and experimentation. These echo
adaptive management approaches adopted in natural resource management [34,35], and include transition management [36,37],
strategic niche management [38], and time strategies [39,40]. The literature on network governance is also useful here, describing
governance strategieswhen power is diffused through actors in heterogeneous networks [41], of which emerging innovation systems
are an example.
Of greatest relevance to our understanding of roadmaps as governance tools for transitions is the attention that the socio-
technical literature in general, and transition management in particular, has placed on the role of expectations and futures in
guiding socio-technical change. In order to more fully clarify how this relates to roadmaps, the paper now turns to a specific
area of the socio-technical literature, that deals with technological expectations.
3.2. Technology futures in innovation policy: governance of and by expectations
A growing literature on the sociology of technological expectations has emphasised that expectations and social visions play
an active role in shaping innovative activities and influencing the technological developments that ultimately occur [42–45].
Scholars in this field describe technological expectations as ‘performative’, meaning that expectations play a role in shaping the
way in which technologies develop.
Expectations lead actors within an innovation system to focus their activities, investment and resources on options that are
thought most likely to succeed, with the result that these options become increasingly likely to succeed as further resources
are focused on them. Furthermore, expectations are important in the process of aligning actors around common goals. Shared ex-
pectations help to establish a common agenda, thus strengthening innovation networks. As a result, expectations can – to some
extent – be self-fulfilling [43]. When expectations becomewidely shared, they shape even the actions of those who do not share in
the widely held beliefs, since such sceptics know that most others in the innovation system will act on the basis of these shared
expectations [46]. Simply put, it is easier to operate within the innovation system when you appear to be in agreement with what
everyone else agrees is ‘the way things are going’. Shared expectations thus become part of the ‘rule set’ that constrains and en-
ables particular kinds of activities within the innovation system. Within an evolutionary perspective on technological change, ex-
pectations can be understood as important factors in both the generation of variation and in the selection environment [47].
Technological expectations thus help to promote several core functions of an emerging technological innovation system out-
lined earlier: the mobilization of resources, the development of legitimacy, networking, and establishing clear guidance of the
search1 [27,28,48]. Expectations are also critical in the establishment of niches, or ‘protected spaces’, in which new technologies
can develop [38,49].
The fact that expectations help to shape the direction of innovative activitymeans that technology futures – scenarios and visions
of the future – become a contested space in which various actors compete to establish dominance of expectations that match their
interests [11,42]. Thus hydrogen enthusiasts envisage, anticipate and promote a hydrogen future; while many deep green environ-
mentalists predict and describe futures in which social and cultural changes, rather than new technologies, reduce the pressures hu-
mankind exerts on our natural environment. This offers an opportunity for governments to attempt to engineer the ‘expectations
landscape’, and hence influence the direction of socio-technical development. Konrad [50] has succinctly summed up this approach
by speaking of ‘governance of and by expectations’.
Several strands of research have built on the idea that futures can be performative, and have articulated approaches to the use
of expectations and futures in the governance of transitions (e.g. [51–53]). Vergragt and others [53–55] have focused on the pro-
cess of vision articulation and participatory backcasting as a means to foster learning about what is possible in terms of systems
innovation, and to build the emerging innovation networks through alignment around a common vision. Their work focuses on
the importance of activities within radical niches, arguing that environmental imperatives such as climate change require transi-
tions to systems with radically improved sustainability performance, and that following business-as-usual assumptions and tra-
jectories is insufficient. Participatory backcasting processes are advocated as providing people with a space to rethink cultural
practices, and (ideally) to experiment with these in the context of ‘bounded socio-technical experiments’ [56].
Sondeijker et al. [51] have also focused on the role of visions and futures in transition management, advocating the use of
‘transition scenarios’. These are seen as serving many of the same functions as technology roadmaps. “Scenarios provide long-
term images of sustainable futures on a strategical level. In this sense, they serve as a framework for short-term actions at an op-
erational level. They ensure the enrolment of actors into coalitions for change and strategic conversation within and between
these coalitions. This is supposed to result in alignment and mobilization of collective action necessary to initiate and maintain
sustainable system innovations.” [51] pp. 20.
There has been little cross-over between ‘transition scenarios’ theory and those working with technology roadmaps, but the
similarities are clear. Indeed, as de Laat has noted, the practice of technology roadmapping has in many ways adopted – perhaps
unconsciously – some of the messages from socio-technical theory [57]. In particular, the idea that technical expectations and
1 Following Hekkert et al. [28], “guidance of the search refers to those activities within the innovation system that can positively affect the visibility and clarity
of speciﬁc wants among technology users”.
533W. McDowall / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 79 (2012) 530–542
71
Author's personal copy
visions have a performative role, and that they therefore can be ‘deployed’ as a strategic action in their own right, is clearly em-
bodied in the practice of roadmapping.
Roadmaps, alongside transition scenarios and participatory backcasting, can thus be seen as ‘purposefully performative’ futures
exercises, in which the explicit aim of the process is not just to inform decision making, but to actively shape the behaviour of actors
in the innovation system through the development and deployment of a view of the future. This is in contrast tomany other foresight
approaches, such as exploratory scenarios or Delphi surveys, and suggests that a different set of issues are relevant for evaluating
roadmapping processes.
3.3. The roadmapper's dilemma: between opening up and closing down
The use of futures as toolswithwhich to shape transition paths is notwithout its critics. In particular, the role of a consensus guiding
vision in transitionshas beenquestioned onboth normative and practical grounds [58]. These critiques are of direct relevance to the use
of roadmapping in informing and enacting transitions policy.
At the heart of these critiques lie questions about the extent to which it is desirable and useful to attempt to articulate and
champion a single coherent view of the future, which ‘closes down’ the relevant set of perspectives and discourses, as opposed
to processes that focus on ‘opening up’ the articulation of alternative possible futures to encompass a pluralist perspective and
more diverse pathways [59].
Of particular concern are issues of politics, power and democratic accountability: if expectations can be deployed as tools with
which to shape the direction of socio-technical change, the question of who is involved in informing the development of prospec-
tive transition paths becomes central. Shove and Walker have noted that “…[D]espite extensive debate and rhetoric about the
construction and democratic choice of visions and images of the future, the depth of the politics involved is frequently under-
played.” [60].p. 766. And while several authors writing on roadmaps have argued for the establishment of consensus pathways,
it is important to recognise that achieving consensus often entails the exclusion of minority perspectives [61].
Researchers developing transition scenarios and participatory backcasting have acknowledged these difficulties. Indeed, some
authors have suggested that the unique value of constructing normative technological visions and roadmaps is neither that they
provide a clear set of ‘signposts’, nor their role in aligning actors and expectations – though these are both acknowledged to be
important – but rather that they provide a space for debate and deliberation about technological options and the preferences,
values and perspectives of different social groups [21,62,63]. In this view, the articulation of visions and pathways is part of
what Stirling calls ‘precautionary foresight’ [64]—it is a means to open up appraisal of options to wider views, perspectives and
framings, rather than a means to develop a consensus plan.
Second, and quite separately from concerns about accountability, the articulation of a single and exclusive transition path ap-
pears to ignore the inescapable truth that the future is neither wholly predictable nor wholly malleable. While shared expecta-
tions clearly play a role in determining the path of socio-technical development, it is obviously not possible to simply talk
ourselves into a sustainable future [65]. In the face of such fundamental uncertainty, attempts to choose and pursue a single tran-
sition path are unlikely to be fruitful. Again, researchers involved in participatory backcasting and transition scenarios emphasise
the multiple and contingent routes towards a ‘guiding visions’. In doing so, they attempt to develop transition pathways that are
more robust in the face of uncertainties, and that enable the inclusion of diverse and plural perspectives. Yet experience suggests
that actors in the innovation system are unwilling to subscribe to overly diverse, pluralist and contested pathways. The language of in-
clusivity, diversity and ‘opening up’ does not breed the kind of confidence and shared sense of purpose on specific investments, projects
and technologies that are required for aligning the innovation network.
Roadmaps must articulate a shared view of where things are going – a coherent and reasonably concrete shared direction of
search – if they are to provide a basis for action. The roadmapper is thus trapped between two possibilities. On the one hand, a
confident, prescriptive roadmap developed on the basis of a consensus of a subset of relevant (and powerful) actors will have
most influence. Yet on the other hand, this is likely to reflect incumbent interests—who are often precisely those interests tied
up with a less-sustainable socio-technical system and, by focusing on a narrow view of what can and will be done, it can downplay
uncertainties and alternative pathways.
The following section develops a set of criteria to address how roadmapping for system innovations can balance these
objectives.
4. Criteria for evaluating roadmaps for systems innovation
In this section, I draw on the preceding theoretical discussion to develop a framework through which ‘transition roadmaps’
may be developed and evaluated. The framework articulates the key attributes that must be addressed if a roadmap is to provide
a useful component of transition policy. It is based on a process evaluation, in which the process used to develop the roadmap is
assessed, as opposed to an outcome evaluation, since the latter would be impractical given the severe difficulties of attribution in
a context as complex as an innovation system [66]. The framework is derived from the preceding theoretical discussion. In par-
ticular, the framework aims to assess the extent to which roadmaps are successful at balancing the need to ‘close down’ the di-
rection to a single, prescriptive view, while remaining responsive and sensitive to the normative and practical critiques set out
above.
Given the special character of roadmaps as ‘purposefully performative’ futures, the evaluation framework differs somewhat
from others found in the foresight evaluation literature (e.g. [66]). Despite these differences, there are also clear parallels with
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the foresight evaluation framework developed by Georghiou and Keenan [66], for example in assessing the quality and type of
analysis underpinning the exercise, and in gauging the appropriateness of the roadmapping process.
4.1. Credibility: is the future pathway plausible?
Roadmaps must articulate a view of the future that is credible and persuasive. Without being seen as a plausible view of the
future, roadmaps lose their power to direct and shape the behaviour of actors involved in the innovation system.
This has a number of implications for how roadmapping is carried out:
• First, it demands that any analysis on which the roadmap is constructed is sound, and based on reasonable assumptions and
methods.
• Second, it requires that the relevant expertise has taken part in shaping the analysis and the roadmap. In the context of a system
innovation, such as hydrogen, this implies that a broad range of expertise must be involved, suggesting some form of participatory
or consultative exercise with a broad range of expert stakeholders.
• Third, credibility demands that the actors with greatest ability to influence achievement of the envisaged futures are involved, and
are – at least to some extent – committed to that future. The roadmapping processmust secure the commitment of key actors to the
process, and must communicate that these key actors believe in the roadmap.
• Finally, credibility requires that the roadmap engages adequately with the social, political, market and cultural aspects of the
envisaged transition, as well as the ‘purely’ technological elements. A roadmap that fails to set out a plausible view of market
and social contexts, but envisages profound technological systems change, will be less credible than one that embeds a vision
of technological change within a broader context of anticipated market and socio-political evolution.
4.2. Desirability: is the future pathway defensible as a good choice for society?
Those developing roadmaps within a public policy context have a responsibility to articulate a future pathway that is desirable
from a societal perspective. This begs the question of who gets to decide what kind of future is in the interests of society, and on
what basis such decisions are made.
Clearly, the desirability of the envisaged future can be based on goals and directions established through existing democratic in-
stitutions. For example, analysis might show that hydrogen technologies can enable emissions reductions to meet legislated carbon
targets. However, guidance from legislatures typically provides insufficient clarity inmaking choices about which technological path-
ways to pursue.
Those developing transition roadmaps must make choices about how to determine a desirable direction for socio-technical devel-
opment. The roadmapping literature emphasises the desirability of establishing consensus amongst the stakeholders involved [3,67].
Yet in a pluralist democratic society, it is not always straightforward – or even necessarily possible – to establish a clear consensus
view of the desirability of a given future pathway [68,69]. To overcome this challenge, the framework in this paper adopts a deliberative
democratic perspective, which demands that public policy decisions are accountable, in the very literal sense that a clear ‘account’ is
given ofwhy a decisionwasmade in thatway [68]. Rather than demand that roadmaps set out a future forwhich there is a broad social
consensus, evaluation of the roadmap should instead focus on the degree to which roadmaps can justify the choices made in deliber-
ative terms. In other words, roadmaps should be explicit and transparent in their aims, the process used, and who took part.
Finally roadmaps that are developed through processes that are broadly inclusive and participatory will have a greater claim to
setting out a legitimately desirable future pathway. Work on network governance (an appropriate theoretical frame for innova-
tion system governance) has emphasised the importance of inclusivity [70]; and, as discussed, many theorists of technology argue
persuasively that broad participation is important in both appraising and committing to particular technological futures [71]. This
is not to say that participation is a clear route to democratic legitimacy, but rather that roadmapping processes that exclude op-
portunities for participation are less able to claim legitimacy.
4.3. Utility: does the roadmap help advance the innovation system?
The third criterion relates to utility: does the roadmap and roadmapping process facilitate the further development of the in-
novation system? In other words, does it help the innovation system to perform core functions of innovation systems, as de-
scribed by Bergek et al. [27]?
Where roadmaps meet criteria 1 (credibility) and 2 (desirability), they automatically help foster legitimacy for the technology
in question, which is a core function of a successful innovation system. Beyond this, to be useful the roadmap must provide a co-
herent direction of search for scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs and other innovation system actors. A shared research agenda
enables alignment of enactors and selectors, and a roadmap is one of the ways in which this function can be facilitated. Any road-
map provides the broad direction of search, in the sense that it articulates a place for the technology in theworld. Beyond this, a road-
map should identify specific research needs and priorities, highlighting what Hughes referred to as ‘reverse salients’ [10]. Depending
on the degree of maturity of the innovation system, this may involve setting detailed, technically-defined ‘targets’. Alternatively, it
may only highlight areas that are of particular concern.
Roadmaps must navigate a careful balance between setting out a confident view of a plausible and desirable future, and over-
promising and ‘hype’, which can damage the prospects of the innovation system [72].
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Finally, the roadmapping processmust be appropriate for the stage of the innovation system [66]. For innovation systems in an early,
formative stage, for example, setting very long-term technical targets may not be helpful if the capacity to work towardsmeeting them
does not exist. In such a situation, a roadmap that sets out a broad framing vision of the path forward is likely to be more useful.
4.4. Adaptability: is the roadmap process consistent with reﬂexive, adaptive management?
The literature on transition management emphasises the need for continual adjustment and re-evaluation of policies and pro-
grammes, and the literature on roadmaps in industry has emphasised that roadmaps are more effective where they are developed
as an ongoing process rather than a one-off document (e.g. [5]). As Propp and Rip [73] have argued “Roadmaps need to bemaintained
and updated to become effective. Where an actor to fulfil that function exists… roadmaps become a powerful tool for creating align-
ment around technological and product options and to help accelerating their development” (p. 11). This argues for roadmaps to be
developed andmaintained within an institutional context – such as a partnership between government and industry groups – that is
able to learn, and to produce updates to the roadmap as time goes by.
Ideally, the actor(s) responsible for producing andmaintaining the roadmapwill do so in a reflexivemanner, one that emphasises
learning and evaluation, and is open to reflection on the role and value of the roadmapping process and its framing. In the context of
transitionmanagement, Shove andWalker [60] highlight that the question of ‘what is to be transitioned’ is frequently not amatter for
debate. In the same way, roadmapping lacks obvious mechanisms through which to adequately justify how transition questions are
framed and determined. As with the substance of the roadmap itself, the institutional structures through which roadmaps are iden-
tified and framed should be transparent, and able to reflect critically on the framing of the exercise overall. In effect, this requires that
roadmapping processes sponsored by government should be conductedwithin a broader context of technology foresight and strategy
governance processes.
4.5. Summary: evaluation criteria for transition roadmaps
Table 1 summarises the criteria, and highlights the key questions addressed by each criterion.
5. The case of hydrogen
Hydrogen, like electricity, is an energy carrier that can be produced and used in a variety of different ways. Like electricity, the en-
vironmental attributes of hydrogen depend largely on how it is produced and used, since it is not a significant pollutant in itself [74].
While there has been a decline in excitement in policy circles about hydrogen since around 2005 [72,75], it remains an important op-
tion for deep decarbonisation of the transport sector and for diversification of energy sources for transport, and potentially as a wide-
spread carrier of energy for heat and power demands.
Hydrogen has been a vibrant arena for the development of roadmaps [67,76]. National and regional governments, US States
(e.g. Ohio, California, Connecticut, New York, Florida, Indiana, Minnesota and others), and a number of cities across the globe
have undertaken roadmapping activities concerning hydrogen, alongside numerous firms and industry associations.
A sample of hydrogen roadmaps produced in the last 10 years was reviewed, with a focus on those produced as part of policy
processes by national governments (or supra-national, in the case of the EU). Roadmaps were identified by searching online da-
tabases and through stakeholder interviews. The review focused on those addressing hydrogen directly, aiming to identify those
that have been used as part of a broader policy process that aims to address the transition to a hydrogen energy system. However,
hydrogen technologies are developed and managed within the context of a broader portfolio of innovative energy technologies,
and so the review identified the following types of relevant roadmaps:
– Hydrogen energy and fuel cell roadmaps
– Low carbon vehicle roadmaps (that include hydrogen)
– Low-carbon energy technology roadmaps (that include hydrogen)
Table 1
Summary table of criteria for transition roadmap evaluation.
Criteria Key questions
Credibility Is the roadmap based on sound analysis?
Does the roadmap draw on the right breadth of expertise?
Has the roadmap secured the participation and commitment of key actors in the innovation system?
Does the roadmap adequately address the political, social and economic aspects of the transition?
Desirability Does the transition meet social goals established through democratic institutions?
Does the roadmap give a clear account of the justification for the proposed pathway, with transparency in aims, process and who took part?
Is the roadmap process inclusive and participatory?
Utility Does the roadmap effectively articulate a path forwards that can enable alignment around common goals?
Is the roadmapping approach appropriate for the stage of innovation system maturity?
Adaptability Does the roadmapping process involve periodic reviews, updates and learning?
Is the roadmapping process embedded in a broader institutional structure that enables reflexivity and learning?
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The review included roadmaps from: the US, Australia, India, the UK, Japan, China, the EU, Iceland, Germany and Canada. In
some countries/jurisdictions, more than one roadmap was examined. In total, 15 roadmapping initiatives were included in the
review (see Table 2). Abbreviations, listed in Table 2, are used to ease the referencing and readability of the paper.
The reviewwas conducted using a standard template to extract a consistent set of information from each document. While the
review focused on the documents themselves, the review also examined further documentary evidence to inform the institutional
context behind the roadmaps (i.e. how were they produced, how are they being used).
6. Evaluation of hydrogen roadmaps: a socio-technical perspective
Governments have used roadmaps to inform and promote the development of hydrogen energy in a variety of ways. The style and
approach include roadmaps built on intensive, multi-year and analytically rich processes (e.g. HyWays), short overview roadmaps
built on the basis of a single workshop (UKH2), and ongoing roadmapping processes that are embedded within broader energy tech-
nology strategy (JPCE). This section applies the framework developed in Section 3 to the literature, to examine how governments are
using roadmaps for a transition to hydrogen energy.
6.1. Credibility
6.1.1. Are roadmaps informed by good quality analysis and broad expert participation?
The quality and depth of technical analysis underpinning roadmaps varies considerably. In many cases (e.g. USH2, UKFC, EUHLG,
IC, CN03, IN), analysis focuses on mapping the actors and institutions involved in hydrogen and fuel cells, and market opportunity
assessment. Rather fewer roadmaps explicitly include technological forecasting of future cost/performance or technology needs as-
sessment (e.g. HyWays, AUS). Analytic modes include both forecasting (identification, examination and projection of market and
technology trends) and backcasting (identification of steps that need to be taken in order to reach an established goal).
Some of the roadmaps are informed by detailed modelling exercises, sometimes involving multiple modelling approaches. The
German, HyWays, and Australian roadmaps included detailed modelling studies of hydrogen costs and competitiveness. Other
roadmaps were informed by relatively simplistic analysis, including simple extrapolation of historical sales figures many years
into the future (e.g. CAN03). Across the studies, analysis of technological goals and needs appears to be more robust than analysis
of future markets and opportunities. This is perhaps not surprising: the former is concerned with providing clear, informed direc-
tion to innovators; while the latter is subject to the inherent tension within roadmaps: providing confidence in the future of the
technology, without contributing to potentially damaging ‘hype’ cycles. In retrospect, the market analysis that contributed to
Table 2
Roadmaps included in the review.
Roadmapping initiative/document(s) Abbreviation Country/region
and year
Core sponsors; reference
Hydrogen technology roadmap AUS Australia 2008 Government of Australia [77]
Canadian fuel cell commercialization roadmap; Canadian fuel





Government of Canada [78], Hydrogen
and Fuel Cells Canada [79]
Hydrogen energy vision and technology roadmap report for China CN China 2004 Ministry of Science and Technology, China [80]
HyWays: the European hydrogen roadmap HyWays EU 2008 European Commission [81]
Hydrogen energy and fuel cells: a vision of our future EUHLG EU 2003 European Commission High Level Group on
Hydrogen and Fuel Cells [82]
European Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Platform:
deployment strategy, strategic research agenda and
implementation plan
EUHFTP EU 2005, 2006
and 2007
European Commission Hydrogen and Fuel Cell
Technology Platform [83–85]
The GermanHy roadmap DE Germany 2008 German federal government and the German
National Organisation for Hydrogen and Fuel Cell
Technology [86]
The Icelandic hydrogen energy roadmap IC Iceland 2008 Icelandic Ministry of Industry and Commerce [87]
National hydrogen energy roadmap: pathway for
transition to hydrogen energy in India
IN India 2007 Indian Ministry for New and Renewable Energy [88]
Strategic technology roadmap (energy sector) JPSTR Japan 2005 Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry [89]
Cool earth innovative energy technology program:
technology development roadmap
JPCE Japan 2008 Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry [90]
Fuel cell vision for the UK; and UK fuel cell development
and deployment roadmap
UKFC UK 2003, 2005 Fuel cells UK and Department for Trade and Industry
[91,92]
Roadmap for hydrogen energy in the UK UKH2 UK 2009 Technology Strategy Board, Department for Energy
and Climate Change, UK Hydrogen Association [93]
A national vision of America's transition to a hydrogen economy —
to 2030 and beyond; national hydrogen energy roadmap
USH2 US 2002 US Department of Energy [94,95]
Fuel cell technologies roadmap; hydrogen production roadmap;
hydrogen delivery roadmap; hydrogen manufacturing R&D roadmap
USFCAR US 2005, 2009,
2007, 2005
US FreedomCAR and Fuel Partnership [96–99]
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some of the earlier roadmaps reviewed (such as CAN03) can be seen as has having contributed to early hype about hydrogen. All
the roadmaps involved some form of participatory or consultative process through which to engage expert stakeholders.
6.1.2. Participation and commitment of key stakeholders
Roadmap credibility depends on the participation and commitment of key stakeholders whose actions are critical in the fur-
ther development of the system, such as major firms involved in automotive and fuel supply markets. All the roadmaps reviewed
attempted to secure the participation or commitment of stakeholders through consultations or participatory processes. In several
cases, participatory workshops were the main input into roadmap development (UKH2, CN, USH2).
Governments are central players in the development of a hydrogen energy system, since policy support is necessary to over-
come the barriers associated with an infrastructure transition [76]. While all the roadmaps were either produced or sponsored by
governments, there are obvious differences among roadmaps in the degree of commitment from government and from other
major stakeholders. Some are endorsed at the highest levels of government, and are associated with the participation and engage-
ment of major industries (e.g. USH2, USFCAR, JPSTR, JPCE, EUHLG, IN). Others are published or sponsored by governments, but
without obvious high-level political endorsement, such as a preface by a senior minister (e.g. UKH2, UKFC, CN, HyWays). Several
of the more technically-detailed roadmapping exercises were sponsored by government, and produced through formal collabo-
rative partnerships made up of industry, government and research organisations, with working groups addressing particular is-
sues (e.g. EUHFTP, USFCAR). These partnerships involve a degree of commitment from all participants to the process, and may be
seen as producing more credible views of future pathways.
6.1.3. Adequate engagement with social, political and economic aspects
Most of the roadmaps engage to some extent with broader social, political and economic aspects of a transition, in the form of
addressing future market needs, energy and transport demands, and the policy drivers that are informing the broader social con-
text for hydrogen energy. In some cases, future consumer requirements (such as acceptable vehicle range) or market conditions
(such as carbon constraints) are set out in specific details.
In all the roadmaps, the future is much like the present in terms of consumer behaviour, cultural practices and transportation pat-
terns. This is in strong contrast to many hydrogen futures developed by NGOs, academics and visionaries, many of which describe fu-
tures that associate the establishment of a hydrogen energy system with widespread shifts in social values or structures. Discursive
themes around ‘ecotopia’ or radical decentralization and democratization, present in many hydrogen futures [100,101], are entirely
absent from the roadmaps. As a body of visions of the future, the roadmaps are strikingly conservative in their representation of how
future people and societies will meet their needs. This can be viewed as a failure to engage with broader uncertainties around socio-
technical change, or simply as a tacit set of assumptions about the durability of social structures and practices.
However, many of the roadmaps do depart from current social norms in their depiction of the governance mechanisms that
might accompany the transition to a hydrogen energy system. Several of the roadmaps envisage a future in which a transition
is effected through corporatist collaborative governance models involving partnerships of major industries (principally automo-
tive and oil companies) with governments. This view envisages government–industry partnerships making major investment
decisions in infrastructure and manufacturing capacity in a co-ordinated way, enabling a hydrogen system to overcome the enor-
mous challenge of establishing an entirely new vehicle refuelling infrastructure solely because of the benefits of the new fuel to
society. In other words, while the roadmaps reviewed tend to be rather conservative in their views of social practices and con-
sumer behaviour, they envisage new governance models for purposive socio-technical transitions.
6.2. Desirability
Very few of the roadmaps incorporate a detailed analytic case for pursuing a hydrogen future (exceptions are HyWays and DE).
Rather,most build an argument based on the key public policy drivers (climate change, energy security, air pollution, and internation-
al competitiveness). Where there is detailed analysis of hydrogen energy systems, these are not comparedwith alternatives (such as
transport systems based on battery electric vehicles) on a like-for-like basis. The analytic work underpinning roadmaps, while often
sophisticated, can thus be seen as providing justification, rather than supporting decision-making and deliberation.
All of the roadmaps are based on some form of participatory or consultative process, involving a range of stakeholders. Road-
maps differ in the degree of transparency about who was involved, with many not making clear who participants were. None of
the roadmaps identified how participants were selected. Similarly, the roadmaps do not make clear how or whether consensus
was reached. Few of the roadmapping processes appear to have directly included broader voices from consumer or citizen per-
spectives, such as elected officials, participants from civil society groups or NGOs, or simply interested or concerned citizens. In
other words, the participatory processes through which roadmaps were developed were tightly framed and constrained in their
modes of participation and representation, and cannot be seen as providing a strong basis for social legitimacy to the hydrogen futures
envisaged.
6.3. Utility
All the roadmaps provide a broad, high-level vision. They frame hydrogen energy as a major area for future development, and
as a priority for R&D and investment activities. In this sense, roadmaps are all useful in endorsing the legitimacy of hydrogen tech-
nologies as a focus for innovative activity.
538 W. McDowall / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 79 (2012) 530–542
76
Author's personal copy
Some roadmaps are limited to this broad, generic view. Examples of these roadmaps include CAN03, USH2, CN, IN, UKFC,
UKH2, and AUS. These roadmaps project a sense of vision and the pathway of development, but with limited technical detail
or specific targets. These ‘framing roadmaps’ are typically produced as an initial attempt to clarify the state of the emerging inno-
vation system and its prospects. They deploy a coherent ‘technology story’, deploying generic expectations (in the sense used by
van Lente and Bakker [44]) about the promise of the field in general, rather than expectations about specific technological details.
Their purpose can be understood as primarily political, doing the work of establishing and legitimating a frame through which to
understand and relate to hydrogen technologies. Many of these roadmaps lack substantial technical detail, and while they typically
provide an overview of the relevant technologies, they provide only limited guidance to innovators in terms of focusing on research
challenges. These roadmaps may describe the technologies in detail, but they are typically empty of the forward-looking technology
analysis that is usually seen as a defining characteristic of technology roadmapping activities. They are most appropriate for the for-
mative phases of an innovation system.
Other roadmaps combine this generic vision with specific technical detail. In these technically-detailed roadmaps, governments
work with academia and industry to establish R&D targets and detailed technological milestones against which progress can be
assessed. Examples of this mode of roadmapping include the USFCAR, HyWays, EUHFTP, JPSTR, and JPCE. Some of the roadmaps es-
tablish milestones and decision-points. For example, the US roadmapping processes highlight a decision point in 2015 on full-scale
commercialization of fuel cell vehicles.
Both of these modes (‘framing’ and ‘technically-detailed’) can be understood as providing a coherent direction of search, but
for different stages of innovation system maturity. For an emerging innovation system, in which alignment of actors is poor and
shared expectations are weak, it is necessary to first provide an overarching framing roadmap through which to facilitate the co-
alescing of the innovation system. Only once this broader framework has become accepted is it possible to provide more specific
direction.
6.4. Adaptability
Most of the roadmaps reviewed appear to be one-off exercises, rather than ongoingmanagement processes. This is particularly
true for the ‘framing’ roadmaps, which tend to set out a strategic view rather than a detailed structure for monitoring progress
(e.g. CN, IN, AUS, UKH2).
A minority of the hydrogen roadmapping processes reviewed have been subject to updates and reviews. The development of
sequential US roadmaps has been taken forward by the FreedomCAR and Fuel Partnership, a joint initiative of government, auto-
motive firms and energy companies. In Japan, the Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has developed hydrogen
roadmaps as part of its broader process of Strategic Technology Roadmapping, which includes reviews of roadmaps every 2 to
3 years [102]. The Canadian hydrogen roadmap has been updated, and radically revised, by the industry body Hydrogen and Fuel
Cells Canada. The roadmaps developed by the European Commission have not explicitly been reviewed and updated, but they
have formed a sequence of related roadmapping initiatives, managed through an evolving institutional structure (first the High
Level Group on hydrogen and fuel cells, followed by the Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Platform, and now the Joint Undertaking
on Hydrogen and Fuel Cells).
7. Conclusions
This paper has described theway inwhich governments have increasingly been using the practices of technology roadmapping to
informand shape long-term systems innovations, or technological transitions. In reviewing hydrogen roadmaps, and evaluating them
from a socio-technical perspective, the following conclusions can be drawn:
• The theoretic literature on transition management and the role of expectations suggests that roadmaps can be a valuable com-
plement to transition management policy. Their use in such contexts reflects a rise in the use of ‘systemic instruments’ [103] in
innovation for sustainability, and this is to be welcomed. However, none of the roadmaps reviewed fully met all the criteria, and
there appears to be considerable scope for improvement in roadmapping practice for long-term transitions.
• The roadmaps reviewed vary in the quality of analysis on which they are based. Some draw on strong analysis, with well-
established methods and transparent assumptions. However, there are also many roadmaps that appear to be based on weak
analysis or that lack sufficient transparency to judge the robustness of the conclusions on which the roadmaps are based.
This is potentially damaging: poor quality and opaque analysis results in unrealistic expectations, and can exacerbate hype-
cycles, undermining the development of the innovation system.
• All of the roadmaps involved some form of consultative or participatory process involving key stakeholders. However, some of
the roadmapping initiatives appear to have been conducted without ensuring participation and buy-in from key players in the
innovation system, which limits the credibility – and therefore the utility – of the resulting futures. Those initiating roadmapping
processes should ensure that they have sufficient resources and credibility to attract key participants to commit to the process.
• Few of the roadmaps set out an adequately argued case for the desirability of hydrogen futures. Most roadmaps clearly identify
the drivers and motivations for developing a hydrogen energy system (climate change, energy security, air pollution and the
development of new industries), but few adequately demonstrate that hydrogen is a likely or preferable means to achieving
those ends.
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• Roadmapping processes are often insufficiently transparent and are often closed to broader participation. Technology road-
maps, when used to address systems innovations, are attempts to engineer a landscape of expectations that is conducive to
the development of a new socio-technical system. They can and should be a site of democratic engagement and debate about
the direction of socio-technical change. Broader consultation and public input is common practice in many other fields of policy
development and should be more common in roadmapping.
• Many roadmaps are conducted as one-off exercises. This is unfortunate, as roadmapping should enable a structure for learning
about a transition as it unfolds. Those developing roadmaps should, where possible, institutionalize the updating and ongoing
evaluation of roadmaps. In other words, roadmappers should allow roadmapping processes to operate in a reflexive, learning
mode, through an established institutional arrangement.
The work has highlighted the potential of transition roadmaps as one type of ‘systemic instrument’ in the governance of tran-
sitions. Two priorities for further research can be identified from this initial study.
1. The relationship of transition roadmaps to other foresight approaches. This paper has suggested a distinction between road-
maps, as ‘purposefully performative’ futures, and most other kinds of foresight activity. However, many of the issues raised
in the paper also apply to other foresight approaches when considered in the broader context of transition management. In
particular, there is a need for clearer insight into the way in which different foresight activities can be used to enable either
“opening up” or “closing down” of appraisal and commitments within the innovation system.
2. The institutional structure and design of transition roadmapping processes requires further development. This paper has
highlighted ways in which the tools of technology roadmapping can be used to inform and shape socio-technical transitions,
and it has provided a broad framework for the application of this approach. Further study on the dynamics of roadmapping
processes, and the impact of roadmaps on innovation system development, would be valuable in shaping recommendations
about the detailed design and structure of roadmapping processes as part of innovation and transition management policy.
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Abstract
The ‘hydrogen economy’ has the potential to provide a sustainable and secure energy system, and there is a wide and growing literature
promoting and exploring different possible hydrogen futures. However, despite broad agreement that hydrogen could make a signiﬁcant
contribution to energy policy goals, the literature exhibits strong disagreements about the form that a future hydrogen economy should take.
Visions of the future select, combine and reconﬁgure individual hydrogen generation, storage, transport and end-use technologies into more or
less mutually compatible energy and transportation systems, which embody deeply contested and conﬂicting views of sustainability.
This paper describes the application of a novel foresight methodology, which combined participatory scenario development, using a backcasting
approach, with an expert-stakeholder multi-criteria mapping (MCM) process, in order to provide an integrated, transparent assessment of the
environmental, social and economic sustainability of six possible future hydrogen energy systems for the UK. The ﬁndings suggest that:
hydrogen has the potential to deliver substantial sustainability beneﬁts over the status quo, or, business as usual, futures, but that hydrogen is
not automatically a sustainable option; carbon emissions are the single most important dimension of sustainability, but that issues other than
carbon and cost need to be considered if hydrogen is truly to deliver greater sustainability. Furthermore, there was signiﬁcant disagreement about
which visions were considered more or less sustainable. These ﬁndings reﬂect two important sources of divergence in the ﬁnal sustainability
rankings: uncertainties and contested views of sustainability.
 2007 International Association for Hydrogen Energy. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Multi-criteria appraisal; Backcasting scenarios; Sustainable hydrogen economy
1. Introduction
In recent years the concept the ‘hydrogen economy’ has
received considerable attention, with the emergence of a broad
based ‘advocacy coalition’ [28], comprising a diverse range
of academic researchers, politicians, business and civil society
organisations, promoting hydrogen as a means of delivering
a sustainable and secure energy system. As a result there
is a wide and growing literature promoting and exploring
different possible hydrogen futures. However, despite broad
agreement that hydrogen could make a signiﬁcant long-term
contribution to energy policy goals, the literature exhibits
strong disagreements about the form that a future hydrogen
economy should take. Visions of a hydrogen future select,
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E-mail address: malcolm.eames@brunel.ac.uk (M. Eames).
0360-3199/$ - see front matter  2007 International Association for Hydrogen Energy. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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combine and reconﬁgure individual hydrogen generation,
distribution and end-use technologies into more or less mu-
tually compatible energy and transportation systems, which
embody deeply contested and conﬂicting views of sustain-
ability [1].
In short, there is no single, shared vision of a ‘sustainable
hydrogen economy’. Rather, different organisations and indi-
viduals produce visions and expectations of possible hydrogen
economies that reﬂect their own interests and values [2]. For
some, hydrogen is a means of maintaining current systems,
structures and ways of life; for others, it has the potential to re-
order energy in ways that may facilitate broader social change.
Despite the range of different possible hydrogen systems that
the literature embodies, the few studies that attempt to appraise
the relative sustainability of different hydrogen futures tend to
do so on the basis of a rather limited set of criteria (typically
carbon emissions, cost, and air pollutants, for example, [3]),
81
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or with no attempt to engage different legitimate perspectives
on problem framings, weightings, and criteria deﬁnition (see,
for example, [4,5]). More commonly research has focussed
on comparing hydrogen energy systems with other prospec-
tive low-carbon transport options, usually biofuels and hybrid-
electric or battery electric vehicles (for example, [6]). While
such studies clearly provide important insights, they often fail
to reﬂect the diversity of possible future hydrogen energy and
transport systems.
This paper describes the visioning and sustainability ap-
praisal phases of a novel foresight study conducted under the
auspices of the UK Sustainable Hydrogen Energy Consortium
(UKSHEC) over the period from March 2005 to September
2006.1 Technology foresight is not forecasting. Foresight tech-
niques use both quantitative and qualitative approaches to ex-
plore and communicate understandings of the long-term future
of science, technology, the economy and society, in order to
draw conclusions for the present. Foresight seeks to improve
society’s capacity to manage uncertainty and actively shape the
direction of socio-technological change. As Cuhls notes often
‘The communication effect of pre-assessing future options or
decisions as well as mobilizing and bringing together the dif-
ferent stakeholders of the innovation system…seems to be as
important as the empirical results’ [8].
This study engaged a broad range of expert stakeholders in
an integrated appraisal of the environmental, economic and so-
cial sustainability and energy security implications of six vi-
sions, encompassing an indicative range of prospective hydro-
gen futures. The aim of the study was not to identify or predict
the most sustainable hydrogen system, but to open-up debate
about the relative sustainability of different options by explor-
ing the technological uncertainties, divergent values and social
priorities that shape competing expectations of the future of
hydrogen.
What follows is not a technical analysis of the economic or
environmental performance of a narrowly deﬁned set of engi-
neering systems. Rather, it is a systematic exploration of the
way in which the expert stakeholders understand and value
the various attributes of a range of prospective hydrogen fu-
tures, under the normative framework of sustainability. Experts
and policy makers have a central role in shaping the advocacy
coalitions that build behind particular socio-technical systems.
This study therefore complements the technical literature on
hydrogen by asking: what are the different ways of prioritising
different elements of sustainability with respect to hydrogen?
What are the implications of uncertainty for the prioritisation
of different systems? And, how do experts translate analysis
into judgement? By exploring these issues, the multi-criteria
approach used identiﬁes questions and uncertainties typically
ignored within purely technical appraisals.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes
the novel backcasting and appraisal methodology used. The
UKSHEC visions are presented in Section 3, and the appraisal
1 For details of the ﬁnal phase of the study, which developed a set of
detailed transitions scenarios exploring the dynamics of four possible socio-
technical transitions or pathways to hydrogen economies see [7].
results in Section 4. Section 5 reﬂects on these ﬁndings, and
explores what the appraisal tells us. Finally, Section 6 draws
out some conclusions and insights for policy.
2. Methodology: participatory backcasting and
multi-criteria analysis
The methodology developed for this study comprised the
following stages: (i) scoping and stakeholder identiﬁcation;
(ii) vision development; (iii) multi-criteria sustainability ap-
praisal. A full account of the methodology is provided in the
relevant project report [9].
2.1. Scoping and stakeholder identiﬁcation
The scoping stage of the project sought to map the rele-
vant stakeholders and expectations on the future of hydrogen,
through a literature review [1] and a series of scoping inter-
views. Stakeholders were identiﬁed through an analysis of the
membership of UK hydrogen-related organisations (such as
H2Net, London Hydrogen Partnership and the Low Carbon Ve-
hicle Partnership) and through a stakeholder mapping exercise
ensuring representation from hydrogen production, distribution
and end-use industries as well as relevant policy and civil soci-
ety stakeholders. Finally a ‘snow-balling’ technique was used
at the scoping interviews, in which interviewees were asked to
identify other key stakeholders to ensure that no major interests
were missed.
2.2. Vision development
The aim of vision development was to create a small number
of credible, transparent and internally consistent end points that
strike a balance between the speciﬁcity of the visions and the
coverage of hydrogen ‘possibility space’.
The UKSHEC visions were developed through a participa-
tory workshop and consultation [10], involving over 40 expert
stakeholders from the UK hydrogen and energy policy commu-
nities: from academia, business, government and civil society
(NGOs).
The visions each comprise: (i) narrative descriptions of
archetypal conﬁgurations of hydrogen production, infras-
tructure (storage and distribution) and end-use technologies;
(ii) indicative quantitative indicators to provide a sense of
the scale of technological deployment implied; and (iii) system
diagrams providing pictorial representations of each vision.
The visions are not intended as predictions, nor should they
be seen as mutually exclusive. Indeed, the technologies they
comprise could be conﬁgured into a wide range of possible fu-
ture hydrogen systems, and hybrid systems. Instead, the visions
are intended to cover the broad range of possibilities in a man-
ageable number of visions. This means that the results cannot
be seen as advocating or endorsing any one of the visions alone,
but they are rather to be thought of as tools for learning about
important perspectives, issues and uncertainties surrounding the
hydrogen debate. The full visions are presented in Section 3.
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Fig. 1. The multi-criteria mapping process.
2.3. Multi-criteria sustainability appraisal
A wide variety of methods exists for multi-criteria appraisal
(for a review see [11]). The highly uncertain and contested
nature of long-term technological visions suggest that meth-
ods that attempt to ﬁnd a single best choice are unlikely to
be useful. In such a situation, a more appropriate approach
seeks to capture alternative framings and value-based perspec-
tives. Multi-criteria mapping (MCM), developed by Stirling
[12,13], aims to “explore the way in which different pictures
of strategic choices may change, depending on the view that
is taken – not to prescribe a particular ‘best choice’.” ([14,
p. 5]). MCM thus maps the sensitivities of performance ac-
cording to different perspectives, uncertainties and framing
assumptions.
MCM is conducted through one-to-one interviews with
stakeholders using a dedicated software package. Interviews
are recorded, providing qualitative information on partici-
pants’ reasoning. A brief overview of the method is outlined
below, and further details are available from the MCM man-
ual and interview protocol [14,15]. Some adaptations to the
method were necessary for this study, as it has not been
previously used to assess long-term visions in the context
of a backcasting exercise. These amendments can be found
in [9].
The expert panel which used MCM to appraise the UK-
SHEC visions was necessarily smaller than the group involved
in vision development, involving 15 participants from a range
of backgrounds (i.e., nuclear industry expert; carbon trust an-
alyst; Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) policy maker;
fuel cell industry participant; sustainable energy policy consul-
tant; industrial gases industry participant; energy technology
researcher; environmental campaigner; health & safety regu-
lator; energy policy researcher; senior oil industry participant;
department for transport (DfT) policy maker; automotive indus-
try participant; regional government policy maker; and climate
scientist).2
2 Participants took part on the basis of their individual expertise, rather
than as organisational representatives.
The MCM interview takes the participant through a struc-
tured series of stages: (i) discuss visions; (ii) deﬁne criteria;
(iii) assess scores; (iv) explore uncertainty; (v) assign weights;
(vi) consider ranks (see Fig. 1). Finally, the software produces
a visual ‘map’ of the rankings of the visions, using a weighted
sum method.
3. Visions of a hydrogen economy for the UK
This section sets out the six UKSHEC visions together with
an additional status quo or reference vision, describing the cur-
rent UK energy system. The six visions differ both in relation
to the role of hydrogen (as a transport fuel only, or as provid-
ing both transport and broader energy services), the means of
hydrogen generation and storage, and the degree of centralisa-
tion/decentralisation of its production and supply (see Fig. 2
below). In terms of time scales, the intention is to imagine
them far enough into the future that substantial infrastructural
changes are conceivable, but not so far into the future that the
technologies envisaged today will be obsolete, that is, around
2040–2050.
Data for the indicative ﬁgures (such as number of wind tur-
bines, or volumes of gas required) were taken from the CON-
CAWE and GM wells-to-wheels studies [16,17]. The calcu-
lations applying them to the UKSHEC visions can be found
in [29].
3.1. Vision 1. Central pipeline (Fig. 3)
In this future, hydrogen has become the dominant road
transport fuel. Hydrogen-powered lorries, buses and passen-
ger cars–and even motor cycles—have become widespread,
using PEM fuel cells. There is some use of hydrogen fuel cell
systems for off-grid and back-up power, but this is a niche
market with little signiﬁcance for the wider energy system.
Hydrogen is also used as a marine transport fuel, and there
is increasing interest in the use of hydrogen as an aviation


















Fig. 2. The six UKSHEC visions.
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Fig. 3. Central pipeline.
There are three major hydrogen production routes in this
future. Hydrogen is produced from:
• Nuclear power, either electrolytically, or through direct ther-
mal or chemical routes in high temperature reactors (such as
the sulphur–iodine process);
• Fossil fuel plant, both coal gasiﬁcation and natural gas re-
forming, with sequestration of the carbon dioxide;
• Large renewable electrolysis installations, principally large
offshore wind farms and marine power stations around the
UK’s coastline.
Energy for road transport is distributed as gaseous hydrogen.
Heat and power for industrial, commercial and domestic use
continue to be supplied by the electricity and natural gas grids.
There is a hydrogen pipeline infrastructure connecting produc-
tion facilities with refuelling stations in major centres of hydro-
gen use, such as city centres and along motorways, and supply-
ing ports and airports. In areas of very low demand, hydrogen
is provided by truck, much as petrol is distributed today. On-
board storage is in solid state or compressed gas tanks; there is
medium-term bulk storage in salt caverns and on-the-forecourt
storage in solid-state stores.
This vision draws on: E4Tech et al. [18], Ogden [19], and
the visions workshop [10].
If transport demand remains much as it is today, this future
would require the following hydrogen production capacity:
• coal gasiﬁcation: 40.6million t of coal, or 76% of UK coal
consumption in 2003, or
• steam methane reforming: 250TWh, or 23–25% of UK gas
consumption in 2003, or
• 32 Sizewell B sized nuclear power plants (1.2GW; assuming
electrolysis rather than thermal routes), or
• 27,700 3MW wind turbines (compared to 1200 wind turbines
currently installed in the UK).
3.2. Vision 2. Forecourt reforming (Fig. 4)
Hydrogen produced locally from natural gas is the dominant
road transport fuel. The existing natural gas network provides
the delivery infrastructure, and hydrogen is generated on-site
by steam methane reforming at the refuelling station.
Natural Gas Grid
Natural Gas reforming on-site,
gaseous hydrogen refuelling 
Fig. 4. Forecourt reforming.
The role of hydrogen is restricted to use as a transport fuel.
Hydrogen-powered lorries, buses and passenger cars have be-
come widespread, using PEM fuel cells, and storing hydrogen
onboard as a compressed gas or in solid stores. Hydrogen is
produced from natural gas, reformed at refuelling stations.
Energy for transport is thus distributed as natural gas, which
plays a leading role in the energy system. As well as providing
fuel for transport, most buildings are equipped with a CHP unit
(possibly fuel cell) running on natural gas. There is some use
of hydrogen fuel cell systems for off-grid and back-up power,
but this is a niche market with little signiﬁcance for the wider
energy system. There is little signiﬁcant hydrogen distribution
infrastructure, as hydrogen is produced at refuelling stations,
where it is needed. Local electrolysis or hydrogen trucks have
a niche role where natural gas networks are poor. Hydrogen
is stored at refuelling stations as compressed gas or in solid
storage media. There is no large scale, long-term storage of
hydrogen.
This vision draws on the vision workshop [10].
If transport demand remains much as it is today, this future
would require 270–346TWh of natural gas to satisfy demand
for hydrogen for transport, equivalent to 24–31% of UK gas
consumption in 2003.
3.3. Vision 3. Liquid hydrogen (Fig. 5)
Liquid hydrogen produced by nuclear power and large scale
renewable installations has become the dominant fuel for both
road and marine transport. There is an international market in
liquid hydrogen. This is largely a scenario of substitution, with
current energy and transport paradigms remaining unchanged.
Hydrogen powered lorries, buses and passenger cars have
become widespread, using either ‘ﬂexible-fuel’ combustion
engines or PEM fuel cells. However, the size of on-board
liquid hydrogen fuel tanks remains an issue for smaller city
cars—where a niche market for battery vehicles exists.
In this future, liquid hydrogen is an internationally traded
product, produced from nuclear power (either electrolytically
or by direct thermal or chemical routes in high temperature
reactors), and from large scale renewable installations, many
of which are outside the UK. Regions of the world with large
renewable resources, particularly solar, hydroelectric and wind,
supply much of the world’s demand for hydrogen.
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Fig. 5. Liquid hydrogen.
While energy for transport is distributed as hydrogen, heat
and power for industrial, commercial and domestic use continue
to be supplied by the electricity and natural gas grids. Hydrogen
is distributed primarily as a liquid, by tanker, train and road,
serving a network of refuelling stations around the UK. On-
board storage is in cryogenic tanks, with liquid hydrogen. There
is also bulk storage of liquid hydrogen at refuelling stations
and fuel depots.
This vision draws on: BMW [20], Ogden [19].
Neither the GM nor the CONCAWE study provide wells-
to-wheels energy for nuclear-liquid hydrogen or renewables-
liquid hydrogen pathways, and we therefore have not calculated
indicative generation capacities for this pathway.
3.4. Vision 4. Synthetic liquid fuel (Fig. 6)
Renewably produced hydrogen again provides the dominant
transport fuel. In this case, however, it is ‘packaged’ in the form
of a synthetic liquid hydrocarbon, such as methanol (or other
alternatives, such as formic acid), to overcome the difﬁculties of
hydrogen storage and distribution. The carbon for fuel synthesis
comes from biomass and from the ﬂue gases of carbon-intensive
industries.
Hydrogen is produced from electrolysis based on renew-
ables, particularly wind and marine installations around UK’s
coastline. The hydrogen is then used as a feedstock for the pro-
duction of methanol, adding hydrogen to carbon derived from
biomass or from carbon intensive industries.
Energy for heat and power is distributed as electricity; en-
ergy for transport is distributed as methanol. Fuel distribution
infrastructures remain largely as they do today, with liquid fuel
tankers serving refuelling stations from large fuel depots. This
future has little need of hydrogen storage. Hydrogen is ‘stored’
in the form of a hydrocarbon fuel, which is used much as petrol
is today.
This vision draws on: Bossel et al. [21]; Arnasson and Sig-
fusson [22].
No wells-to-wheels energy data were found for this pathway,
though a recent feasibility study claimed that up to 62% of the









Fig. 6. Synthetic liquid fuel.
3.5. Vision 5. Ubiquitous hydrogen (Fig. 7)
Renewably produced hydrogen is a major energy carrier
for heat and power as well as the dominant transport fuel. A
national hydrogen pipeline grid serves most buildings. Many
homes and businesses use fuel cell CHP systems running on
hydrogen, and it is common to refuel vehicles at home. Hydro-
gen is produced from a mix of larger centralised and smaller
scale distributed renewables and biomass.
Hydrogen-powered lorries, buses and passenger cars have
become widespread, and hydrogen is also a major means of dis-
tributing energy for heat and power competing with electricity
in much the same way as natural gas does today.
Hydrogen is produced both centrally and locally, using a
variety of technologies, with a signiﬁcant proportion from
distributed renewables (such as wind turbines and building-
integrated PV) and biomass (such as wood from short rotation
coppice and forestry, agricultural, food industry and municipal
waste streams via gasiﬁcation, and from ‘wet biomass’ such
as grasses and sewage sludge via fermentation). Large scale
renewable hydrogen installations operate in renewable-rich ar-
eas (for example, highland Scotland, and offshore zones with
wind, tidal and wave power potential), and some limited fossil
fuel production of hydrogen with sequestration of CO2.
An extensive hydrogen pipeline network competes with the
electricity grid as the dominant means of distributing energy for
all sectors: transport, heat and power. The hydrogen pipeline
infrastructure has become ubiquitous, driven by the twin de-
mands of vehicle refuelling and stationary use of hydrogen for
the provision of heat and power in micro-CHP units. Vehicle
refuelling is common in homes and businesses, and it is pos-
sible to ‘plug-in’ vehicles and sell electricity to the local elec-
tricity grid. On-board storage is in solid state or compressed
gas tanks. The hydrogen pipeline network represents signiﬁ-
cant storage capacity, but this is supplemented with large scale
storage in salt caverns and refuelling station installations.
This vision draws on: Rifkin [24], Lovins and Williams [25].
If transport demand remains much as it is today, providing
hydrogen for transport only in this future would require either:
• 47–57million t of dry short rotation coppice biomass, about
4.7–5.7million ha, assuming average yield of 10 t/ha, or
• 27,700 3MW wind turbines.
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Fig. 8. Electricity store.
Clearly signiﬁcantly more capacity would be required for the
heat and power loads envisaged in this future.
3.6. Vision 6. Electricity store (Fig. 8)
Hydrogen, produced through onsite electrolysis, is the dom-
inant road transport fuel, and also plays a vital role overcom-
ing the intermittency problems of a renewables-based electric-
ity system. Hydrogen production is ﬂexible, and can respond
to variable electricity supply conditions, easing load-balancing.
Since hydrogen is produced onsite it requires no distribution in-
frastructure. Locally stored hydrogen provides back-up power
for domestic and commercial CHP units at times of peak elec-
tricity demand/limited supply.
Large scale renewables have achieved near total domination
of electricity generation, particularly offshore wind and marine
installations around the UK coastline.
Electricity is the dominant energy carrier with gaseous hy-
drogen serving only as the storage medium and vehicle fuel.
There is therefore no hydrogen distribution infrastructure. Hy-
drogen is produced (electrolytically) and stored onsite in refu-
elling stations or in private homes. Hydrogen is stored in solid
state or compressed gas tanks.
This vision draws on: Sorenson et al. [26] and the vision
workshop [10].
If transport demand remains much as it is today, this future
would around 27,600 3MW wind turbines, for transport alone.
There are currently 1200 wind turbines in the UK. Clearly
signiﬁcantly more capacity would be required for the heat and
power loads envisaged in this future.
3.7. Status quo vision
Hydrogen plays a negligible role in energy and transport sys-
tems. Transport is dominated by oil, reﬁned in large centralised
reﬁneries into petrol and diesel for internal combustion vehi-
cles in road transport, and kerosene and fuel oil for aviation
and shipping. Transport fuel is distributed by road tanker from
reﬁneries to refuelling stations.
Power is provided by the electricity grid, and is generated
from a combination of centralised natural gas, coal and nuclear
plant. Renewable generation is a small proportion of total elec-
tricity supply. Heat is largely provided through the natural gas
grid, and most homes have a domestic boiler burning natural
gas for hot water and space heating. CHP plants, mostly in in-
dustry, provide only a small percentage of the heat and power
consumed in this vision.
4. Results: appraising the sustainability of hydrogen
futures
This section gives an overview of results from the multi-
criteria appraisal, presenting the broad outputs. It is structured
as follows. Firstly the panel’s responses to the overall set of
visions they were asked to appraised are brieﬂy discussed. The
criteria deﬁned by the panel members and weightings attributed
to these are then presented. Finally, the detailed pattern of ap-
praisal, for example, rankings of the visions and associated un-
certainties, are explored.
4.1. Visions
Overall, participants were comfortable appraising the set of
visions developed, with none feeling that major elements of a
possible hydrogen future were obviously missing. One partici-
pant deﬁned an additional vision, while a further two explored
hybrids of two of the UKSHEC visions. These additional vi-
sions are described in McDowall and Eames [9].
4.2. Criteria and weighting: dimensions of sustainability for
hydrogen
In order to provide an integrated appraisal of the sustain-
ability of the visions, participants were invited to deﬁne crite-
ria under the following broad headings: (i) environmental; (ii)
economic; (iii) social; (iv) energy security; (v) other. Between
them, the 15 panel members deﬁned a total of 98 criteria, of
which many were very similar across different participants (for
example, various criteria exploring carbon emissions, social ac-
ceptability, energy security and so on) (Fig. 9).
The overall picture of weightings provides an overview of the
groups of issues that participants judged to be most important.
There is a clear tendency for environmental issues to receive
high weightings, with social issues in general receiving much
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Fig. 9. Shows the spread of weightings from all participants. Each participant
distributed 100 weighting ‘points’ among their criteria, to indicate relative
criteria importance.
less attention, and with a substantial spread of views around
the importance of economic criteria.
4.2.1. Environmental issues
The six visions were clearly differentiated on the basis
of their environmental performance. This was dominated by
carbon emissions, but included a range of other criteria (see
Table 1). Uncertainties with respect to these scores occurred
despite relatively well characterised ‘wells-to-wheels’ data for
different hydrogen infrastructure pathways. Some participants
were sceptical of, for example, the viability of sequestration
technologies, and gave visions involving sequestration a range
representing that risk of technological failure. In terms of
weightings across the participants overall, carbon emissions
were clearly considered to be the most important single deter-
minant of a vision’s sustainability.
Five participants scored an ‘air quality’ criterion that focused
on the emissions from vehicles, although in general these were
not weighted highly. There was little difference among the vi-
sions from a local air quality perspective, with lower scores
for synthetic liquid fuels. Environmental issues other than car-
bon and local air quality favoured electricity store. Visions in-
volving nuclear power, and with a predominance of large scale
fossil fuels, tended to do less well.
4.2.2. Economic issues
The economic sub-rankings are interesting, with none of
the visions coming out as obviously better or worse when
the appraisals of all participants are examined as a whole.
However, many of the individual participants did see signif-
icant variation among the visions in terms of economic per-
formance. All participants scored some form of economic cri-
terion (although for the health and safety regulator this was
through a ‘feasibility’ criterion in the ‘other’ category of issues)
(Table 2).
The most highly weighted economic criteria concerned
feasibility, and economic attractiveness of the vision to in-
vestors. Nine participants scored some kind of ‘cost’ criterion.
However, these were varied. Some concerned costs to society
Table 1
Environmental criteria




Carbon trust analyst Global impacts
Regional impacts
Local impacts
DTI policy maker Carbon emissions
Other environmental issues
Fuel cell industry participant Carbon emissions
Local air quality
Other environmental impacts
Sustainable energy policy consultant Cost effective carbon reductions
Local environmental impact
Industrial gases industry participant Carbon emissions
Local air quality




Environmental campaigner Greenhouse gases
No nuclear power
Health and safety regulator Greenhouse gases
Non-carbon pollution
Energy policy researcher Carbon emissions trajectory
Natural environment/wilderness
Catastrophic risk
Senior oil industry participant Energy efﬁciency
Physical integrity
DfT policy maker Carbon
Other environmental issues
Automotive industry participant Carbon
Utilisation of available resources
Regional government policy maker Carbon
Air quality
Complementarity with renewables
Climate scientist Global environmental improvement
Table 2
Economic criteria
Nuclear industry participant Affordability of H2 fuel
Carbon trust analyst Cost of fuel
Impact on UK economy
Degree of consumer choice
DTI policy maker Impact on UK economy
Impacts on local economy
Fuel cell industry participant Fuel cost
Business case feasibility
Sustainable energy policy consultant Economic attractiveness
Industrial gases industry participant Upfront capital costs
Ongoing fuel cost
Energy technology researcher Cost
Environmental campaigner Cost
Energy policy researcher Least cost portfolio
Senior oil industry participant Affordability
DfT policy maker Business case feasibility




Climate scientist Cost competitiveness
overall, while others were intended to represent what con-
sumers might pay at the pump. Moreover, variations in the
appraisals of the economic performance of the visions were also
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Table 3
Social criteria
Nuclear industry participant Socio-political acceptability
Carbon trust analyst Access to energy services
Public acceptability
DTI policy maker Social acceptability
Fuel cell industry participant Social acceptability
Energy technology researcher Public acceptability
Health and safety regulator Public acceptability
Energy policy researcher Social justice
Senior oil industry participant Physical intrusion
Control of energy
Usability
DfT policy maker Public acceptability
Automotive industry participant Degree of state intervention required
Regional government policy maker Acceptability/risk
dependent on different assumptions about policy frameworks
around carbon; fossil fuel prices; the costs of nuclear power;
and the relative affordability of more decentralised, modular
systems or capital-intensive centralised systems.
4.2.3. Social issues
Seven participants scored only a ‘social acceptability’ cri-
terion under this heading, and the way in which these were
scored suggested that acceptability was seen as a barrier to up-
take, rather than an ongoing dimension of sustainability. The
performance of the visions varied amongst participants, with
some arguing that ‘out of sight’ centralised systems such as
central pipeline would be most acceptable, and others arguing
that publics would be most willing to accept the least polluting
visions, such as electricity store (Table 3).
Some participants scored visions on a wider range of social
and political concerns: for example, the degree to which the
system enabled access to energy services, or the degree to which
the future was seen as necessitating interference of the state.
These other social issues tended to be given higher weightings
than acceptability criteria. In general, visions involving greater
decentralisation tended to do well under these criteria.
4.2.4. Energy security issues
All but three participants scored criteria under ‘energy
security’, including primary energy security, infrastructural
integrity, and diversity of sources. Unsurprisingly, forecourt
reforming did badly under energy security criteria, given its
dependence on natural gas (Table 4).
4.2.5. Other issues
This diverse category included criteria addressing issues of
feasibility and practicality, health and safety, ﬂexibility and
adaptability of the system, the degree to which the visions pro-
mote decentralised renewable energy options, and radioactive
waste (seen here as having both environmental and social im-
plications, and therefore not conﬁned to one or other category).
Liquid hydrogen tended to do badly here, based on concerns
about practicality, safety, ﬂexibility and the inclusion of nuclear
power, among other factors. Perhaps surprisingly, synthetic liq-
Table 4
Energy security
Nuclear industry participant Redundancy/security of primary supply
Diversity of primary
Carbon trust analyst Security/diversity








Energy technology researcher Resource scarcity
Diversity of supply
Energy policy researcher Primary supply
Infrastructure
Senior oil industry participant Diversity of sources
DfT policy maker Security of supply






Nuclear industry participant Quality of supply
Technical feasibility
DTI policy maker Health and safety
Feasibility




Health and safety regulator Practicability/feasibility
Flexibility
Energy policy researcher Radioactive waste
Complementarity
Climate scientist Scale of tech deployment
uid fuel was, on aggregate, seen as the best performing under
these criteria (Table 5).
4.3. Ranking the visions
Fig. 10 presents the panels’ ﬁnal appraisal of the visions sus-
tainability. These aggregated results provide a rough picture of
the contours of the appraisal, and allow us to examine where in-
dividual participants’ appraisals differ markedly from the panel
as a whole.
Fig. 11 above provides ﬁnal outputs for each participant, and
demonstrate the wide variety of individual appraisals.
This analysis conﬁrms the highly contested nature of the
debate, with no absolute winners or losers, and with a wide
range of rankings for all visions. However, examination of the
relative performance of each vision, under both optimistic and
pessimistic assumptions, provides some clear messages about
the likely sustainability of the different visions.
4.3.1. Central pipeline
All participants recognised this future as playing a well-
established role in hydrogen debates, but it was the vision with
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Final Weighted Scores for all Participants
Fig. 10. Final weighted scores aggregated across all participants. Bars indicate extreme (grey) and average (black) pessimistic and optimistic scores, capturing
the degree of uncertainty about future performance. The x-axis is a relative scale indicating low (0) to high (100) performance.
the widest range of rankings. Central pipeline was ruled out
by the environmental campaigner because of its inclusion of
nuclear, and in the view of the energy policy researcher and
regional government policy maker it performed worse than any
other vision. In these participants’ views, centralised systems
with fossil fuels, nuclear power and pipelines performed poorly.
In contrast, the sustainable energy policy consultant ranked this
vision as the best performing, arguing that it provided the most
cost effective way to reduce carbon emissions and enhance
energy security.
4.3.2. Forecourt reforming
Eight participants saw this as having little role as a viable
‘end-point’ vision, but spoke of it as having a valuable role to
play as a transitional step in terms of infrastructure develop-
ment. However, there was also some support for it as an ‘end-
point’ vision, if natural gas remains plentiful. An interesting
feature of this vision was the debate over its practicality, with
the panel showing sharply opposing views on the feasibility of
widespread distributed natural gas reforming.
This vision was seen as the worst performing by six partici-
pants. This was because of poor performance on carbon criteria,
and for some participants, poor performance on energy security
criteria. In no case was this seen as the best performing vision.
The overall poor performance of this vision is conﬁrmed at the
aggregate level, where it performs worst under both optimistic
and pessimistic assumptions.
4.3.3. Liquid hydrogen
Several participants felt that this was one of the least likely
visions presented in the set. However, the technologies within
the vision were all felt to be relevant and worth exploring. The
industrial gases industry participant felt it was not likely, but
broadly plausible: “the technology’s known, it’s a current way
of distributing hydrogen, … if you can justify the investment in
the plant and you know there’s a market there, then… it doesn’t
seem unreasonable to me.” The feeling overall seemed to be that
while liqueﬁed hydrogen is likely to play an important role in
the distribution and storage of hydrogen in some circumstances,
the sole use of liquid is unlikely.
The health and safety regulator, the senior oil industry par-
ticipant, and the DfT policy maker ranked liquid hydrogen worst
under both pessimistic and optimistic assumptions. A further
participant (the environmental campaigner) ruled it out entirely,
on the basis of its inclusion of nuclear power. In no case was
the liquid hydrogen vision the best performing. However, the
automotive industry participant created an additional vision, a
hybrid of liquid hydrogen and ubiquitous hydrogen, and this
performed very highly in this participant’s appraisal.
4.3.4. Synthetic liquid fuel
Unlike the other visions, this was new to many of the partic-
ipants, but in general it was thought to be an interesting addi-
tion to the overall set. The industrial gases industry participant
and the regional government policy maker both felt that it was
not plausible, given the apparent direction of automotive ﬁrm
R&D, which was seen to have ‘turned its back’ on synthetic
fuels such as methanol. The DTI policy maker had been scep-
tical at the scoping interview stage, but was more positive in
the MCM interview: “I was sceptical because… all the vehi-
cle manufacturers seem to be assuming gaseous hydrogen as
storage or possibly solid-state hydrogen storage as being, the
means of introducing fuel cell vehicles. Having looked at the
arguments for synthetic liquid fuels, I think there’s deﬁnitely a
case to be made there.”
The sustainable energy policy consultant and industrial
gases industry participant saw scope for this being the worst
performing vision, but both of these participants gave this
ranking a high degree of uncertainty. Only in the view of the
industrial gases industry participant did it remain the worst
performing even under most positive assumptions. Both of
these participants were sceptical of the carbon balance of
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Fig. 11. Individual weighted score ranges. The x-axis is a relative 1–100 scale showing performance, with better performing visions further to the right. Bar
length is a result of the degree of difference between pessimistic and optimistic scores, and is thus a function of the degree of uncertainty.
this vision, and of its likely feasibility and costs. No par-
ticipant saw this as the best performing vision, but in the
views of six participants it performed well under positive
assumptions.
4.3.5. Ubiquitous hydrogen
Opinion on this vision was sharply divided. The sustainable
energy policy consultant felt it to be implausible, because of
the efﬁciency issues around distributing energy for stationary
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Fig. 11. (continued).
applications as hydrogen. For others, it is the most sensible
and desirable system. A common attitude to this vision was
summed up by the DTI policy maker, who commented that
“it’s credible when there aren’t really any alternatives left”,
and particularly when natural gas is no longer economically
available.
Only the sustainable energy policy consultant saw this as
potentially the worst performing vision. This was largely on
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the basis of cost and feasibility, and the feeling that hydrogen
should not compete with electricity for stationary power. Two
participants (the carbon trust analyst and senior oil industry
participant) saw this as potentially the best performing vision,
and a further two participants saw it as joint best with elec-
tricity store. However, no participant ranked it best under least
favourable assumptions, suggesting that it would not be seen
as a fall-back option.
4.3.6. Electricity store
All participants recognised this as a major part of the hydro-
gen debate. Most saw it as only viable in the very long term,
given its reliance on renewables, and the industrial gases in-
dustry participant and DfT policy maker were concerned that
pursuit of this vision would lead to less efﬁcient use of limited
renewable electricity supplies. The nuclear industry expert felt
that the inclusion of nuclear power in this vision would make
it more robust and more feasible.
No participant saw this as the worst possible vision, and
where it did perform poorly, this was on the basis of concerns
about feasibility and cost, and scepticism about the availability
of sufﬁcient renewables capacity. Several participants saw it as
only viable in the very long term. Electricity store was seen as
performing the best under ﬁve participants views, and as joint
best along with ubiquitous hydrogen under a further two. This
vision did best among participants that strongly supported re-
newables, rejected nuclear and carbon sequestration, and pre-
ferred decentralised systems. Electricity store also performed
best overall at the aggregate level.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the performance of the
status quo vision with the hydrogen visions.
4.3.7. Status quo
In the appraisals of many participants, there were conditions
under which the status quo was not the worst performing option,
implying that some hydrogen visions could be less sustainable
than current, or business as usual, activities. However, status
quo was frequently the worst performing option, and in no case
was it the best performing, suggesting broad agreement that
many hydrogen systems bring sustainability gains.
4.4. Key uncertainties affecting vision performance
The picture as a whole shows huge uncertainty. In the views
of some participants, the scale of uncertainties within the vi-
sions is as important as the differences between them, a conclu-
sion that should not be surprising given the long time horizons
involved. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the MCM in-
terviews suggests two key dimensions to this uncertainty.
4.4.1. Uncertainty about technologies
There are uncertainties surrounding technologies, not only
in terms of their physical performance, but in terms of what
impacts the technologies might have in broader socio-economic
and environmental terms. The following uncertainties were each
identiﬁed by more than three participants, and were reﬂected
in variations between pessimistic and optimistic scores.
• Potential leakages of CO2 from carbon capture and storage.
• Fuel cell performance.
• Performance of small scale natural gas reformers—in terms
of both cost and pollution.
• Likely carbon balance and toxic emissions from synthetic
liquid fuel synthesis and use.
• Costs for all technologies were subject to uncertainty, but
in particular uncertainties relating to the costs of synthetic
liquid fuels, nuclear power, and pipeline infrastructures were
raised.
• Signiﬁcant uncertainties around public acceptability of tech-
nologies in general.
• Performance, integrity and vulnerability of pipelines.
• Very large uncertainties around the possible impacts on the
UK economy as a whole.
Other areas of uncertainty, raised by fewer participants, in-
cluded: hydrogen storage, safety of handling hydrogen in a
domestic environment, safety of liquid hydrogen, likely de-
velopments of fast-breeder reactors (seen as necessary if ura-
nium resource constraints are to be avoided), efﬁciency of liq-
uefaction, performance of electrolysers, likely pollution from
biomass gasiﬁcation, whether the natural gas network can be
upgraded to take hydrogen, and whether decentralisation con-
strains or enhances access to energy.
4.4.2. Sensitivity of vision performance to different possible
future contexts
Variation between optimistic and pessimistic scores also oc-
curs where there is uncertainty about the broader context in
which the visions exist, such as:
• Future natural gas availability and price—particularly impor-
tant for the feasibility of ubiquitous hydrogen, and the feasi-
bility and costs of forecourt reforming.
• Future national and international climate change policy
frameworks, such as carbon taxes, clearly have an important
effect on the feasibility of the visions, and on their relative
costs.
Other context uncertainties of this kind included broader so-
cial attitudes towards technology and the environment, and the
strategic direction taken by the automotive industry.
5. Analysis and discussion: issues in the appraisal of
hydrogen futures
This section explores what the process tells us about the
sustainability of competing hydrogen futures, by examining the
issues which most clearly divided participants’ perspectives.
Overall, carbon emissions were the most important factor in the
panels’ appraisals. However, participants differed strongly over
three key issues and it was their attitudes towards: (i) nuclear
power; (ii) decentralisation; and (iii) feasibility that most clearly
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deﬁned their differing perspectives on how to judge the future
sustainability of hydrogen systems.
5.1. Nuclear power
Nuclear was the only component of the visions that any par-
ticipant (the environmental campaigner) ruled out on principle,
as fundamentally unsustainable. For many participants, nuclear
provoked concerns about the environmental and health risks
of radiation, but nuclear was also a more signiﬁcant factor in
the appraisals of the energy policy researcher and the regional
government policy maker. Their reasons for opposing nuclear
power extended to political issues, and perceived implications
of nuclear to the development of alternative energy systems.
In the energy policy researcher’s view, nuclear power is a
fundamentally ‘anti-democratic’ technology that would be dan-
gerous in a destabilised, climate change world. Both the energy
policy researcher and regional government policy maker also
opposed nuclear on the basis that the development of nuclear
would undermine efforts to move towards energy efﬁciency
and renewables. In the words of the regional government pol-
icy maker, “[nuclear and renewables] work against each other.
If you can do nuclear on that scale, you’d probably just do
nuclear”.
However, a somewhat different view was articulated by the
sustainable energy policy consultant, and as similar arguments
were made by others it is worth quoting at length:
“Nuclear… is fundamentally opposed to the notion of sus-
tainable development. The idea that you have to bury waste
in a hole for a hundred years before you can even deal with
it ﬂies in the face of the leaving the world in the state that
you found it. However, I see it as a lesser of evils debate,
because leaving the world closer to the risk of catastrophic
climate change is probably a worse thing to do.”
By contrast the nuclear industry expert felt that good man-
agement could overcome the difﬁculties associated with waste
and with the global political implications of nuclear power, and
that nuclear would not necessarily undermine the development
of renewables. This view is in sharp opposition to the view of
the energy policy researcher, and illustrates very different be-
liefs about the politics of this technology.
5.2. Centralisation and decentralisation: beliefs about the
impacts of scale on society
There are claims in the hydrogen futures literature and pop-
ular press about the potential for hydrogen to enable decen-
tralisation and consumer awareness of energy or even greater
democratisation and empowerment (for example, [23]). The
members of the expert panel took a range of views about such
claims, and their approach to decentralisation and was an im-
portant factor distinguishing their appraisals.
Several participants (the regional government policy maker,
senior oil industry participant, automotive industry partici-
pant, DTI policy maker, energy policy researcher and envi-
ronmental campaigner saw value in distributed systems em-
phasising local energy production. These views were reﬂected
through, for example, criteria examining the economic beneﬁts
to local communities and ‘control over energy’. The case for
distributed systems was put most forcefully by the regional
government policy maker, who argued that decentralised hy-
drogen “has the potential to revolutionise the way we use
energy”, allowing much greater efﬁciencies, local control and
empowerment.
Other participants were more sceptical about the beneﬁts of
decentralised hydrogen systems. The sustainable energy policy
consultant broadly agreed with the social arguments in favour
of distributed energy, but felt that the visions could not be dif-
ferentiated on this basis. The potential beneﬁts of decentrali-
sation were seen as not coming from a particular structure of
energy system per se, but instead on the structure of ownership
and management. This participant felt that there was nothing
inherent in the technologies that implied the social and techno-
logical worlds that go with them.
5.3. Feasibility, practicality and speed
Some participants felt that the most important issue was not
to compare the likely sustainability impacts of the various hy-
drogen systems, since with the partial exception of forecourt
reforming, all the visions tackle the basic problem of climate
change. The question, for these participants, was more to do
with the feasibility and practicality of arriving at the visions.
As one participant argued “in terms of prioritisation, what’s
important is how quickly will this particular route get to the
end game [of low carbon emissions]. And … I would say that’s
probably THE most important issue.”
All visions were considered technically possible. The ques-
tion of feasibility was more frequently seen as economic and
political. As one participant argued: “what I mean by practica-
bility/feasibility is… why should that be done? …Why should
the customer want to do this? And in a … reasonably demo-
cratic situation… The customer is going to have to want to
do…one of these rather than being told to do one of these.”
This raises some fundamental issues of what is possible in a
democratic consumer society, and the extent to which govern-
ments can force technology choices onto the public in the name
of sustainability.
Finally, participants differed in their perceptions of which vi-
sions might be more or less feasible, particularly from an eco-
nomic point of view. Some felt that electricity store was more
feasible because of its modularity and relatively low infrastruc-
ture costs; most felt that the high levels of renewables involved
in the scenario made it feasible only over very long time hori-
zons, and much less feasible than others. Two participants felt
that ubiquitous hydrogen would only be possible when natu-
ral gas supplies are unavailable. Participants also differed in
their perceptions of the feasibility of forecourt reforming, with
most seeing it as relatively straightforward. In contrast, the se-
nior oil industry participant argued that for most refuelling
stations, there is no space for reforming technologies, saying
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Fig. 13. Shows the rankings and weightings for the sustainable energy policy consultant, industrial gases industry participant, DfT policy maker, health and
safety regulator, automotive industry participant and nuclear industry expert.
“as somebody who actually runs one thousand three hundred
petrol stations, I could tell you this is nigh impossible”. Simi-
larly, the regional government policy maker also raised the is-
sue of very limited space in urban environments.
5.4. Differing perspectives on vision appraisal
The way in which participants approached these three key
issues had a major impact on their overall ranking of the visions.
Three participants (the energy policy researcher, environ-
mental campaigner and regional government policy maker)
were strongly opposed to nuclear power, and strongly favoured
renewables and decentralised systems (Fig. 12).
A second group of participants took a view much more
clearly deﬁned by economic feasibility. This group comprised
the sustainable energy policy consultant, industrial gases
industry participant, DfT policy maker, health and safety reg-
ulator, automotive industry participant and nuclear industry
expert. In this view, while social issues are recognised to be
important, there is little sense that different technological sys-
tems have strong implications for social issues or political
relations. Participants in this view tend not to be hostile to nu-
clear power, or at most to see it as a ‘necessary evil’. Some of
these participants felt that there would be little differences be-
tween the environmental performance of the six visions, with
the exception of forecourt reforming. Instead, the important
aspect of appraisal was the relative feasibility and economic
attractiveness of the visions (Fig. 13).
Striking differences between the patterns of appraisal are
clear, based on very different perceptions of what is important
in determining sustainability.
Finally, the remaining participants sat between these two
groups, voicing concerns about the more social and politi-
cal dimensions of the different systems, but seeing these as
either intractable, or as less important than other aspects of
the problem. These other participants identiﬁed some criteria
that explored broader social and political aspects (such as
‘social control over technology, ‘degree of consumer choice’
and ‘physical intrusion’), but did not have strong views
about the social implications of any particular technologies,
or about the nature of centralised rather than decentralised
systems.
6. Conclusions: insights on the road to a sustainable
hydrogen economy
This MCM exercise yields two kinds of conclusions. First,
in reﬂecting the judgements of leading UK hydrogen energy
experts, it provides some direct insight into the likely relative
performance of the different hydrogen energy systems under
consideration, and helps us to decide which might be more sus-
tainable to pursue. Secondly, it makes clear what issues and
uncertainties are at stake, and opens up the range of social, po-
litical and ethical perspectives that lead to differing conclusions
about the sustainability of the visions.
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6.1. The sustainability of the UKSHEC visions
The results from the MCM indicate that, overall, electricity
store was seen as the most sustainable option, subject to con-
cerns about feasibility. Forecourt reforming was judged to be
least sustainable, largely because of carbon emissions, but also
concerns about the security and economic implications of nat-
ural gas dependence.
Central pipeline was the most contentious vision, with the
widest range of rankings, reﬂecting divergent opinions on nu-
clear power, carbon sequestration and the viability of a large,
centralised pipeline infrastructure. The relatively strong perfor-
mance of synthetic liquid fuels reﬂected the potential beneﬁts
of a low carbon fuel that is straightforward to store and trans-
port, and that offers fewer technological barriers than the use
of pure hydrogen. It was also the vision around which there is
greatest uncertainty. Liquid hydrogen did poorly, partly because
of participants’ concerns about nuclear power, but more impor-
tantly because liqueﬁed hydrogen was seen as impractical and
inefﬁcient for use as a mainstream transport fuel (although it
was widely seen as having niche applications). Finally, ubiqui-
tous hydrogen performed relatively well, but as with electricity
store, there were some concerns about its feasibility.
Since there are many possible conﬁgurations of the technolo-
gies that compose each vision, the ﬁnal rankings of the visions
tell us only a small part of the story. Alternative conﬁgurations
of the visions, with technologies such as nuclear included in
a different set of visions, might have lead to a rather different
pattern of ﬁnal rankings. The important issues, uncertainties
and participants’ perspectives on particular technological com-
ponents are the second-order conclusions, and provide us with
deeper insight into issues surrounding the sustainability of hy-
drogen.
6.2. Insights into the likely sustainability of a hydrogen future
The panel recognised that a hydrogen energy system has the
potential to deliver substantial sustainability beneﬁts over the
status quo, or business as usual futures. Overall the panel’s
results support the view that carbon emissions are the single
most important dimension of sustainability with respect to the
hydrogen visions. However, a very wide range of issues were
seen by the panel to be important in judging the sustainability
of hydrogen systems, and the ﬁndings remind us that issues
other than carbon and cost need to be considered if hydrogen
energy is truly to deliver greater sustainability.
Furthermore, the appraisal suggested that hydrogen is not
automatically a sustainable option, as the panel recognised a
range of circumstances in which hydrogen energy might be
less sustainable than the current system or some non-hydrogen
business as usual futures. There was also signiﬁcant disagree-
ment about which visions were considered to be more or less
sustainable. These ﬁndings reﬂect two important sources of di-
vergence in the ﬁnal sustainability rankings: uncertainties and
contested views of sustainability.
Important uncertainties were expressed with respect to the
performance and costs of: carbon capture and storage, nuclear
power, hydrogen pipelines, small scale reformers, fuel cells
and hydrogen storage technologies. These uncertainties go be-
yond purely technical performance to include the way in which
technologies might be expected to work in the real world, in
relation to the behaviour of users, ﬁrms and regulators. Uncer-
tainties about the dynamics of technological change are also
important—does pursuing some options close off others? Pol-
icy should seek to respond to such uncertainty by ensuring that
a diversity of options are pursued, and that backstop technolo-
gies are available.
Hydrogen policy must also be robust in the face of uncer-
tainties about future context conditions, such as the availabil-
ity and price of natural gas, and public attitudes to technology.
The future of political frameworks around carbon and climate
change was a key uncertainty affecting the perceived feasibility
of the visions.
However, the ﬁndings suggest that even with perfect fore-
sight and no uncertainties it would not necessarily be possible
to obtain a single consensus view on which futures are most
sustainable. This is because participants have different ideas
about what sustainability means, what elements are more or
less important, and about what sort of society is desirable. In
short, there is an inescapably political element to long-term
technological choice. Different approaches to nuclear power
and decentralisation were important in distinguishing partic-
ipants’ appraisals, and reﬂect different understandings of the
social impacts of technology. Attitudes to feasibility were also
very different, with some participants feeling that differences
in the sustainability of the end visions were less important than
differences in the feasibility of getting to them. These con-
tested priorities and perspectives suggest that the broad advo-
cacy coalition promoting hydrogen may be fragile. If hydrogen
systems develop, there is signiﬁcant potential for conﬂict and
disagreement over the shape and direction that those systems
take.
These ﬁndings complement technical appraisals such as
wells-to-wheels carbon analysis. The ﬁndings broaden the
range of issues considered, and are useful to policy-makers
concerned with broader uncertainties. In a report to the Euro-
pean Parliament, for example, these results have been presented
alongside wells-to-wheels data to provide parliamentarians
with a broader insight into the issues at stake [27].
Finally, the appraisal suggests that ‘business as usual’ or the
market alone are unlikely to deliver any of the visions, at least
in the short term, and that shifts in fossil fuel supplies, policy
frameworks, or social priorities with respect to climate change
will be necessary to drive a transition to hydrogen. If and when
such a transition occurs, it is essential that there is opportunity
for open, accountable and democratic debate, to ensure that the
interests of society as a whole are reﬂected in a sustainable
energy future.
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This paper reports an innovative foresighting study which constructed a set of hydrogen futures
and pathways to them, in order to inform the transition to a sustainable hydrogen economy.
Combining backcasting and multi-criteria appraisal the authors developed a participatory expert
stakeholder-led methodology to build and appraise a set of visions, which sought to acknowl-
edge the diversity of possible hydrogen futures and contested claims as to their sustainability. A
set of transition scenarios were then developed exploring the dynamics and governance of the
large-scale socio-technical changes that would be required for the emergence of the different
visions. While aspects of this project have been reported elsewhere, this paper seeks to: (1)
locate the work with respect to broader developments in the fields of foresight, expectations
and socio-technical transitions to sustainability; (2) provide a description of the UKSHEC
sustainable futures methodology; and (3) reflect on key insights for research and practice.
Keywords: scenario planning; technology and innovation studies; energy industry; foresight
1. Foresight, transition management and reflexive governance
In recent years a growing community of academics and opinion formers has argued for fundamen-
tal transformation in the socio-technological structure of human society to address the challenges
of climate change and sustainable development. As Shove and Walker (2007) note, ‘for those
concerned with sustainability, the idea of transition – of substantial change and movement from
one state to another – has powerful normative attractions’. Indeed the concept of transitions and
transitions management are central to the emerging discourse of reflexive governance of sustain-
able development, while the notion of a transition to a low carbon economy increasingly frames
policy responses to climate change.
Drawing inspiration from ecology, systems and complexity science, transition theory seeks
to develop an evolutionary perspective on societal change. With this perspective, addressing the
inherently ‘wicked’problem of sustainability becomes ‘a learning-by-doing exercise: experiment-
ing with partnerships, new institutions, new technologies and new regulations within. . . ecological
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limits’, informed by a co-evolutionary, non-linear, multi-level conception of systems innovation
and socio-technological transition (Kemp and Loorbach 2006, 104–105). Transition management
is by its very nature flexible and adaptive. However, processes of foresight, experimentation,
evaluation and social learning, built upon stakeholder engagement and participation are central.
Particular emphasis is placed on the development of shared problem definitions, normative visions
and prospective transition pathways (Kemp and Loorbach 2006, 114).
In other words, transition management consciously seeks to mobilise and exploit the perfor-
mative power of expectations: facilitating the alignment of actors around common goals, defining
research priorities, stimulating resources for R&D and deployment, reducing uncertainty in deci-
sion making for technology developers, promoting political support for necessary institutional
and regulatory change, etc. (Van Lente 1993; Dierkes, Hoffmann, and Marz 1996).
However, some have questioned the politics and practice of transition management (and the
role of foresight therein). In particular, authors such as Berkhout, Smith, and Stirling (2004) and
Shove and Walker (2007) have challenged the role of shared normative vision(s), and argued that
transition management fails to adequately address the operation of power and deeply political
and contested character of sustainable development. Berkhout, Smith, and Stirling (2004, 57–
59), in particular, raise two substantive concerns over the centrality of guiding visions in driving
the transition management process. First, noting what they see as a ‘disjuncture’ between the
‘historically informed niche based model of regime transformation and the normative policy
aspirations of transition management’ they argue that there are many examples of past transitions
where a consensus around a particular guiding vision was largely absent or where a guiding
vision has played only a relatively modest role. Conversely they point out there are also many
examples where guiding visions have failed to deliver upon the hype they generated. Second, they
argue the notion of an unproblematic social consensus around any particular guiding vision is
profoundly problematic as it ignores confounding issues of incommensurability in technological
performance, divergent social values and interests, interrelationships between social and evaluative
context, irreducible uncertainty, the operation of political and economic power and capture by
incumbent interests.
Within the wider discourse of reflexive governance, Stirling (2006) has sought to move this
discussion on by arguing for what he terms ‘precautionary foresight’. He suggests using a variety
of ‘heuristic’ tools to facilitate more pluralistic forms of ‘iterative participatory goal formation’,
and radical institutional means to achieve greater reflexivity over the role of power through
‘opening up’ previously closed processes of strategy development. While in seeking to review
and re-conceptualise the role of scenario methods in transition management, Sondeijker et al.
(2006) have argued that transition management processes should work with multiple transition
scenarios as an explicit response to the need to acknowledge and explore systemic uncertainties,
avoid premature lock in and create space for new socio-technical solutions.
At the same time a stream of work has emerged which has sought to build upon insights from
transitions theory and expectations dynamics in order to provide a more theoretically grounded
and reflexive set of foresight tools and methodologies (see, for example, Elzen et al. 2004; Voss,
Truffer, and Konrad 2006; Tyndall Centre 2005; Spath et al. 2006; Weber 2006; Truffer, Voss, and
Konrad 2008).
This paper responds to Stirling’s call for the development of ‘precautionary foresight’ tools to
facilitate reflexive governance. In common with the sustainability foresight method developed by
Truffer, Voss, and Konrad (2008), the UKSHEC sustainable futures methodology combines par-
ticipatory scenario building, sustainability assessment and an exploration of transition pathways
and innovation dynamics. Specifically the study aimed to construct a small number of plausible
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and internally consistent hydrogen futures and pathways to them, in order to better inform the
ongoing deliberations and actions of policy, business and civil society actors engaged in shaping
the prospective transition to a sustainable hydrogen economy.
Section 2 examines the challenges of foresight with respect to the transition to a sustain-
able hydrogen economy. Section 3 provides an account of the UKSHEC sustainability futures
methodology. Section 4 describes the UKSHEC scenarios framework, and Section 5 summarises
the transition scenarios. Section 6 draws together key insights with respect to hydrogen, while
Section 7 provides reflections on the methodology.
2. Foresight and the transition to a sustainable hydrogen economy
Advocates of a hydrogen economy often claim that hydrogen has a vital role to play in the transi-
tion to a sustainable energy system: reducing carbon emissions, particularly from road transport,
improving energy security, local air quality and boosting economic competitiveness. Indeed, at
first sight the notion of a ‘hydrogen economy’ may appear to provide an unproblematic norma-
tive vision of a sustainable energy system. For a time, following President Bush’s enthusiastic
endorsement of hydrogen energy in his 2003 State of the Union address, it appeared that everyone
from sections of the green movement to the coal and nuclear lobbies and industrial giants of the
global energy and auto industries were in favour of hydrogen. However, upon closer inspection it
is apparent that any prospective transition to hydrogen faces significant challenges: much of the
technology is immature and expensive, or yet to be developed; mobilising the resources to develop
a refuelling infrastructure is problematic in the absence of a market for hydrogen vehicles (and
vice versa); there is an absence of an appropriate regulatory framework of codes and standards;
and hydrogen is a potentially hazardous gas with explosive properties, resulting in questions
over its safety and public acceptability. Moreover, there is in fact not one hydrogen economy
but many contested visions of a hydrogen future. These range from decentralised systems based
upon small-scale renewables, through to centralised systems reliant on nuclear energy or fossil
fuels with carbon-sequestration. Some see hydrogen primarily as a transport fuel, while in others
hydrogen competes with electricity as an energy vector (McDowall and Eames 2006a). Indeed,
once we scratch the surface it becomes apparent that the notion of a hydrogen economy encom-
passes multiple contested socio-technological futures, value judgements and problem framings
(Eames et al. 2006).
In this context reviewing the hydrogen futures literature reveals a number of insights. Hydrogen
has provided a very active arena for the development of visions, scenarios and foresight exercises,
and that the notion of a hydrogen economy has indeed functioned as powerful ‘guiding vision’,
mobilising expectations and resources on a significant international scale. Not surprisingly given
its performative role, much of this literature has an explicitly pro-hydrogen agenda. What is also
apparent is that despite the diversity of hydrogen systems it describes the literature provides little
systematic appraisal of the relative sustainability of different hydrogen futures. Moreover, much
of the literature may be characterised by a lack of transparency and stakeholder participation, and
few studies pay much attention to the dynamics of systems innovation and socio-technological
change (McDowall and Eames 2006a).
The recognition that there is no single shared vision of a ‘sustainable hydrogen economy’
suggests that any attempt to articulate a desired hydrogen future must take seriously the issue of
whose desires are being expressed as well as how in practical terms the transition to such a future
could actually occur. This implies a need for an open and transparent scenario building process,
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using participatory approaches as a route to ‘social learning’ (e.g. Robinson 2003; Brown et al.
2003).
3. The UKSHEC hydrogen futures methodology
An overview of the participatory foresight methodology developed for the UKSHEC project is
provided in Figure 1.
Phase 1: Scoping and literature review
The scoping phase (March–August 2004) comprised a literature review, stakeholder identification
and recruitment, and small number of exploratory interviews.
A detailed review of the state-of-the-art of the (English language) hydrogen futures literature
was undertaken (McDowall and Eames 2006a) Relevant stakeholders were identified by ‘mapping’
key actors involved in hydrogen production, supply and end-use chains.A ‘snowballing’technique
was also used with key informants to ensure participation from all relevant sectors, including
academia, industry, government and civil society.
Phase 2: Vision development
A Hydrogen Visions workshop was held in September 2004, with some 40 leading UK hydrogen
experts and stakeholders exploring and articulating visions of desirable hydrogen futures. The
workshop was structured around four breakout groups, each exploring a different theme with
Figure 1. Overview of the UKSHEC hydrogen futures project.
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respect to the ‘hydrogen economy’. These themes (Climate Change, Energy Security, UK Com-
petitive Advantage and Empowering Consumers) reflected key drivers drawn from the hydrogen
futures literature and UK Government’s 2003 Energy White Paper (DTI 2003). Each group under-
took three ‘brainstorming’ exercises: (1) working with a series of technological ‘building blocks’
to develop long-term visions of a hydrogen economy; (2) exploring the socio-economic dimen-
sions of these visions; and (3) exploring how change might come about. The workshop outputs
were written up and circulated for participant review (McDowall and Eames 2004).
The UKSHEC visions
Building on the insights from the stakeholder workshop and literature review, the research team
developed a set of six visions which sought to capture the diversity of stakeholder expectations
about what a hydrogen future might or should look like. A key objective at this stage was to ensure
that the set of visions as a whole encompassed the broad ‘possibility space’ and that no relevant
future was excluded. The credibility, transparency and internal consistency of the draft visions
were again refined in consultation with the project stakeholders.
The six visions differ both in relation to the role of hydrogen (transport fuel only, or providing
both transport and broader energy services), the means of hydrogen generation and storage, and
the degree of centralisation/decentralisation of production and supply (see Figure 2). The visions
were set around 2040–2050.
Each vision comprised: (1) a structured narrative storyline describing archetypal configurations
of hydrogen production, infrastructure (storage and distribution) and end-use technologies; (2)
indicative quantitative indicators of the scale of primary energy demanded by the vision; and, (3)
a systems diagram providing pictorial representations of each vision. See Eames and McDowall
(2005). Summaries of each vision are given in the Table 1.
Phase 3: Sustainability appraisal
A key challenge for the UKSHEC hydrogen futures study was to find an approach to vision
appraisal that recognised both the uncertainties involved in long-term futures, and differing stake-
holder perspectives, values and framings of the debate. Debates within the field of environmental
policy appraisal since the mid-1990s have highlighted the weaknesses of traditional approaches
















Figure 2. The UKSHEC hydrogen visions.
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only used as a
transport fuel)
Central pipeline Hydrogen has become the dominant transport fuel, and
is produced centrally from a mixture of clean coal and
fossil fuels (with C-sequestration), nuclear power, and
large-scale renewables. Hydrogen is distributed as a gas
by dedicated pipeline
Forecourt reforming Hydrogen produced locally from natural gas is the dominant
road transport fuel. The existing natural gas network
provides the delivery infrastructure, and hydrogen is
generated on-site by steam methane reforming at the
refuelling station
Liquid hydrogen Liquid hydrogen produced by nuclear power and large
scale renewable installations has become the dominant
transport fuel. There is an international market in liquid
hydrogen. This is largely a scenario of substitution,
with current energy and transport paradigms remaining
unchanged
Synthetic liquid fuels Renewably produced hydrogen again provides the dominant
transport fuel. In this case, however, it is ‘packaged’ in the
form of a synthetic liquid hydrocarbon, such as methanol,
to overcome the difficulties of hydrogen storage and
distribution. The carbon for fuel synthesis comes from





Ubiquitous hydrogen Gaseous hydrogen is not only the dominant road
transport fuel. Many buildings also use fuel cell CHP
systems running on hydrogen. Distributed renewable
generation predominates, reducing need for long distance
transmission and distribution, and allowing hydrogen
to compete directly with electricity as the main energy
vector for the provision of domestic and commercial heat
and power. Regional grids of hydrogen pipelines connect
(predominantly local) hydrogen supplies with local needs
Electricity store Hydrogen is not only the dominant road transport fuel, it
also plays a vital role providing distributed energy storage
to overcome the intermittency problems of renewable
electricity generation. Hydrogen is produced locally in
small scale electrolysis units for forecourt refuelling and
onsite storage for use in domestic and commercial CHP
units at times of peak electricity demand/limited supply
such as cost–benefit analysis, especially where ‘the facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes
high, and decisions urgent’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994). Critiques of such approaches stem
from recognition that they are closed to alternative problem framings, criteria definitions and
hence different social perspectives, that there is no uniquely rational way to aggregate different
dimensions of value along a single metric and that their treatment of uncertainty is frequently
insufficient (Munda 2004; Stirling 1999).
Proposed alternatives to traditional technical appraisal include a broad array of multi-criteria,
participatory and deliberative techniques, all attempting to deal with what Vatn calls the problem
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of ‘institutionalising social choice’ (Vatn 2005). Many of these have been applied to problems in
energy policy (Pohekar and Ramachandran 2004; Stagl 2006; Giampietro, Mayumi, and Munda
2006).
To this end the study adapted a multi-criteria decision analysis tool called multi-criteria mapping
(MCM), originally developed by Stirling in the late 1990s (Stirling and Mayer 1999; Stirling
1999). It focuses on eliciting and documenting detailed technical and evaluative judgements
concerning the performance of alternative options, through in-depth one-to-one interviews with
expert stakeholders using a dedicated software package. Rather than seeking to identify an optimal
solution or ranking, MCM maps the sensitivities of performance according to differing stakeholder
perspectives, uncertainties and framing assumptions (for further details, see McDowall and Eames
2007; Stirling 2004, 2005).
The transdisciplinary panel that undertook the MCM appraisal of the UKSHEC hydrogen
visions comprised 15 experts from a range of professional and disciplinary backgrounds.1 Partic-
ipants took part on the basis of their individual expertise and sceptical as well as pro-hydrogen
viewpoints were represented. In addition to the six UKSHEC visions, a status quo or reference
scenario, describing the current systems for energy and transport in the UK was also appraised,
as a way of providing a benchmark comparison for the different visions.
Finally, the plausibility and sustainability of different visions are inevitably contingent upon
implicit framing assumptions about the wider future, e.g. framing assumptions concerning geopo-
litical and social stability, rates of climate change, resource availability and fuel prices, and so
on. While an MCM study attempts to record such framing assumptions, these are often implicit
and remain tacit. In order to more fully explore participants’ framing assumptions, at the end of
the interview participants were confronted with two short external ‘sideswipe’ scenarios – rapid
climate change and sustained oil and gas crisis. They were then asked to comment on how such
sideswipe might change their appraisal. This allowed some insight into the importance of tacit
framing assumptions in the appraisal and the robustness of the ‘desirability and plausibility’ of
the visions in the light of these major uncertainties. The opportunity to explore the importance
of such sideswipes is often cited as one of the advantages of scenario approaches, although it is
rarely done in practice (Van Notten, Sleegers, and Van Asselt 2005).
Phase 4: Transition pathways and scenario development
Having developed and appraised the sustainability of a set hydrogen visions, the next stage of
the process was to articulate a series of plausible transition pathways. To this end a further
expert-stakeholder Hydrogen Transitions workshop was convened in September 2005. Prior to the
workshop, the project team drew on a range of sources to sketch a number of ‘prototype’ transition
pathways. In breakout groups, participants worked through a series of structured questions in order
to develop a picture of how each transition might take place. Drawing loosely on the multi-level
perspective, these questions were organised around three themes: e.g. (1)Technologies, niches, and
early markets; (2) Diffusion and market growth; (3) Context and timescales.The outcomes from the
workshop were again written up and subject to stakeholder review (McDowall and Eames 2005).
In the final stage of the project the team developed an integrated set of transition scenarios,
combining a revised set of four end-visions, with theoretically informed pathways describing
a prospective transition to each of these hydrogen futures. The structure and key dimensions
of these integrated scenarios drew heavily upon: (1) the multi-level perspective (MLP) on
socio-technological transitions (Geels 2002); (2) SPRU’s work on transition contexts (endoge-
nous renewal; re-orientation of trajectories; emergent transformation; purposive transition)
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(Berkhout, Smith, and Stirling (2004); and (3) IVM’s work on governance paradigms (gov-
ernance by government; governance by policy networking; governance by corporate business;
governance by challenge) for long-term technological change (Hisschemoller, Bode, and Van der
Kerkhof 2006). To our knowledge this was the first time that the SPRU transition contexts have
been used as part of a scenario study. The precise association of the transition contexts and gov-
ernance paradigms adopted here appears to have been a good fit. While other combinations are
possible, the point to recognise here is that by associating each of the transition contexts with a
particular governance paradigm we were encouraged to enrich the institutional and governance
dimensions of our scenarios.
The rational for reducing the number of end-visions from six to four was two-fold, driven both
by insights obtained from the earlier sustainability appraisal and the need to work with a more
limited set of visions which could be reconciled with the transitions framework adopted for the
final phase of the project. Forecourt reforming was dropped from the final scenarios as many of
our expert stakeholders saw this vision as a shorter-term intermediary step to a hydrogen economy.
The Central pipeline and Liquid hydrogen visions were merged to form a Central hydrogen for
transport end vision (see below).
4. The UKSHEC transition scenarios framework
The UKSHEC transition scenarios are not predictions. They are intended to shed light on possible
innovation processes and transition pathways by which a future hydrogen economy might be
achieved. They seek to illustrate different ways in which the large-scale socio-technological
changes required for the establishment of a hydrogen economy might come about and so highlight
the choices and policy options facing the research community, business, policymakers and civil
society alike on the road to a sustainable hydrogen economy. While the scenarios have a UK
focus, they seek to place prospective developments in a broader global context.
Each scenario comprised: (1) a short description of a distinctive hydrogen future (or end vision);
(2) a ‘storyline’ summary; (3) a set of qualitative indicators; (4) a detailed ‘multi-level’ narra-
tive describing the transition pathway in terms of landscape, niche and systems changes; and
(5) a ‘transition diagram’ providing a visual representation of the innovation dynamics and key
developments along the individual pathway.
The scenarios are framed by two key dimensions of change, adapted from work by Berkhout,
Smith and Stirling (2004), which developed a quasi-evolutionary model of systems innovation:
These dimensions are:
• The degree to which innovation is shaped by a shared normative guiding vision. This axis
allows us to explore how hydrogen might emerge without a coherent action plan, as well as
through concerted efforts to bring about a hydrogen future.
• The extent to which innovation is driven by existing actors and institutions, or by new actors
and institutions (or existing actors taking on new roles). This axis invites us to think through
the possible roles of the different actors and institutions involved in any possible transition.
As noted above, each quadrant was also associated with one of the four governance paradigms
developed by Hisschemoller, Bode, andVan der Kerkhof (2006). Figure 3 illustrates the association
of governance paradigms with transition contexts.
The four quadrants provide a useful way to distinguish different types of transition pathway.
Each scenario is also described in terms of a second, multi-level, structure, adapted from the
MLP,2 as illustrated in Figure 4.
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Existing  actors/ institutions













Figure 3. Mapping of the transition contexts and governance paradigms.
Figure 4. Multi level perspective on socio-technical transitions. Adapted from Geels (2002).
By simultaneously focusing on how technologies develop in niches; the dynamics of the incum-
bent systems; and the wider changes for society, we can get a better insight into the possible future
for hydrogen. All of the UKSHEC scenarios are therefore described in terms of developments at
niche, landscape and systems levels.
The major drivers for hydrogen at a landscape level, climate change and security of primary
energy supplies, are well established. To a lesser extent local air quality and regional or national
competitiveness also provide drivers for policy-makers to consider support for the development
and diffusion of hydrogen technologies. In addition, landscape level drivers for the energy system
more broadly include rates of economic growth (and hence of energy demand), and prevailing
societal values.
In addition to these landscape level policy drivers, it is important to consider drivers at the sys-
tems and niche level that influence the dynamics of change by either articulating, or responding
to, changes at the landscape level, such as the: strategic activities of firms and industries; national
and regional energy and transport policies (e.g. carbon trading, zero emissions mandates); lob-
bying by hydrogen and fuel cell associations, activists, NGOs, etc.; the activities of scientists
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and engineers in advancing hydrogen and fuel cell technologies; and growth in portable and on-
vehicle power demands, leading to funding, support and the creation of niche markets for fuel cell
products, etc.
5. Summaries of the UKSHEC transition scenarios
The following section provides brief summaries of the four UKSHEC transition scenarios together
with a summary table and multilevel transition diagram for each scenario. For details see Eames
and McDowall (2006).
UKSHEC transition scenarios are shown mapped onto the 2×2 grid in Figure 5. Table 2 provides
a summary of the four transition scenarios.
Structural shift→ Electricity store
In this scenario the transition to Electricity store emerges from a restructuring of the energy market
triggering rapid changes in the behaviour of existing firms, new entrants and their customers.
In the face of mounting concerns about climate change and energy security, the UK government
restructures the market to provide much stronger economic incentives for renewable electricity
and microgeneration. While developments in hydrogen transport are initially limited to a few high
profile demonstration projects, hydrogen enters commercial use as a distributed storage medium
to buffer intermittent renewable electricity supplies in the energy sector. As the use of hydrogen
for distributed energy storage becomes widespread eventually it provides an alternative refuelling
infrastructure allowing the rapid expansion of hydrogen transport.
This pathway results largely from a ‘re-orientation of trajectories’, where radical innovation
within the energy sector, and later transport, emerges as a result of an ‘external’ shock in the form
of restructuring of the electricity supply market to promote low carbon generation and energy
efficiency. Here restructuring of the energy supply market is considered an external shock as it
is a manifestation of the landscape pressures acting upon the existing regime and is not directly
intended to promote hydrogen energy per se (cf. the use of direct regulation to promote the use
of hydrogen as described in Government Mission below). This scenario is depicted in Figure 6.
Innovation driven by existing actors/institutions
Weak Guiding Vision
Innovation driven by new actors/institutions
Government  
Mission 










Figure 5. The UKSHEC transition scenarios. Note: Disruptive innovation → Synthetic liquid fuel is shown










Table 2. Summaries of the UKSHEC transition scenarios.
Structural shift Corporate race Government mission Disruptive innovation
End vision Electricity store Ubiquitous hydrogen Central hydrogen for transport Synthetic liquid fuel
Dimensions • Innovation driven by exist-
ing actors/ institutions
• Weak guiding vision
• Innovation driven by exist-
ing actors/ institutions
• Strong guiding vision
• Innovation driven by new
actors/ institutions
• Strong guiding vision
• Innovation driven by new
actors/ institutions
• Weak guiding vision
Drivers • Strong UK Government and
social concern for climate
change and energy security
• Greater social awareness of
need for demand reductions
• Societal rejection of nuclear
and carbon capture and stor-
age
• Strategic positioning by big
auto and big oil in the face of
climate change and energy
security concerns
• High demand and volatile
supplies for oil and gas lead
to increasing prices
• Strong UK/EU government
concerns over climate and
energy security
• Societal acceptance of
nuclear and carbon capture
and storage, and greater
social trust in science and
technology
• Emerging climate and
energy concerns
• Emphasis on building com-
petitive markets and high
innovation
• Social preference for lib-
eralised markets and con-
sumer economy
Key technologies • Fuel cells
• Storage and handling







• Pipelines and metering
• Carbon capture and storage
• Waste, biomass gasification
• Renewables
• Storage and handling
• Fuel cells
• High temperature nuclear
• Pipelines and liquefaction
• Gasification technologies
• Carbon capture and storage
• New nuclear power
• Direct methanol fuel cells
(DMFC)
• Synthetic liquid fuel syn-
thesis






• Renewables reach a high
enough proportion of grid
electricity to require buffer-
ing of supply and demand
• Nuclear and CCS go/no-go
decisions
• Commercialisation
decisions of big auto
• Hydrogen injected into nat-
ural gas grids
• ‘Go’ decision on major
hydrogen programme, and
on nuclear
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energy schemes
Figure 6. Structural shift → Electricity store.
Corporate race→ Ubiquitous hydrogen
In this scenario, the transition to Ubiquitous hydrogen is driven by the actions of corporate business,
initially by strategic competition between global companies within the auto–oil sectors.
Despite the continued failure of inter-governmental action on climate change, global automotive
and energy companies increasingly see the shift to a low carbon energy system as in their long
term interests. A strategic race develops to achieve leadership in hydrogen technologies. Regional
and local governments play important role facilitating demonstration projects and early ‘flag ship’
initiatives in partnerships with corporate players. Rapid improvements in on-board storage and fuel
cell technologies promote the rapid penetration of hydrogen in the transport sector. Later, as natural
gas prices rise, fuel providers use the natural gas grid to supply hydrogen, ultimately moving to
an integrated hydrogen grid, with decentralised as well as centralised hydrogen production.
This pathway is one of ‘endogenous renewal’, where innovation arises largely out of the R&D
activities and investment decisions of companies within the existing transport system, more specifi-
cally the major global companies within the automobile and oil industries. This scenario is depicted
in Figure 7.
Government mission→ Central hydrogen for transport3
In this scenario, the transition to Centralised hydrogen for transport is driven by strong government
at both a national and regional/international (EU) level. The public sector and ‘national champion’
industries work in partnership to build a hydrogen transport infrastructure.
Problems of climate change and energy security are increasingly seen as too pressing to be
left to the market and as warranting more direct government intervention. National governments
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Figure 7. Corporate race → Ubiquitous hydrogen.
in the leading advanced and rapidly industrialising economies (US, Japan, China, India) and EU
take strategic decisions to prioritise the rapid development of hydrogen transport. Partnerships are
established with national industry champions. Regulation, subsidies and public procurement are
all used to push hydrogen making extensive use of near-term technologies and large centralised
supply routes.
This pathway is one of ‘purposive transition’, where innovation is driven by the goals and expec-
tations of national political elites, and scientific, policy and business interests become enrolled in
a shared mission to transform the existing system. This scenario is depicted in Figure 8.
Disruptive innovation→ Synthetic liquid fuel
In this alternative scenario, the transition to Synthetic liquid fuel is driven by the market forces,
with the role of government largely restricted to fostering competitive markets and the knowledge
economy.
Despite ongoing concerns about climate change and energy security, hydrogen in its pure form
fails to take off. On-board storage in particular remains a significant barrier to the widespread
adoption of hydrogen as a transport fuel. However, innovation in the electronics sector and niches
outside of the mainstream transport and energy systems opens up novel technological opportuni-
ties, changing consumer behaviour and expectations and resulting in the growth of new markets
for portable power and synthetic liquid fuels.
This pathway is largely one of ‘emergent transformation’. Innovation outside of the mainstream
transport and energy systems opens up novel technological and market opportunities, resulting in
the growth of new industries and consumer services as well as unexpected solutions to existing
problems. This scenario is depicted in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Disruptive innovation → Synthetic liquid fuels: an alternative scenario.
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6. Insights into the future of hydrogen
Insights from the sustainability appraisal
The MCM process produced a qualitatively and quantitatively rich picture of the panel’s expecta-
tions of the sustainability of the visions: their assessment criteria (environmental, economic, social
and energy security criteria); the relative weightings attributed to these; and overall performance
and rankings of the visions and associated uncertainties.
The results from the MCM appraisal have been reported in detail elsewhere (McDowall and
Eames 2006b, 2007). These confirm the highly contested nature of the debate, with no absolute
winners or losers and with a wide range of weighted scores for all visions, as shown in Figure 10.
This does not mean no patterns are clear, but rather that there are no uncontested winners. Indeed,
examination of the relative performance of each vision, under both optimistic and pessimistic
assumptions, does provide some clear messages about the likely sustainability of the different
futures.
Hydrogen is not automatically sustainable
Participants recognised a range of circumstances in which hydrogen energy might be less sustain-
able than the current system or some non-hydrogen business as usual futures. However, hydrogen
was perceived as having the potential to deliver substantial sustainability benefits over a wide
range of issues.
Multiple dimensions of sustainability
The panel identified carbon emissions as the single most important dimension of sustainability
with respect to the hydrogen futures. However, a very wide range of other environmental, social,
economic, political and technical issues were also seen to be important in judging the sustainability
of hydrogen systems.
Risk and uncertainty are critical
Even for issues with relatively well characterised data sources (such as wells-to-wheels carbon
studies) there were debates about how well technological systems could be expected to perform in
Final Weighted Scores for all Participants








Figure 10. Final weighted scores aggregated across all participants. All participants score the visions with
both optimistic and pessimistic assumptions, to provide a sense of the degree of uncertainty. Bars indicate
extreme (grey) and average (black) pessimistic and optimistic scores, capturing the degree of uncertainty
about future performance. The x-axis is a relative scale indicating low (0) to high (100) performance. Source:
McDowall and Eames (2006b).
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real world applications. There is significant uncertainty over the future costs and performance of
the technologies, and these uncertainties have important impacts on the likely sustainability of the
different futures. In particular, there are uncertainties concerning: the performance and costs of
carbon capture and storage, nuclear power, pipelines, small scale steam methane reformers, fuel
cells and hydrogen storage technologies. Figure 11 shows the final weighted scores for four of
the participants, with the bar length indicating the range of uncertainty each participant expressed
about the future sustainability of each vision.
Priorities and rationales for ranking futures are contested – values count too
There is a wide range of rationales for ranking different futures (e.g. political implications vs
technical appraisals of likely system performance). While some of these issues are amenable to
further research in order to reduce uncertainty about the future, others are based on normative
value judgements about the way in which society should operate, and are therefore likely to be
a continuing source of disagreement and dissent. Nuclear power, the degree of decentralisation
and feasibility were key areas dividing participants’appraisals. For those concerned about nuclear
power opposition was as much to do with social and political aspects of the technology as envi-
ronmental concerns. These contested priorities and perspectives suggest that there is significant
potential for future social and political conflict over the shape and direction of any transition
towards a hydrogen economy.
Future surprises would shift appraisals
In discussing the ‘sideswipes’ scenarios that were presented at the end of the MCM interviews (on
rapid climate change and sustained oil crisis), it was noteworthy that many participants felt these
were plausible and not radically different from the futures they expected despite their somewhat
extreme character. However, while many participants recognised the importance of the threats
embodied in the sideswipes during the appraisal, they did not take into account the radically
changed conditions that such sideswipes would imply. Rather, participants tended to explore
future states in terms of current society’s assessment of the importance of climate change and
energy security. Their agreement with the sideswipes as plausible futures demonstrates their high
levels of concern for these issues, but also demonstrates the difficulties of thinking through the
implications of a radically altered future. Most participants felt that the sideswipes would alter
the weightings given to energy security and carbon emission criteria.
While there was not the time to explore these possibilities, the fact that they were raised
suggests that the exercise did promote broader thinking about background assumptions made
in the appraisal and that such interventions might be useful in exploring tacit expectations and
framing assumptions future studies.
Key insights from the UKSHEC transition scenarios
The UKSHEC transition scenarios highlight a number of broader strategic decision points, for gov-
ernment, business and wider society, which are likely to prove influential in shaping the direction
of future technological developments with respect to hydrogen. These include decisions over: (1)
the construction of new nuclear capacity, carbon capture and storage, and large scale renewables;
(2) the viability of distributing hydrogen through natural gas pipelines; and (3) the commercial-
isation of FCVs by major automotive firms. More profoundly, the exploratory character of the
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Figure 11. Individual weighted score ranges for four participants. The x-axis is a relative 1–100 scale
showing performance, with better performing visions further to the right. Bar length is a result of the degree
of difference between pessimistic and optimistic scores, and is thus a function of the degree of uncertainty.
Source: McDowall and Eames (2006b).
scenarios focuses attention on the innovation dynamics and governance of the transition processes
involved. Taking each scenario in turn:
Structural shift → Electricity store. Much of the literature and policy discussions around the
future of hydrogen in the UK emphasise the role of hydrogen as a transport fuel and assumes
that breakthroughs will come about as a result of developments with respect to fuel cell vehicles.
By contrast this scenario illustrates a transition driven by moves towards a low-carbon energy
system. Here the emergence of hydrogen is not driven by a particular guiding vision, but rather is
an emergent response to a restructuring of energy markets and the broader technological changes
this creates. This scenario therefore focuses attention on the importance of market structure and
regulation as a driver of innovation. It challenges the assumption that a major programme of
investment in infrastructure will be required for the development of a hydrogen transport system.
Corporate race → Ubiquitous hydrogen. Often it is assumed that government holds the key to
the development of a hydrogen economy. This scenario emphasis the role and power of global
companies, and the potentially positive outcomes of strategic competition as a driver for radical
innovation. It draws attention to the relationship between global companies, niche experimentation
and regional systems of innovation with respect to hydrogen, and the importance of environmental
regulation in fostering new markets for clean technologies.
Government mission → Central hydrogen for transport. Despite the scale of the challenge posed
the climate and energy security drivers of a hydrogen economy, much of the policy discussion
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about hydrogen is constrained by current assumptions about the dominance of the market, the
limits of government and antipathy to ‘picking winners’. In contrast to the Corporate race scenario,
this storyline explores the idea that stronger government intervention may be required for a rapid
transition to hydrogen and challenges us to critically reconsider the ability of liberalised markets
to deliver the purposive, large-scale socio-technological and infrastructural developments that
may be required in an increasingly unstable and hostile world.
Disruptive innovation → Synthetic liquid fuel. This is an alternative or ‘wild card’ scenario.
Conventional wisdom suggests that the market alone will not deliver a transition to a hydrogen
economy and that the automotive industry in particular has moved away from research into the use
of synthetic liquid fuels such as methanol as a possible source of power for future fuel cell vehicles.
The Disruptive innovation → Synthetic liquid fuel transition scenario challenges us to rethink
these assumptions and re-examine the sorts of technological developments, firms and industrial
sectors that might drive the transition to hydrogen, and indeed what a hydrogen economy might
actually look like.
Despite very different governance structures and policies across the four scenarios, all con-
tain at least some attempts by policy-makers to reduce carbon emissions and enhance energy
security. This together with the results from the earlier MCM appraisal this suggests that, in the
short term at least, ‘business as usual’ or the market alone are unlikely to deliver a transition to
hydrogen.
7. Reflections on the UKSHEC hydrogen futures methodology
This final section reflects on the UKSHEC sustainable futures methodology. Some of the practical
challenges and insights gained from undertaking the work are discussed. Finally we conclude by
considering how the methodology promotes critical engagement with the three key themes of this
special issue: institutions, interests and ideas.
As noted above both sustainability foresight (Truffer,Voss, and Konrad 2008) and the UKSHEC
sustainable futures methodologies share a number of similar steps in terms of: (1) participatory
scenario building; (2) sustainability assessment; and (3) the development of transition path-
ways. However, the specific combination of backcasting and MCM appraisal, the exploration of
sideswipes and the adaptation of the SPRU transitions contexts to frame the prospective transitions
pathways were unique to the UKSHEC study.
It is important to remember that scenario building is an art not a science. It requires expertise
and creativity to design bespoke foresight processes which fulfil their users’ needs. Combining
participatory stakeholder engagement with the development of a conceptually rigorous and theo-
retically informed scenarios framework at times proved challenging and inevitably incorporated
a certain degree of learning-by-doing.
While the process of ‘opening up’ the range of hydrogen futures to appraisal was not unprob-
lematic, the individual format of the MCM appraisals proved particularly well suited to calm
reflection. Given the scope for disagreement that clearly existed, a group-based process might
have been much more difficult to manage and less productive at this stage. However, the MCM
process is very resource intensive, with interviews typically lasting several hours.
One potential weaknesses of normative backcasting is that it may encourage a blind eye to
unwanted or unexpected developments. Both working with multiple futures and the development
of tools for more systematically exploring the impact of ‘sideswipes’ would help to better address
issues of uncertainty and resilience within transition management.
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In the latter part of the project challenges centred on our stakeholders’ lack of familiarity
with systems innovation and transitions concepts, with the rather abstract academic terminology
of transitions theory proving a real barrier to be overcome. In order to make these concepts
accessible and meaningful it was therefore necessary to think carefully about the language used
and manner in which the final scenarios were presented.
While the sustainable futures methodology described in this paper was specifically designed
to explore the transition to a sustainable hydrogen economy, it clearly has a wider relevance.
The participatory backcasting approach adopted addresses Stirling’s call for the development of
tools for ‘precautionary foresight’ in that it allowed us to engage and explore a wide range of
stakeholder interests, while combining the scenario and MCM tools allowed us to ‘open up’ the
appraisal of the sustainability of different hydrogen futures: systematically mapping different
social perspectives and uncertainties. In this way the process of articulating and challenging ideas
– (normative) visions and expectations of the future – becomes an opportunity for real deliberation
and debate about social and political priorities with respect to new technologies.
Moreover the findings from this study support Berkhout, Smith, and Stirling’s (2004) contention
that the notion of an unproblematic social consensus around any particular guiding vision is
profoundly problematic. Indeed in the case of hydrogen our results suggest that even with perfect
foresight and no uncertainties it would not necessarily be possible to obtain a single consensus view
on which hydrogen futures are most sustainable. This is because stakeholders have different ideas
about what sustainability means, what elements are more or less important and about what sort of
society is desirable. In short, there is an inescapably political element to long term technological
choice.
Drawing upon the systems innovation and socio-technical transitions literature encouraged
particular attention to the role of institutions – in the form of market, regulatory and political
frameworks – in the transformation of the energy system, and the importance of exploring a
variety of alternative social, economic, technological and political choices in shaping prospective
transition pathways. Moreover, the framework and structure of the scenarios, linking the SPRU
transition contexts and IVM governance paradigms with the multi-level perspective enabled explo-
ration of different transition dynamics and encouraged attention to the role of governance, agency
and power in transitions.
Moreover, the two key dimensions of change used in framing the scenarios explicitly encouraged
creative future thinking. The recognition that explicit normative guiding visions may play a greater
or lesser role in driving transitions – and hence working with both emergent and normatively driven
pathways – again addresses Berkhout, Smith and Stirling’s criticism that transition management
all too often assumes that a guiding vision is a necessary prerequisite of systems transformation,
despite historical evidence to the contrary. The second dimension of the scenarios framework,
focusing attention as it does on the extent to which innovation is driven by either existing or new
actors and institutions, both helps us avoid simply prescribing future options which correspond
with incumbent stakeholder interests and encourages precisely the sort of thinking about novel
solutions advocated by Sondeijker et al. (2006).
Finally it is worth reflecting that in policy terms transition management itself represents a
relatively new institutional innovation. To date much of the practical experience of transition
management has been confined to the Netherlands, where it has evolved in a very particular
governance and institutional context. However, it is too early to know whether the Dutch model
of transition management will diffuse widely and succeed in overthrowing the dominate policy
and institutional regime. A particular value of the UKSHEC transitions scenarios framework is
that it encourages a rich exploration of alternate (emergent and purposive) transition pathways.
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In addition to highlighting a number of strategic decision points for any prospective transition
to hydrogen, the final scenarios also focus attention on a number of more generic challenges for
reflexive governance and transitions management, particularly with respect to: the importance
of market structure and regulation as a drivers of innovation; the role of corporate power and
strategic competition between firms in shaping innovation; the limits of liberalised markets and
place of direct government intervention; and the potential of disruptive innovation on the part of
‘outsider’ or non-regime actors to drive transitions.
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Exploring possible transition pathways for hydrogen energy:
A hybrid approach using socio-technical scenarios and energy
system modelling
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1. Introduction
Hydrogen remains an important option for long-term decarbonisation of energy and transport systems, and modelling
studies often suggest that hydrogen could be an important part of an affordable and achievable transition to a low carbon
economy. Despite a recent period of disappointment following several years of hydrogen ‘hype’ (Bakker, 2010), technological
progress in hydrogen technologies has been promising. Automotive ﬁrms have focused on vehicles running on pure
hydrogen with fuel cells, and on-board compressed hydrogen, moving away from earlier work with liquid hydrogen or on-
board conversion of other fuels. Costs have fallen, and there is increasing conﬁdence from automakers that fuel cell vehicles
are approaching commercial competitiveness.
However, studying the possible transition paths and development prospects for a hydrogen energy system is challenging.
The long-term nature of technological transitions inevitably means profound uncertainties, diverging perspectives and
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contested priorities. Both modelling approaches and narrative storyline scenarios are widely used to explore the possible
future of hydrogen energy, but each approach has shortcomings.
This paper presents a hybrid approach to examining hydrogen transitions in the UK, by linking qualitative transition
scenarios with quantitative energy systems modelling. The approach acknowledges the contested nature of ways
of understanding future possibilities by placing two different methods (participatory storylines and energy
systems modelling) in explicit ‘dialogue’. Three possible transition pathways are explored, each exploring different
uncertainties and possible decision points, with modelling used to inform and test key elements of each scenario. The
scenarios draw on literature review and participatory input, and the scenario structure is based on patterns identiﬁed in
historical energy system transitions, reﬂecting insights relating to innovation system development and resistance to
change.
2. Background and approach: scenarios and models for technology transitions
2.1. Modelling energy transitions
Formal models are powerful ways of exploring the dynamics of systems and hence play a crucial role in thinking about
how those systems might develop in the future. A wide variety of models have been developed to inform the transition to
a low carbon economy, and these have generated robust1 insights into the likely importance and roles of various
technologies, trends and policy instruments. In the context of hydrogen energy, three types of models2 have been
prominent:
 So-called ‘‘Bottom-up’’ energy system models (e.g. MARKAL and MESSAGE) evaluate the desirability of hydrogen within
the context of overall decarbonisation. They model trade-offs with the wider energy system, and so provide greater
techno-economic consistency than sectoral approaches, but they have weak spatial representation, and many have
simplistic representations of technology dynamics and the economy-wide costs of energy transitions (Barreto & Kemp,
2008; Hourcade, Jaccard, Bataille, & Ghersi, 2006). Examples of studies addressing hydrogen transitions using such models
include (Barreto, Makihira, & Riahi, 2003; Endo, 2007; Gu¨l, Kypreos, Turton, & Barreto, 2009; Krzyzanowski, Kypreos, &
Barreto, 2008; Mau, Eyzaguirre, Jaccard, Collins-Dodd, & Tiedemann, 2008; Strachan, Balta-Ozkan, Joffe, McGeevor, &
Hughes, 2009; Yeh, Farrell, Plevin, Sanstad, & Weyant, 2008).
 System dynamics and agent-based simulation models examine interactions between agents (governments, consumers, car
manufacturers). These models are valuable in showing how simple relationships can result in complex dynamics similar to
previous attempts to foster alternative fuel transitions; and they can provide insights into the conditions under which
heterogeneous actors might foster a transition through consumption, investment, policy and cooperation decisions.
However, they lack the broader system view, without feedbacks and synergies between sectors in the wider economy.
Examples in the ﬁeld of hydrogen transitions include (Contestabile, 2010; Hue´tink, der Vooren, & Alkemade, 2010; Keles,
Wietschel, Mo¨st, & Rentz, 2008; Ko¨hler, Wietschel, Whitmarsh, Keles, & Schade, 2010; Schwoon, 2008; Struben & Sterman,
2008).
 Infrastructure optimisation transition models. These optimise spatial and temporal aspects of infrastructure and vehicle
deployment, but exogenise hydrogen demand. For a review, see (Agnolucci & McDowall, 2013).
Quantitative models used in the analysis of possible transitions have grown increasingly sophisticated, endogenising the
effects of scale economies and learning (Schwoon, 2008), social network effects (Hue´tink et al., 2010; Mau et al., 2008), and
strategic games between actors (Schlecht, 2003). Energy systems models have been adapted to incorporate better
representation of behaviour (Daly et al., 2012; Mau et al., 2008), macro-economic developments (Strachan & Kannan, 2008);
and technological change (Anandarajah, McDowall & Ekins, 2013).
However, on their own, none of these model types is able to provide a compelling account of transition dynamics, since in
the real world the structure of the system itself evolves. In other words, the rules guiding development co-evolve with
technologies, user behaviours and business strategies (Foxon, 2011). Moreover, there is scant agreement on the extent to
which dominant rule structures used in models provide a good approximation of socio-technical developments over long
time periods (Trutnevyte, 2014). As a result, existing models may be unable to represent the key issues that are widely
recognised by stakeholders to be important. These issues then lie outside the scope of any formal analysis, potentially
remaining unexamined tacit assumptions that guide decisions. Attempts to develop models of transitions dynamics that are
informed by evolutionary and co-evolutionary thinking are developing, but are still in their infancy (Safarzyn´ska, Frenken, &
van den Bergh, 2012).
1 At least, robust in the face of the uncertainties that are considered to be most well characterised, following Lempert and Groves deﬁnition of ‘robustness’
of model outcomes (Groves and Lempert, 2007). D.G. Groves, R.J. Lempert, A new analytic method for ﬁnding policy-relevant scenarios, Global
Environmental Change, 17 (2007) 73–85.
2 Others have also been applied, such as Computable General Equilibrium models, but these have been less frequently used.
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2.2. Socio-technical scenarios
Scenarios3 are widely used to help inform decision-making in the face of signiﬁcant uncertainty, particularly in ﬁelds with
long-term planning horizons such as energy policy. A major reason for adopting an exploratory scenario approach as an
analytic tool for considering possible energy decarbonisation transition paths is a belief that formal quantitative models are
unable to adequately represent the dynamics of socio-technical change, for the reasons discussed above (So¨derholm,
Hildingsson, Johansson, Khan, & Wilhelmsson, 2011; Swart, Raskin, & Robinson, 2004). Rather than ignore the issues that are
already informing stakeholder decisions because they are not tractable in a formal model, scenario approaches draw these
out, make them explicit, and conduct thought experiments to test judgements about their importance.
Scenario storylines informed by participatory processes, though not always as analytically coherent or internally
consistent in techno-economic terms, are thus able to capture, distill and explore ideas about the future that are currently
shaping stakeholder perceptions, but that cannot be adequately represented in formal modelling frameworks. The
resulting scenarios do not incorporate the technical rigour of models, but they can be valuable in making explicit widely
held views about possible technology dynamics. This does not necessarily mean that these are more ‘accurate’ in terms of
predicting what kinds of dynamics are likely. Indeed, that is not the core aim. Scenarios are ‘learning machines’ (Berkhout,
Hertin, & Jordan, 2002) that can enable reﬂection on the realism or implications of widely held views, and on how
stakeholders understand and relate to different possibilities. Rather than provide evidence to inform concrete decisions,
such scenarios foster ‘conceptual learning’, i.e. providing new insights, perspectives and ideas on policy issues, a function
seen as very important within the literature on the use of evidence in policymaking (Hertin, Turnpenny, Nilsson, Russel,
& Nykvist, 2009).
Recent years have seen the development of scenario approaches designed speciﬁcally to inform understanding of possible
technological transitions—shifts from one dominant socio-technical system to another (archetypal examples being the shift
from sailing ships to steam ships, or from gas lighting to electric lighting). Informed by the burgeoning literature on
technological transitions (Markard, Raven, & Truffer, 2012), such scenario approaches attempt to reﬂect understanding of the
dynamics of technological change, focusing in particular on the relative durability of different institutional and socio-
technical conﬁgurations, and the co-evolutionary dynamics of technologies, users and institutions (Elzen, Geels, & Hofman,
2002; Elzen, Geels, Hofman, & Green, 2004; chap. 11; Foxon, Hammond, & Pearson, 2010). In the arena of hydrogen energy,
there have been several attempts to develop qualitative socio-technical scenarios inspired by transitions research to
examine potential hydrogen transitions (Eames & McDowall, 2010; Van Bree, Verbong, & Kramer, 2010).
2.2.1. The UKSHEC II scenarios approach
This project goes beyond those previous socio-technical hydrogen scenarios by developing qualitative scenarios in
parallel with modelling work. Quantitative modelling has been used in combination with scenario planning since the origins
of the ﬁeld (Wack, 1985). One common approach is the use of scenario storylines as tools for identifying and differentiating
the values of key parameters for modelling exercises, with the resulting dynamics of change still determined by the model
(e.g. Barreto et al., 2003). A second common alternative is the detailed quantiﬁcation of narrative scenarios, to ensure that
they are technically feasible and consistent (for example, Dutton et al., 2004).
Others have highlighted the way in which the complementary strengths of qualitative storyline scenarios and
quantitative modelling tools can be put to good use by comparing and contrasting the insights and dynamics produced in
each method (Alcamo, 2008, chap. 6; Ault, Frame, Hughes, & Strachan, 2008; Fontela, 2000), often using multiple iterations
between modelling and scenario writing. Alcamo describes this as the ‘SAS’ (storyline and simulation) approach (Alcamo,
2008), and describes its use by the IPCC and others. In the energy ﬁeld, examples of work of this kind include (Ault et al.,
2008) and (Fortes, Alvarenga, Seixas, & Rodrigues, 2014), both of whom use energy system models to explore qualitative
scenarios developed through participatory stakeholder processes. Recent work within the UK’s Realising Transition
Pathways project has also linked models to qualitative socio-technical transition scenarios, through quantiﬁcation of
storylines and iteration with various modelling tools (Foxon, 2013).
The UKSHEC II project follows in that tradition, though with a looser coupling of model runs and scenario storylines
than is typically undertaken. In this project, socio-technical scenarios and energy system modelling have been used in
parallel. The model is not forced to reproduce the dynamics of each storyline, and model runs are not to be understood as
quantiﬁed versions of the storylines. Instead, modelling exercises are used to examine and inform elements of the
scenarios, while the scenarios are used to challenge and confront the results suggested by the model. This can be
described as a ‘dialogue’ between the two approaches, rather than a process of using one to provide input into the other,
and with no attempt to arrive at fully quantiﬁed model-based equivalents to the qualitative storylines. The approach has
similarities with approaches based on ‘constructive conﬂict’ in stakeholder dialogue (Cuppen, 2010), which attempt to
confront different stakeholder positions, and thereby promote ‘‘an open exploration and evaluation of competing ideas
3 There is frequently confusion about the purpose and utility of scenario approaches, in part due to the great diversity of applications, which arise from
the fact that the future is profoundly uncertain and that not thinking about or making assumptions about the future is impossible. Confusion also arises
because most models are run different with sets of input parameters, for which the term scenario is typically used. That model-speciﬁc use of the term
scenario is distinct from what are here termed ‘exploratory scenarios’, which develop qualitative, narrative storylines of alternative possible futures.
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and knowledge claims in order to achieve new ideas [and] new insights. . .’’ (Cuppen, 2010, p. 26). Here, the approach
confronts two contrasting ‘‘worldviews’’, one derived from stakeholder opinion, the other a model that operates as a
planner optimising the energy system.
3. Developing socio-technical storylines: methods and approach
The methodological approach used in this study followed a simple sequences of stages, similar to many other socio-
technical scenario development exercises. The method draws on that suggested by Hughes (2013). Note that many of these
stages are overlapping and iterative.
1. Development of theoretical framework for describing transitions.
2. Participatory involvement of expert stakeholders to scope key issues, uncertainties and possible dynamics.
3. ‘Mapping’ the system in terms of actors, regime structure, niches, and landscape developments, and identiﬁcation of key
strategic uncertainties and the branching points that they imply.
4. Writing of storylines, with a structure drawn from insights from transitions research, attempting to highlight key
branching points and their possible implications.
5. ‘‘Dialogue’’ with modelling: use scenarios to identify issues that may not be addressed with models, and use models to
highlight potential weaknesses in the scenarios.
3.1. Step 1: developing a theoretical framework for describing possible transitions
Two complementary and related theoretical frameworks, drawn from the technological transitions literature, are used to
structure the analysis of the key uncertainties and the way in which they may unfold. This framework is brieﬂy described
here.
First, the analysis is situated within the multi-level perspective (MLP) on technological transitions (Geels, 2002), and
draws on the typology of Geels and Schot in order to inform some basic transition ‘types’ (Geels & Schot, 2007). Their
typology is based on two dimensions:
i. The timing of interactions (how mature is the niche when the regime comes under pressure).
ii. Nature of interaction (relationship of the niche innovation to the broader regime, i.e. is the niche innovation disruptive or
re-enforcing to existing regime).
Beliefs about the status of hydrogen with regard to these dimensions differ. Geels and Schot offer four criteria for
determining whether the niche innovation is mature: (a) the presence of a dominant design, (b) presence of powerful actors
in the innovation system supporting the technology, (c) price/performance have improved and there are expectations of
further improvement, and (d) the innovation is used in markets that cumulatively account for more than 5% market share.
Hydrogen technologies meet the ﬁrst three of these criteria, but fall short of the fourth, suggesting that they are not quite at
the level of maturity that might enable a rapid transition. However, there is considerable uncertainty about how fast this
level of maturity might arise. With regard to the nature of hydrogen as disruptive or re-enforcing the existing regimes,
stakeholder opinions differ. Stakeholder interviews and participant observation make clear that while some see hydrogen
as highly disruptive to existing regimes, others promote hydrogen precisely because they see it as ﬁtting well into
established industrial, commercial and consumer patterns of behaviour.
The typology provides a useful way of exploring the types of dynamics that may occur in the course of a transition, and in
particular provides a way of structuring the types of interaction between events and processes occurring at different levels
within the MLP. Each transition is therefore described in terms of its position within this broad typology.
The scenario-development approach used here complements the MLP by focusing attention on developments within co-
evolving ‘subsystems’, drawing on Foxon’s work on co-evolutionary processes in transitions (Foxon, 2011). While Geels and
Schot’s framework sheds light on archetypal dynamics between levels, Foxon’s work provides a useful structure for thinking
through the dynamics within the heterogeneous conﬁgurations of actors, networks and institutions that comprise regimes
and niches. Based on observations of the hydrogen energy innovation system, Foxon’s framework is adapted here, focusing as
he does on user practices, technologies and business strategies, but also explicitly considering governments, and considering
institutional changes as part of the dynamics of each subsystem, rather than existing as a distinct unit of analysis (similar to
Freeman and Louca’s (Freeman & Louca, 2001) treatment of institutional arrangements in each of their co-evolving
subsystems4). This analysis of co-evolving sub-systems is used to shed light on the way in which niche-regime interactions
may occur. These categories correspond well with the key areas of uncertainty highlighted by stakeholders and in the
literature, and described in (McDowall, 2012a).
4 See F&L p. 125. The framework adopted here also follows Freeman and Louca in excluding the natural environment (Foxon’s ‘ecosystems’) from analysis.
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3.2. Steps 2: participatory scoping and issue identiﬁcation
Socio-technical scenarios are a way of examining, extending and confronting themes prevalent in actor perceptions and
discourse about the future of the technology in question. An important step for this project was thus to identify uncertainties
and issues prominent in stakeholder expectations and discourse around possible hydrogen transitions. This was undertaken
through an initial participatory expert workshop, and a series of stakeholder interviews. Insights into stakeholder views
were also gathered through participant observation at a series of UK and international hydrogen stakeholder events between
2010 and 2012. The storylines are thus rooted in ideas and views common among stakeholders engaged in debate and
dialogue around hydrogen energy in the UK.
3.3. Step 3: mapping the system
A key step in the construction of socio-technical scenarios is an analysis of the incumbent socio-technical regime, an
assessment of the various niches and emerging innovation systems that may threaten it, and an overview of the pressures at
the landscape level. For the sake of brevity, this paper does not elaborate these issues in detail, and in any case socio-
technical accounts of these are given by a number of authors (see summary in Table 1).
3.4. Step 4: identiﬁcation of strategic uncertainties and possible branching points
The fourth stage identiﬁed key uncertainties and possible branching points. This step identiﬁed the uncertainties and
transition dynamics prominent in stakeholder discussions, in the literature, and which have been important in historically
analogous transitions. These were structured according to the theoretically-informed framework developed in stage 1.
Uncertainties and potential branching points are highlighted for each of the subsystems identiﬁed as relevant in niche-
regime interactions, and at the landscape level.
This section reports brieﬂy on insights from literature review, a stakeholder workshop and stakeholder interviews. Based
on the adaptation of Foxon’s co-evolutionary approach and the Geels and Schot multi-level framework, critical uncertainties
for three dimensions of niche-regime dynamics are identiﬁed: (i) technologies, (ii) user practices, (iii) business strategies and
government policies (i.e. strategic actions of major actors). In addition to these three, a fourth set of critical uncertainties that
occur within the broader energy system landscape is also examined.
3.4.1. Technologies
Despite signiﬁcant technical progress in recent years (James & Spisak, 2012), including related to reductions in platinum
catalyst requirements and associated costs, doubts remain about the ability of hydrogen technologies to reach benchmark
performance targets at an acceptable cost. Signiﬁcant analysis has gone into examining the implications of these
technological uncertainties, and as a result the uncertainties can be regarded as relatively well characterised. That is to say,
there is a high degree of alignment about which unknowns are known and how important they might be.
Possible branching points:
- Automotive hydrogen fuel cell and storage systems reach performance and costs that are close to incumbent vehicles, such
that foreseeable carbon prices or air quality regulations are expected to render them a truly competitive option in the near
term, with mass production.
- Battery electric vehicle technologies undergo sufﬁcient range enhancements, cost reductions, and recharging speeds to render
them an attractive option for a sizeable portion of consumers. This branch would greatly diminish the prospects for hydrogen.
Table 1
Key features of the niches, regimes and emerging innovation systems of relevance to hydrogen and fuel cells.
Key features References
Hydrogen niches Market niches (forklift trucks, back-up power, telecoms remote
power); Also ‘technological niches’: the California Air Resources
Board’s Zero Emission Vehicle mandate; demonstration




Car-based transportation regime Dominance of car as a mode of personal mobility; close
relationship of car industry and state; ubiquity of road,
refuelling and maintenance infrastructure; well-articulated
rules and user needs, etc.
Marletto (2011) and Van Bree
et al. (2010)
The broader UK energy system regime Dominance of natural gas (for space and water heating) and
electricity (for lighting and consumer appliances). Mature and
well established infrastructures, increasing pressure to
decarbonise energy use by deploying renewable power
technologies and fuel switching to electricity.
Foxon et al. (2010) and
Shackley and Green (2007)
The emerging hydrogen and
fuel cell innovation system
Strong R&D capabilities, entrepreneurial ﬁrms, clear articula-
tion of search and alignment of actors; failure so far to build
signiﬁcant markets.
Bakker, Van Lente, and Meeus
(2011), McDowall and Ekins
(2011), Ruef and Markard
(2010) and Schaeffer (1998)
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3.4.2. User practices
User practices have generally been less well addressed in the literature examining hydrogen energy transitions than have
other aspects (McDowall, 2012a; McDowall, 2012b). Many studies simply ignore this as a source of uncertainty, choosing to
believe that users will continue to relate to vehicles in the same way as they currently do. Four issues with respect to user
behaviour appear particularly important: (i) Consumer willingness to adopt limited-range electric vehicles; (ii) Plugging-in
behaviour, and the resulting implications for electric charging infrastructure; (iii) Consumer willingness to adopt vehicles
when only a portion of fuelling stations provide hydrogen; (iv) Emergence of new models of ownership, and potential for
new technologies to lead to changing user practices, resulting in a co-evolution of user practices and technologies.
These are issues seen as having critical importance within the leadership of automotive companies (KPMG, 2012), but
they have received relatively little attention in the research literature. The issue that has received least attention is that
concerned with the potential of new ownership models, such as car sharing, which has been shown to reduce overall
ownership and change the proﬁle of the ﬂeet (Firnkorn & Mu¨ller, 2012; Martin, Shaheen, & Lidicker, 2010). With different
ownership options, it is possible that existing market segments for vehicles will become more pronounced, as consumers
would no longer need a vehicle that met all conceivable needs. Alternative ownership options for infrastructure have also
been suggested, such as through user co-operatives (Thomas, 2012).
Possible branching points:
- Rejection/acceptance of signiﬁcant numbers of BEVs and other plug-in vehicles.
- Rejection/acceptance of fuel cell vehicles following market introduction.
- Differentiation of vehicle demands as a result of market changes and social innovation in ownership models.
3.4.3. Business strategies and government policies
In addition to consumers, whose practices were addressed above, four groups of actors will be critical in determining how
and whether a transition to a hydrogen energy system takes place:
1. Governments. Both national and local governments play a key role as regulators, and in shaping the market environment
for hydrogen technologies through supportive policies for low carbon transport.
2. Incumbent automotive ﬁrms. These ﬁrms are the technology leaders, but all of them maintain a portfolio of low-carbon
vehicle options and none are likely to commit wholly to any one technology choice.
3. Incumbent fuel providers (owners and operators of existing petrol stations). Even more than automotive ﬁrms, fuel
companies investing in infrastructure take on very signiﬁcant ﬁrst mover risks.
4. Emerging hydrogen and fuel cell ﬁrms. These are the actors at the core of the advocacy coalition lobbying for hydrogen.
Possible branching points include:
- Widespread local government adoption of zero emission zone policies
- The success of failure of initiatives to commercialise hydrogen vehicles, potentially backed by national governments
concerned to protect and promote their automakers’ technology. In particular, the emerging ‘H2Mobility’ programmes in
Germany and the UK and equivalent exercises elsewhere.
3.4.4. Uncertainties in related regimes and at the landscape level: what is happening within the wider energy system?
How might the wider energy system evolve, and how would this affect the prospects for hydrogen? Most studies
examining possible transition pathways for hydrogen focus on the transport sector and the potential adoption of hydrogen
in vehicle ﬂeets. However, there has been increasing interest in the ways in which hydrogen energy systems may play
broader roles in sustainable energy systems, facilitating the deployment of low carbon primary energy sources by enabling
long-term, inter-seasonal storage of energy, and by mediating between power, heat and transport markets. In particular,
there is growing interest in the potential of ‘‘power-to-gas’’ projects, in which hydrogen is produced when surplus
renewable electricity would otherwise be curtailed, and is then injected into gas networks, decarbonising gas
while providing a ﬂexible demand service to the power system. In the UK, where distributed gas dominates domestic
heating, there is a question as to whether the gas network will need to be decarbonised or decommissioned in order to meet
carbon targets.
Key uncertainties include the possible evolution of markets for the provision of heating in a low-carbon future; the
availability and cost of key resources; and the ability of energy systems to cope with increasing levels of intermittent
generation.
Possible branching points of relevance to hydrogen include:
- Decision (or not) to begin decommissioning the natural gas distribution system in the 2020s, with heating increasingly
provided by electricity instead of gas.
- Failure to achieve sufﬁcient electricity grid management through ‘smart’ systems and efﬁciency measures.
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3.5. Write scenario storylines
This step involves combining scenario elements and uncertainties as described in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 into narratives that
illustrate the implications of key uncertainties and capture the major issues discussed by stakeholders.
3.6. Step 5: the dialogue between scenarios and modelling
The ﬁnal stage is to test elements of the scenario storylines with a quantitative modelling framework, and use the
scenario storylines to interrogate the model, by bringing them into a dialogue of ‘creative conﬂict’ (Cuppen, 2010). This
project used a single model, the UK MARKAL model (Kannan, Strachan, Balta-Ozkan, & Pye, 2007). MARKAL is a
technologically detailed optimisation model that uses linear programming to ﬁnd the least cost energy system from a
database of energy technologies to meet an exogenously speciﬁed set of energy service demands (Fishbone & Abilock, 1981;
Loulou, Goldstein, & Noble, 2004). MARKAL models have been widely used to examine possible hydrogen transitions in the
UK and elsewhere (Endo, 2007; Gu¨l et al., 2009; Krzyzanowski et al., 2008; Strachan et al., 2009; Tseng, Lee, & Friley, 2005;
Yeh et al., 2008).
Much of the modelling work discussed here is published in fuller form elsewhere (Dodds & McDowall, 2013; Dodds &
McDowall, 2014). Further description of the basic model details are therefore not provided here, and this paper focuses
instead on the way in which the modelling and scenario work was used in complementary ways. The dialogue between the
scenario and modelling involved two elements.
First, the scenario storylines were used to ‘ask questions of the model’, by examining where the storyline differed from the
explicit or implicit assumptions embedded in the model structure and data. This process revealed ways in which the model
was unable to reﬂect either options or dynamics thought likely to be important in stakeholder discourse. This process
revealed assumptions that would otherwise have remained implicit and opaque within the model. Where possible, the
model was adapted to enable exploration of potential transition options that had previously been missing (such as
differentiation of vehicle markets). Resulting model runs were conducted to examine the implications of introducing these
different possibilities, and testing their techno-economic characteristics.
Second, the model was used to question and confront the scenarios, by showing where certain scenario elements
may involve unrealistic energy market dynamics, such as the penetration of technologies that appear to be far from
cost-effective, or where scenarios appear to overstate the importance of elements whose techno-economic signiﬁcance
appears less when examined in a formal quantitative framework. Where scenario storylines were found to involve
elements that appeared unrealistic when analysed with the model, these were re-examined and if necessary revised
(see Fig. 1).
4. Hydrogen transition scenarios and modelling for the UK
4.1. Background common to all scenarios
There are common features of all scenarios, which deﬁne the broader ‘state of the world’ in which these futures unfold. In
this state of the world, there is (a) continued global emphasis on achieving decarbonisation; (b) continued global geopolitical
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Fig. 1. Diagram showing development of scenarios and interaction with modelling.
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stability; (c) continued long-run economic growth, periodic recessions notwithstanding. These background conditions
provide part of the landscape conditions common to each scenario.
4.2. Scenario summaries
Summaries of all scenarios are presented in Table 2.
Scenario 1. ‘‘Car of the future’’ – 2010–2050
Headline summary
This scenario is a relatively straightforward transformation of the existing transport vehicle regime, in response to
continued and increasing pressure from governments to reduce transport sector GHG and air pollution emissions. In this
scenario, the behavioural and structural dynamics of the transport sector remain intact, with hydrogen FCVs replacing the
ICE as the dominant form of personal transport. This scenario is similar to many found within the broader hydrogen futures
literature, which tends to envisage relatively unproblematic shifts towards use of hydrogen as a direct replacement for
petroleum in fuelling road vehicles.
Key branching points: Failure of battery electric vehicles to attract signiﬁcant customers; tepid performance of PHEVS
because of challenges in charging and consumer behaviour shifts. Alignment among automotive ﬁrms and governments
around hydrogen as the technology for decarbonisation of the transport sector, along with good progress in technology
performance and cost reduction.
How key areas of uncertainty play out in the scenario:
 Technological uncertainties. Research and development activities in hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles continue to yield
strong progress in driving down costs and improving performance.
 Behavioural uncertainties. Consumers prove resistant to battery electric vehicles, which only penetrate in niches and in
response to generous but expensive government incentives. PHEVs are more popular, with increasing uptake in the
medium term, but limited plug-in opportunities and high battery costs continue to act as a barrier to dominance.
Table 2
Summaries of the scenarios.
Car of the future Horses for courses Hybrid fuels
Transition type Transformation Reconﬁguration De-alignment/re-alignment
Key branching
points
Weak uptake of BEVs and PHEVS
Alignment among automotive ﬁrms
and governments around H2.
Good progress in technology
Rapid growth of car-clubs; ownership
of BEVs as second-cars; new business
and ownership models enable FCVs to
enter market in some market segments.
Decarbonisation of gas becomes
increasingly prominent, with rise of
‘power-to-gas’.
Technology R&D activities in H2 and FCVs continue
to yield strong progress in driving down
costs and improving performance.
H2 technologies show steady develop-
ment, as do other low carbon vehicle
technologies
H2 technologies show steady develop-
ment, as do other low carbon vehicle
technologies.
Behaviour Private car remains dominant. Consu-
mers are resistant to BEVs, which only
penetrate in niches. PHEVs are more
popular, but limited plug-in opportu-
nities and high battery costs prevent
dominance.
Consumer behaviour evolves with the
introduction of new technologies, and
the emergence of social innovations in
car ownership, particularly car clubs.
Consumers maintain similar charac-
teristics as today. There is a reluctance
to embrace new vehicle technologies






Automotive ﬁrms turn to FCVs as the
long-term goal for their vehicle port-
folios. Governments of countries with
large automotive sectors attempt to
initiate a transition. Major launches of
vehicles are accompanied by a big
infrastructure investment programme.
Uptake of BEVs as second cars; growth
of car clubs using FCVs, which act as a
key niche for the establishment of
hydrogen infrastructure. Urban emis-
sions standards become important in
converting taxis to hydrogen.
There is a system failure: despite
evidence that FCVs would work well,
there is a failure to overcome the
barriers to it. Some efforts are made,
but these are not strong enough in the
near term. H2 is developed elsewhere in
the energy system, and introduced by
infrastructure and utility companies to
support power and heat system, ulti-
mately facilitating adoption in the
transport sector.
Energy system Early power sector decarbonisation;
electriﬁcation of much of heat demand;
integration of renewables is facilitated
through smart grid and demand-side
management. Concerns over bioenergy
sustainability limit the contribution of
biofuels.
Similar to car of the future scenario. Signiﬁcant deployments of renewables
create a looming ‘balancing crisis’, with
signiﬁcant costs associated. In
response, the gas industry actively
promotes decarbonisation of gas, ex-
ploring biogas and hydrogen injection.
Implications for
hydrogen
Rather rapid adoption of hydrogen
FCVs, beginning in the mid-2020s.
Slower transition to H2 in transport,
beginning in earnest from the mid-
2030s.
H2 becomes important niche in heat
and power. Longer term sees H2 wide-
spread in transport (in 2040s) and
throughout energy system.
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 Business strategies and government policy in the transport regime. Automotive ﬁrms increasingly see fuel cell vehicles
as the long-term goal for their vehicle portfolios. Governments of countries with large automotive and fuel cell sectors
provide support for attempts to initiate a transition, seeing potential ﬁrst-mover advantages – or the slightly different ﬁrst
mover defence – in which governments use stringent air quality legislation to ‘lock-out’ cheaper but less technologically
advanced imports from emerging economies. The infrastructure strategy is a ‘build it and they will come’ approach, in
which major launches of vehicles are accompanied by a big infrastructure investment programme.
 Energy system dynamics. This scenario envisages an energy system decarbonisation trajectory similar to that illustrated
in the UK Carbon Plan: early power sector decarbonisation is followed by electriﬁcation of much of heat demand, and is
facilitated through smart grid-enabled demand-side management and conservation measures. However, political
uncertainty continues to surround bioenergy, inhibiting both policy and investments in capacity for biofuels production.
Scenario narrative
This scenario sees the major automotive ﬁrms increasingly backing hydrogen and fuel cells from 2015 onwards, in the
face of tepid consumer responses to battery electric vehicles, political battles over the sustainability of biofuels, and
intensifying decarbonisation and low-emission vehicles policy in key market regions (Japan, Germany, and California).
Leadership in hydrogen FCVs is increasingly seen as a key route to long-term dominance of automotive markets. Plug-in
hybrids are an important transition technology, with range extending engines being replaced with fuel cells. Battery electric
vehicles remain a niche, popular as a second car in wealthier regions, but never replacing more than a portion of vehicle
kilometres. As markets for hydrogen vehicles become established during the early 2020s in Germany, Japan and the US,
prices for such vehicles fall. In the face of competition from automotive producers in emerging economies, the Japanese,
European and American automotive giants increasingly lobby for tighter emissions standards to ensure that only ﬁrms with
advanced powertrain technology can compete.
Following success of initial markets elsewhere, the UK government facilitates the development of initial infrastructure,
introducing strong tax incentives for FCV purchases, infrastructure investments, and hydrogen fuel. Regional governments
concerned to protect their automotive sectors (e.g. Midlands) provide support for some early infrastructure, as do regions
(e.g. London) with air quality problems.
Buses provide an important early market in the UK, with hydrogen buses increasingly on the roads in the largest UK cities
by 2020–2025 on a commercial basis rather than as demonstrations. Hydrogen FCV market entry into car markets begins in
earnest from about 2025, following introduction among early adopters in 2016. Hydrogen is produced largely from fossil
fuels, with carbon capture and storage.
4.2.1. Insights from modelling in UK MARKAL
As a perfect-foresight5 optimisation model, UK MARKAL represents a world with low barriers to transition, perhaps
implicitly assuming high alignment among stakeholder deploying infrastructure and vehicles together. The model decision-
structure is thus relatively close to the dynamics of the storyline, in which alignment is high and barriers to technology
adoption are minimised through strategic cooperation of dominant actors.
Cost assumptions for hydrogen vehicles used in the modelling are based on cost forecasts that assume global hydrogen
technology success (as indeed is common in energy system model representation of new technologies including
hydrogen, except those applying endogenous technology learning; Anandarajah et al., 2013). Even so, the model prefers to
deploy hydrogen only from 2035 onwards, rather later than the 2025 described in the narrative. The optimisation
procedure means that the least-cost carbon abatement opportunities are pursued, and options are not selected until they
form part of that least-cost low-carbon solution. Even if hydrogen vehicles are relatively attractive, they will only enter
the market where there are no cheaper uses for limited supplies of low-carbon energy. The model suggests that in earlier
periods low-carbon primary energy is better used to displace coal-ﬁred power generation, and the unabated use of gas in
heating, while the adoption of more-efﬁcient hybrid electric vehicles reduce the competitive edge of hydrogen vehicles.
The model does not take into account, however, the market preparation work and niche markets required to enable rapid
uptake in 2040 and beyond. In the real world, the market entry date in the narrative of 2025 might be necessary to achieve
sufﬁcient initial sales and infrastructure build-up to enable mass deployment in the 2030s as depicted in the modelling
results.
Scenario 2. ‘‘Horses for courses’’ 2010–2050
Headline summary
This scenario is a reconﬁguration. The new regime grows out of the old regime, picking up lots of innovations, with
substantial changes to the regime’s basic architecture. This scenario argues that structural changes and social innovation,
alongside technological substitution, are a likely response to the pressures of decarbonisation and the emergence of new
technologies.
5 ‘‘Perfect foresight’’ in this context, means that the model optimises across all time periods simultaneously. That is, the optimisation algorithm ‘knows’
all the input data (future costs, future demands, etc.), and optimises the entire time period (2010–2050) with that knowledge.
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Key branching point: Breakdown of current paradigm of vehicle ownership and operation, rapid growth of car-clubs and
ownership of BEVs as second-cars, with disruptive companies entering the automotive sector.
How key areas of uncertainty play out in the scenario:
 Technological uncertainties. Hydrogen technologies do not progress more rapidly than competing low-carbon vehicle
technologies, but continue to show strong development in terms of performance, durability and cost.
 Behavioural Uncertainties. Consumer behaviour evolves with the introduction of new technologies, and the emergence of
social innovations in car ownership, particularly car clubs.
 Business strategies and government policy in the transport regime. Uptake of battery electric vehicles as second cars;
growth of car clubs using FCVs, although they remain a small overall portion of the market in early years, these clubs act as
a key niche for the establishment of hydrogen infrastructure. Urban emissions standards are important in converting taxis
to hydrogen.
 Energy system. Similar to car of the future scenario.
In this scenario, globally heterogeneous approaches emerge to low carbon vehicle policies, with some countries placing
more emphasis on electric vehicles, biofuels or hydrogen, in response to national industrial strengths, differing policy
approaches to fostering innovation, and different policy priorities. Automotive ﬁrms continue to back diverse portfolios and
continue to develop EV, PHEV and FCV technologies. Car markets become increasingly complex, with different fuels and
drivetrains common, unlike the current dominance of internal combustion engines with either petrol or diesel.
Technological advancements are forthcoming in all powertrain technologies, with no powertrain achieving a breakthrough
that enables it to dominate all parts of the car market.
Social innovation is a key feature of this scenario: car clubs and new ownership models enable more efﬁcient use of cars as
capital goods. That is, changes in normative and cognitive rules around ‘ownership’. This facilitates a growing differentiation
of vehicle markets, with consumers either owning or accessing different vehicle types for different purposes. Uptake of
electric vehicles is strong in this scenario, with hydrogen FCVs and diesel PHEVs competing in the market for larger vehicles.
Policy emphasis is on emissions reduction rather than supporting the development of a particular industrial choice, implying
a shift away from technology-speciﬁc support mechanisms such as the RTFO and grants for plug-in vehicles. Hydrogen
emerges more strongly only in the longer term (i.e. from 2035).
This scenario highlights an emerging debate in the recent literature around the idea of a portfolio of complementary
options across the transportation ﬂeet. The concept has attracted both advocates (McKinsey, 2010) and critics (Bakker & Van
der Vooren, 2011).
4.2.2. Insights from modelling in UK MARKAL
Many aspects of this scenario are not suitable for analysis within the MARKAL modelling paradigm. Indeed, this exercise
highlighted the limits of an energy system model framework for understanding transport technology choice in scenarios in
which social innovation and ﬂexible consumer preferences play a prominent role. The process reveals the implicit and
conservative assumptions in such models concerning market structure and user behaviour. Though increasingly prominent
in stakeholder opinion (see, e.g. KPMG, 2012), scenarios in which new business models, social innovation and new
powertrain types disrupt established patterns of vehicle ownership have been poorly integrated into the energy system
modelling frameworks most prominent in major strategic energy policy decisions.
Models examining hydrogen energy transitions have tended to build-in the assumption that a single technology will
dominate road transport vehicle demand. Bottom-up energy system optimisation models, including the UK MARKAL model
used in this analysis, follow this approach, with vehicle technologies competing to fulﬁl consumer demand for car-based
transport. This scenario prompted a revision of the model to examine whether a differentiation of vehicle demands, such that
large and small vehicle technologies compete to fulﬁl distinct demands, makes a different to technology choice in the model.
The assumptions behind the modelling, as well as results, are reported in detail in (Ekins, Anandarajah, McDowall, & Usher,
2011) and (Dodds & McDowall, 2014). Contrary to the scenario storyline, the modelling suggests that technology choice is
similar across vehicle classes in most model runs. The modelling suggests relatively minor differences in adoption timing and
rates within different market segments, but in general model outcomes did not vary substantially between the model version
in which vehicles markets are assumed to be homogenous vs. that in which technologies compete in semi-distinct market
segments (such as smaller cars vs. larger cars). Here, model and storyline disagree. While the linear optimisation formulationof
the model does not envisage differentiated vehicle markets resulting in greater heterogeneity of vehicle technology, the
weaknesses of the model representation of consumer behaviour suggest that the storyline remains a valid possibility.
Scenario 3. ‘‘Hybrid fuels’’
Headline summary
The storyline explores a future in which hydrogen plays a limited role in transportation to 2050, but is involved in a de-
alignment/re-alignment within the heat and power regime, leading to a shift in the energy system context for decarbonising
transport fuels. This de-alignment/re-alignment is caused by a rapid loss of conﬁdence in the early 2020s in the direction of
development in power and heat regimes, as a result of disappointing uptake of efﬁciency measures, slower than anticipated
power grid upgrades, and resulting cost escalation associated with the penetration of high levels of intermittent renewables.
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Key branching point: This scenario explores the possibility that commitment to existing gas infrastructure results in a
redirection of decarbonisation efforts away from the focus on electriﬁcation in the reference case, to include decarbonisation
of gas. This has a wider effect on the availability of hydrogen, and ultimately its use in transport. A second key branching
point is technology choice in CCS, with pre-combustion gasiﬁcation emerging as the key CCS technology. This enables the
ﬂexible production of hydrogen and electricity.
How key areas of uncertainty play out in the scenario:
 Technological uncertainties. Hydrogen technologies do not progress more rapidly than competing low-carbon vehicle
technologies. Hydrogen remains conﬁned to niches, some of which gradually grow, but which do not represent an
important role within the energy system.
 Behavioural uncertainties. Consumers maintain similar characteristics as today. There is a general reluctance to embrace
new vehicle technologies unless they represent signiﬁcant personal beneﬁts. Electric vehicles make progress as second
cars, and hybrids and eventually PHEVs are the incremental route to transport decarbonisation.
 Business strategies and government policy in the transport regime. There is a system failure: despite evidence that a
hydrogen system would probably work well, there is a failure to overcome the barriers to it. Some efforts are made, but
these are insufﬁciently strong in the near term.
 Energy system dynamics. Two major developments distinguish energy system developments in this scenario. First,
signiﬁcant deployments of renewables and nuclear during the 2010s and early 2020s create a looming ‘balancing crisis’,
with signiﬁcant costs associated with natural gas balancing plant, and particularly associated with the very signiﬁcant
seasonal variations in energy demand, resulting in very low capacity factors for some dispatchable plant. Second, the gas
industry is increasingly active in promoting decarbonisation of the gas grid, exploring biogas and hydrogen injection.
Scenario narrative
In many countries, gas companies begin strategic activities to resist the ‘all-electric’ low carbon future presented in many
long-term decarbonisation scenarios: lobbying emphasises the inter-seasonal and strategic storage beneﬁts of gas,
investments in biogas, hydrogen and CHP. Globally, there is growing interest in hydrogen in gas grids, with increasing R&D
dedicated to end use applications and infrastructure issues. This was led by Germany and the Netherlands. Hydrogen plays a
role in transport only in the long-term. In the 2020–2030 timeframe, progress with hydrogen fuel cell vehicles is still too
slow to justify major infrastructure investments. Some vehicle niches do exist: buses, various military applications, and
niches in which zero emissions and fast refuelling are required.
Strong development of renewables takes place in the UK, in particular the offshore wind energy grid. However, uptake of
domestic efﬁciency measures is disappointing, and the seasonal variation in heating demand exceeds the capacity of the low-
carbon power network. There is some interest in storage projects, various models of demand-side management and smart grid
technology are attempted, and there is investment in biogas. The UK government closely watches attempts to introduce
hydrogen vehicles elsewhere, but decides not to intervene in markets to promote FCVs above other ultra-low emission
vehicles. Instead, biofuels, PHEVs and EVs are seen as sufﬁcient, alongside renewed investments in commuter rail and other
alternatives to cars. In the long-term, roles for hydrogen throughout the energy system enable further decarbonisation of
transport, but hydrogen vehicles do not enter the transport market until 2035, and are not widespread until the 2040s.
4.2.3. Insights from modelling in UK MARKAL
Previous work with UK MARKAL had assumed that the natural gas grid would start being retired from 2020 onwards. In
line with the ‘hybrid fuels’ scenario, Dodds and McDowall (2013) revisited the representation of gas grids in UK MARKAL, and
tested the importance of current investment programmes and decarbonisation options for the future of the grid. This work
provides at least some support for the notion in this scenario that the gas grid may provide a route for hydrogen to become
established as a part of the energy system, through injection of hydrogen into gas distribution networks, or wholesale
conversion of some (or ultimately all) of the network.
In this case, the modelling informed a change in the scenario storyline. A previous version of the storyline emphasised the
UK Government decision to require the replacement of all iron gas distribution pipes with safer polyethylene pipes by 2030
(the Iron Mains Replacement Programme). However, the modelling suggested that, despite the signiﬁcant sunk investments
this programme represents, it was not itself a decisive development that represents a branching point. This is because
despite the large scale of the investments, they are dwarfed by both the value of the existing assets, and by the value of
energy ﬂowing through the network (and the costs associated with carbon emissions under a strict decarbonisation target).
Thus the signiﬁcance of the iron mains replacement programme, which an intuitive approach had suggested might be
important, appears less decisive when examined in a formal quantitative framework.
5. Discussion and conclusions
5.1. Key insights for hydrogen transitions:
The analysis makes clear that there are many possible routes by which hydrogen may play a role in a low-carbon UK
energy system. In particular, the scenarios highlight three key important key uncertainties and knowledge gaps for hydrogen
transitions:
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- The ‘car of the future’ scenario posits a case in which a high degree of alignment and collaboration between various
industry sectors and government takes place. This is effectively the implicit assumption within many system models, since
the co-ordination failures that would prevent this from occurring are not represented in most model frameworks. Yet the
plausibility of this scenario must be confronted by the limited and partial nature of historical precedents for this kind of
transition (with none a perfect analogy). The uncertainties associated with the transition governance capacity of key actors
are enormous.
- Conventional analytic techniques and scenarios may have underestimated the potential importance of innovation in car
ownership models, and more broadly in social innovation with respect to transport needs. It seems plausible that these
could inﬂuence adoption and patterns of use of both conventional and alternative vehicle types, though understanding
(and particularly modelling) how this might work in practice is highly uncertain.
- Roles for hydrogen outside transport may be valuable in themselves as renewables gain market share, and this could
facilitate infrastructure transitions: assumptions about the dynamics of the rest of the energy system are highly relevant
for the future of hydrogen in transport, yet are often excluded from hydrogen transition analysis in order to focus on more
analytically tractable issues. In particular, the potential for hydrogen to play a role in decarbonising gas networks appears
promising in both the storyline and the modelling.
5.2. Reﬂections on method
The work reported in this paper has illustrated the value of using both narrative storylines informed by participatory
scenario approaches and formal quantitative models in exploring possible long-term transitions. The qualitative storyline
scenarios resulted in both tests of model structure that showed sensitivity to tacit assumptions, and also revisions to model
structure that demonstrated the importance of issues that have been of interest to stakeholders but neglected in the
literature modelling possible transitions. At the same time, the quantitative modelling revealed areas in which scenarios
placed too much emphasis on issues that appear to be techno-economically less important.
Previous work with socio-technical scenario approaches (with notable exceptions, such as the UK’s Transition Pathways
project) has arguably tended to neglect the quantitative dimensions, such as the rates of transition that are plausible, or the
relative techno-economic signiﬁcance of different investments and scenario elements. At the same time, analysis of
hydrogen with energy system models has tended to focus on a relatively narrow range of uncertainties and possibilities, and
model structures have tended to obscure issues around implications of behavioural change or systemic energy system
change.
The point is that thinking about radically alternative futures is necessarily an exercise that can only be informed in a
limited way by changing the parameters of a given model. While it has been useful to use scenarios as structures for
developing a set of input parameters to modelling exercises, it is perhaps unfortunate that fewer studies use qualitative
scenarios informed by stakeholder participation to highlight different possible structural issues in the models that are
applied to a given problem.
In conclusion, bringing narrative socio-technical storylines into ‘dialogue’ with quantitative energy systems modelling
can yield insights that could be missed if these tools are used independently. This analysis has focused attention on key
branching points and uncertainties analysed within the UKSHEC II project. However, it does not represent a comprehensive
analysis of conceivable transition pathways, and should not be seen as attempting to do so.
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